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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis investigates the evolution of the FRG’s multilateral policy of 
détente between 1975 and 1985. During this decade Cold War relations went 
through major crises and changes which affected directly political balances in 
Europe. This work investigates how Bonn’s federal government – and the 
Auswärtiges Amt in particular – rethought its détente strategy after the 
conclusion of the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in Helsinki in order to adapt it to changing international conditions. It 
highlights the increasing importance of the CSCE process within the West 
German broader international strategy towards the Western allies and the 
Eastern partners.  
The FRG’s CSCE policy during the first half of the Seventies has commonly 
been described as a completion or multilateral guarantee of Bonn’s bilateral 
Eastern policy (Ostpolitik). Its development after the 1975 signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act has been largely overlooked by historical research. This 
thesis aims at offering a new interpretation of its later evolution. It argues that 
the CSCE process affirmed itself after 1975 as a FRG’s priority foreign political 
domain. Undoubtedly, Bonn’s efforts to rescue multilateral détente in the late 
Seventies-early Eighties were directed to shelter the prosecution of its bilateral 
cooperation with the East from escalating Cold War tensions. However, 
pursuing a proactive CSCE policy became increasingly important per se. 
Indeed, the series of conferences on security and cooperation in Europe offered 
the adequate diplomatic framework wherein Bonn could chase its national 
interests and foreign political ambitions, in years in which the FRG was called 
to greater international responsibilities and was trying to emerge as a more 
influent political actor on the global stage. 
Based on a foreign policy-centred approach, this thesis is the result of the 
careful investigation of a wide range of primary sources from the Political 
Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, as well as of newspapers articles 
from the Seventies and Eighties. The work offers a contribution to the study of 
West German foreign policy and Cold War history during the decade which 
paved the way to the important transformations of the late Eighties.
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“It is therefore once again a duty of responsible observers at this moment in history to 
focus their minds on the Germans. What are they, really (eternal question)? 
Luigi Barzini, The Europeans, 1983 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1983 Italian journalist Luigi Barzini observed: “The future of 
Europe appears largely to depend today once again, for good or evil, 
whether we like it or not, as it did for many centuries, on the future of 
Germany. It is still, as Madame de Staël wrote, ‘le cœure de l’Europe’.1 [...] 
It is therefore once again a duty of responsible observers at this 
moment in history to focus their minds on the Germans. What are they, 
really (eternal question)? What do they fancy they are? Where are they 
going, wittingly or unwittingly? Where do they think they are going?”.2 
As Barzini’s interrogatives suggest, a German question continued to 
exist and affect European affairs in the early Eighties. What historians 
of the Cold War traditionally refer to by using the formula “German 
question”, represented the cornerstone of the postwar settlement of 
Europe. It was, first, about the postwar division of the German nation 
and the management of peace in Europe; second, about the creation of 
two separate German states – the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) – belonging to different 
and competing systems in the centre of Europe, where the dividing line 
                                                          
1 L. Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 69. 
2 Ibid., p. 107. 
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between the opposite Cold War blocs run.3 As a tight bipolar system 
came into being in world affairs, Germany’s division became strictly 
dependent on East-West dynamics: i.e. any transformation of the Cold 
War status quo in Europe implied a redefinition of the German question 
and vice versa. A number of other aspects contributed, moreover, to 
shape the German question: constraints to the German power, material 
and psychological limits to the sovereignty of both German states, 
security needs, questions of uncertain borders, enduring memories of 
the recent past and enemy images evoking deep-seated fears 
(Feindbilder).4 
For the Federal Republic of Germany dealing with the German 
question meant foremost, in the course of the Cold War decades, 
coping with its peculiarity within the Western front. This implied, in 
the specific, finding a way of living in direct contact with the 
cumbersome presence of occupying forces, the Iron Curtain and the 
Berlin Wall; handling the peculiar needs and worries deriving from its 
geopolitical position in the middle of the continent (Mittellage) and on 
the East-West border (Randlage); striking a balance between the 
presumption of being the only legitimate representative of a 
(temporary) divided nation and the need of finding concrete ways of 
living together with the other German state; finding a solution to the 
dilemma of whether giving up maintaining contacts with the Germans 
living in the East or pursuing dialogue with the authorities of a not 
recognised country, the GDR,5 and of the enemy bloc; dealing with the 
                                                          
3 For a definition of the Cold War German question both as “Central European question” 
and “central European question”, see: T. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. Germany and the 
Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 1-13. 
4 For an insightful analysis of the historical meaning, dimensions and implications of the 
German question, see: E. Collotti, Dalle due Germanie alla Germania unita (Torino: Giulio 
Einaudi Editore, 1992); I. Geiss, Die deutsche Frage 1806-1990 (Mannheim, et al.: B.I.-
Taschenbuchverlag, 1992); W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin. The Cold War Struggle over 
Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); D. Verheyen, The German question. A 
Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1991). 
5 The recognition of the GDR as international sovereign state on the same level as the 
FRG was prohibited by West German postwar constitution, the Basic Law. 
3 
 
burdens and the legacies of the German power’s past aggressiveness. 
Last but not least, it meant learning to develop a new foreign political 
identity and finding a more certain collocation in international politics.  
 
Object and arguments of the thesis 
This thesis investigates the evolution of the West German 
multilateral policy of détente (Entspannungspolitik) – as it was 
implemented within the framework of the Conferences on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 1975 and 1985 – by 
contextualizing its pursuit in the broader changing international 
scenario. Indeed, during this decade Cold War relations went through 
major crises and transformations which affected directly the political 
balances in the European continent. With regard to East-West relations, 
the new era of bipolar dialogue inaugurated at the end of the Sixties 
reached its peak in 1975, as thirty-five heads of state and government 
from Europe, the U.S. and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the final 
accords from the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. During the first half of the Seventies relations between the two 
Cold War blocs had profited from the convergence between the 
different projects of superpower détente and European détente.6 As the 
relationship between Washington and Moscow deteriorated 
dramatically after 1975, Western Europeans were confronted with the 
question of how to continue East-West dialogue in a context of 
renewed Cold War confrontation (i.e. the so-called “Second Cold 
War”). Defending the achievements of détente was particularly 
                                                          
6 For an analysis of the different meaning of European détente and superpower détente and 
of their interaction, see: J. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975” in The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 198-218; I. M. Wall, “The United 
States and two Ostpolitiks: de Gaulle and Brandt”, in The making of Détente. Eastern and 
Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-1975, eds. W. Loth and G.H. Soutou (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 133-150; G.M. Mattox, “The United States Tests 
Détente”, in The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany and the United States in the Shaping of 
the New Europe, eds. H. Haftendorn, G.H. Soutou, S.F. Szabo, S.F. Wells Jr. (Washington 
D.S.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), pp. 261-285. 
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important to the FRG: given its special geopolitical position, it was the 
European country which benefited the most from improved relations 
with its Eastern neighbours and suffered the most under the 
consequences of a new international confrontational course. 
The general assumption of this thesis is that the years under study 
represented a fundamental formative period for West German foreign 
policy. The evolution of the West German multilateral policy of détente 
is studied as an important part of a broader process of definition and 
implementation of a more assertive foreign policy which could better 
fit the FRG’s undisputed economic strength without otherwise fuelling 
perennial fears of rising German power. During the decade of the 
Seventies, indeed, the West German economic stability against a 
background of diffuse crisis enhanced the country’s relative weight 
within an international system growingly dominated by economic 
issues and interdependence.7 Moreover, the successes of the new policy 
of dialogue with the East (Ostpolitik) implemented by the social-liberal 
coalition government of charismatic and popular Chancellor Willy 
Brandt encouraged the West German ambition to take more effective 
foreign political initiatives. Boosted by these developments, foreign 
policy returned to be a federal government’s top priority, after 
domestic politics had been in the foreground for years.8 As it has 
traditionally been stressed, the “economic giant” aimed at overcoming 
its position of a “political dwarf” on the international stage. Truly, in 
the course of the Seventies West German diplomacy went through an 
important learning process as the FRG was called upon to take greater 
international responsibilities. 
The present work argues, first, that the CSCE framework 
represented – for a series of reasons which will be analysed in the 
course of this dissertation – the foreign political domain where this 
evolution of Bonn’s international action was more evident, 
                                                          
7 W. Jäger, W. Link, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: 1987, DVA), p. 276. 
8 R. Zundel, “Mitspieler oder Spielmacher? Bonns neue Rolle in der Außenpolitik“, in Die 
Zeit, Nr. 30/1975, 18.07.1975. 
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notwithstanding some hindrances and setbacks; second, that the West 
German federal government – especially the Foreign Office 
(Auswärtiges Amt) – invested a great deal of efforts into the CSCE 
process, as it offered an adequate field to implement a proactive and 
comprehensive détente policy which allowed fostering the country’s 
own vital interests. The mechanism of follow-up conferences set out in 
the Helsinki Final Agreement provided a permanent multilateral 
diplomatic forum where Bonn could best chase its national and 
international interests and foreign political ambitions, in years in which 
the FRG was expected to shoulder greater international responsibilities 
and was trying to emerge as a more influential political actor on the 
global stage.  
This research focuses in particular on the diplomatic strategy 
deployed by Bonn’s Foreign Office to chase, reinforce and safeguard 
the multilateral policy of dialogue with the East within the framework 
of the CSCE follow-up meetings. It analyses how the Auswärtiges Amt 
rethought and revised its détente strategy after the 1975 conclusion of 
the first CSCE in Helsinki in order to adapt it to changing international 
conditions. This dissertation advances the argument that the FRG’s 
multilateral détente policy underwent a major qualitative change 
during the years between 1975 and 1985, by taking increasingly the 
shape of a realistic, flexible and countercyclical policy. The major episodes 
of East-West crises of the decade – i.e. the renewed superpower nuclear 
competition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exacerbation of 
the Polish crisis – challenged seriously the prosecution of the process of 
détente; however, they turned into important occasions of foreign 
political refection and stimulated the transformation of the West 
German multilateral détente strategy. The analysis of this evolution 
shows, moreover, the increasing importance the CSCE process gained 
within the FRG’s overall spectrum of international action. The pursuit 
of multilateral détente affirmed itself, in the course of the years 1975-
1985, as a well-established issue in the West German political agenda: it 
became largely accepted by those domestic political forces which had 
originally firmly opposed it and survived nearly unchanged the major 
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political turn of the early Eighties, i.e. the return to power of the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU). 
The present work confirms the existence of a strict intertwining 
between Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policy and multilateral détente policy. 
They were undoubtedly linked by a relationship of functional 
interdependence. As it emerges with evidence from the analysis of this 
dissertation, the continuation of the CSCE process contributed 
importantly to safeguarding at the multilateral level both the 
achievements and the working conditions of Bonn’s bilateral dialogue 
with East Berlin and the other Eastern capitals. However, the view 
according to which the West German CSCE policy would represent a 
mere multilateral completion of Ostpolitik is challenged: indeed, its 
pursuit gained growing value per se, as well, within the Auswärtiges 
Amt’s comprehensive international strategy.  
 
Defining the time period: years of crises, years of changes 
The first aim of this dissertation is to contextualize the evolution of 
the West German policy of multilateral détente in the broader 
transforming Cold War scenario of the late Seventies-early Eighties. As 
the FRG’s foreign political decisions were profoundly affected by 
international circumstances, it is useful to review briefly the main 
developments marking the decade under study. 
The years between the mid-Seventies and the mid-Eighties were 
marked by serious crises, several returns and a number of major 
transformations. After the postwar economic boom and revolutionary 
spirit of the late Sixties, the Seventies represented a decade of 
“diminished expectations”, according to the definition used by Tony 
Judt.9 These years were characterised by diffuse sentiments of crisis, 
pessimism and preoccupation. Western democracies were faced with 
the return of monetary inflation and economic recession; declining 
                                                          
9 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), p. 
453. 
7 
 
growth rates were flanked by raising unemployment; social discontent 
grew in parallel with mounting social problems and protests against 
the establishment turned to violent confrontation in some countries – 
particularly Italy and West Germany – where terrorist groups 
intensified their open challenge to the stability of the democratic 
system in the late Seventies.10 The overall impression that the West had 
entered an age of crisis it was incapable to handle with led, as Judt 
analyses, “to much nervous talk of the ‘ungovernable’ condition of 
Western societies. Such anxieties proved overwrought: under stress, the 
institutions of Western Europe showed more resilience than many 
observers had feared. But there was no return to the optimism – or the 
illusions – of the first postwar decade.”11 Economic downfall and social 
discontent undermined the broad consensus which had embraced the 
Keynesian model and traditional political parties throughout the 
postwar decades. As a consequence, political landscapes underwent a 
process of fragmentation and the free-market ideology fostered by 
neoclassical economics gained a foothold almost everywhere in 
Western Europe.12 
With regard to international relations, the time period which spans 
between the second half of the Seventies and the first half of the 
Eighties has been traditionally depicted by historians as an age marked 
by multiple crises. Commenting on these years, West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt talked about a “double crisis” which the 
world (and the FRG) entered between the late 1970s and the early 
1980s.13 This “double crisis” involved, first, the strong escalation of 
                                                          
10 For a comparative historical analysis of West German Rote Armee Fraktion and Italian 
Brigate Rosse, see: R. Lucchesi, RAF und Rote Brigaden – Deutschland und Italien von 1970 bis 
1985 (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2013). 
11 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, p. 453. 
12 For an historical account of the ideological-intellectual turn of the early Eighties and 
the advent of the liberal era, see: J.W. Müller, “The Cold War and the intellectual history 
of the late twentieth century”, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume III: 
Endings, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), pp. 1-22; and G. Arrighi, “The world economy and the Cold War, 1970-
1990”, ibid., pp. 23-44. 
13 H. Schmidt, Freiheit Verantworten (Düsseldorf, Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1983), p. 7. 
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tensions between the two blocs, which raised citizens’ fears and worries 
over the chance to preserve peace and the possible explosion of a 
nuclear conflict; second, the economic stagnation regarding the whole 
industrialised world, which led to recession and the rise of 
unemployment in many countries and raised worries about the return 
of a possible second, big global depression.  
In the course of these years of international crises superpower 
détente collapsed, causing the stalemate of bilateral arm talks and 
undermining seriously the conditions for the prosecution of European 
détente.14 The worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations was boosted by the 
return of military confrontation outside Europe (so-called “proxy wars” 
between the superpowers in Africa), growing Soviet military 
interventionism (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and renewed military 
competition in Europe (dispute over missiles). It was aggravated by the 
rigidity of the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership, by Carter’s dogmatic 
human rights campaign and by Reagan’s assertive policy of strength. 
Security issues returned to be at the centre of Western European – and 
especially West German – worries, as the deployment of Soviet new-
generation missiles in Eastern Europe and Moscow’s military 
intervention in Afghanistan were interpreted as threatening signals of 
the USSR’s willingness to return to a renewed aggressive international 
course. The transatlantic relationship, as well, was confronted with 
major difficulties and tensions in the course of the decade under study: 
the lacking transatlantic entente over a number of international issues 
significantly contributed to reinforce the impression of a steady state of 
crisis in the Alliance.15 The outburst of the second oil crisis, which was 
                                                          
14 For an overall analysis of the most important aspects of the crisis of détente in the late 
Seventies and Early Eighties, see: L. Nuti, ed., The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki 
to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 
15 Amongst the large number of historical analyses of the state of transatlantic relations 
in the late Seventies-early Eighties, see: M. Gilbert, “Gli anni Settanta: un decennio di 
tensione e disattenzione nelle relazioni transatlantiche”, in Le crisi transatlantiche. 
Continuità e trasformazioni, eds. M. Del Pero, Mario, F. Romero (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, 2007), pp. 45-64; L. Nuti, “Gli anni Ottanta: le relazioni transatlantiche 
durante la Presidenza Reagan”, ibid., pp. 85-110; K.K. Patel, K. Weisbrode, eds., European 
Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s (New York: Cambridge University 
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mainly caused by the wave of panic that the 1979 overthrow of the 
Shah in Iran produced in the oil markets, had tremendous large-scale 
consequences for international economies.16 Whereas during the 
Seventies there had been many talks about the “crisis of the West”, it 
was the traditional reputation of the Soviet strength that began to 
crumple at the end of the decade. The East bloc was increasingly 
confronted with internal ideological challenges coming from the euro-
communist movement, dissident groups and supporters of a 
liberalisation of Eastern socio-political systems; with economic 
hardship and stagnation; with its own incapability to cope adequately 
with the renewed East-West rivalry in the field of arms race. The 
outburst of the Polish crisis in the early 1980s became the emblem of 
the poor health conditions of the whole Soviet bloc.  
The “years of crises” entailed, however, significant transformative 
aspects, whose importance has been often overshadowed by their 
negative denotation. All these episodes of crisis were mainly late 
consequences of older scleroses and unsolved problems inherited from 
the previous years. They urged and boosted processes of 
transformations, redefinitions and pursuit of innovative solutions. 
Hence, the time span under study in this work was also a time of 
radical redefinition of the postwar order and of major transition to a 
new social-cultural age. The “conservative revolution” promoted by the 
tandem Reagan-Thatcher in the early Eighties – paralleled by its West 
German version, namely the “spiritual-moral turn” (geistig-moralische 
Wende) announced by Christian Democratic leader Helmut Kohl – 
spread across the Western bloc. Political landscapes in Western Europe 
underwent similar processes of fragmentation and new political 
groupings started to challenged the monopoly of traditional political 
parties. The list of large-scale transformations marking this process of 
renovation includes also: the advent of postmodernism in many fields 
                                                                                                                               
Press, 2013); M. Schultz, T.A. Schwartz, eds., The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations 
from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge and Washington: Cambridge University Press and 
German Historical Institute, 2010) 
16 G. Garavini, After Empires. European Integration, Decolonization & the Challenge from the 
Global South, 1957-1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 246. 
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of human activities, a concept which insisted on the idea of breaking 
with the past and whose vagueness was paralleled by immediate wide-
spread popularity;17 and the onset of globalization and of the 
technologic revolution which prompted a dramatic acceleration of 
interdependence. With regard to the novelties in the realm of 
international politics, the growing economic interdependence urged the 
start of a new season of regular summits amongst the leaders of the 
most industrialised nations, which began in November 1975 in 
Rambouillet;18 a process of radical economic reforms started in China in 
1978, prompting growing economic growth and opening to the world; 
dictatorships came to an end in Portugal, Spain and Greece and were 
followed by parallel processes of transitions in all three countries and 
by the ensuing EC’s enlargement to the South;19 the development of 
new energetic sources received significant impulse on the wave of the 
second oil shock and ecological issues became crucial items of political 
and public debate, involving the active commitments of governments20; 
peace movements burgeoned in Western societies and their demands 
directly questioned the validity and the sustainability of the bipolar 
international order, urging an overall rethinking of the whole Cold War 
system.21  
All these episodes of crisis and change compose the broad 
background against which this study unfolds. A large part of them will 
be addressed in the ensuing chapters: they will be analysed through the 
lenses of their impact on and interaction with the main research 
                                                          
17 Philosophical manifesto of post-modernism was the work of French philosopher Jean-
François Lyotard La conditione postmoderne, published in 1979. 
17 N. Ferguson Niall, C. Maier, S. Charles, E. Manela, D.G. Sargent, eds., The Shock of the 
Global. The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, MA; London: 2010); H. James, Rambouillet, 15. 
November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft (München: DTV, 1997). 
19 For an historical account of the EC’s role in Southern Europe after the end of the 
dictatorships, see: M. Del Pero, V. Gavìn, F. Guirao, A. Varsori, eds., Democrazie. L’Europa 
meridionale e la fine delle dittature (Milano: Le Monnier, 2010). 
20 An example for this trend is represented by U.S. President Carter’s project for the 
development of solar energy. 
21 The requests of the West German peace movements in the FRG alimented renewed 
fears of pan-Germanism and neutralization, raising a large public debate in the FRG.  
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question of this work. By coping with major crises and transformations, 
Western national states were urged to make sense of themselves, both 
with regard to their domestic transformations and their changing 
international tasks. This process of rethinking was particularly evident 
in the case of the FRG, which went through a process of profound 
revision of its national and international identity. 
 
Defining the context: West German foreign policy between 
continuity and change 
The second aim of this dissertation is to place the analysis of the 
evolution of the West German CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985 
within the broader process of transformation of West German foreign 
policy. Détente policies provided an important field where the 
Auswärtiges Amt could carry out its attempts to play a more dynamic 
and assertive role in the international arena. It is therefore important to 
introduce briefly the foreign political context underpinning the 
implementation of Bonn’s CSCE policy after 1975, i.e. to highlight the 
main characteristics marking West German foreign policy in the mid-
Seventies. 
Elements of continuity 
As Helga Haftendorn has claimed, West German foreign policy was 
a curious construction, subject to a “double containment”, i.e. affected 
by the burden of past horrors as well as by the East-West 
confrontation.22 Structural and psychological limits continued to restrict 
the room of manoeuvre of West German foreign policy in the years 
wherein the FRG committed itself to playing a more assertive 
international role.  
The country’s geopolitical position steadily affected its national 
interests and needs, amongst those security issues remained in the 
                                                          
22 H. Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 
(Stuttgart, München: DVA, 2001), p. 10. 
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foreground. The FRG continued to depend on the Western Alliance – 
especially on the U.S. – for the tutelage of its security needs. The 
coordination with the Western partners remained essential even 
though sometimes difficult. In particular the special relationship with 
the bigger ally, i.e. the U.S. administration, was carefully cultivated by 
Bonn’s federal government notwithstanding frequent divergences and 
mutual incomprehension. Dealing with the East continued to be a 
delicate affair even after the major shift introduced by the launch of 
Brand’s new Ostpolitik: the FRG’s Eastern initiatives remained under 
scrutiny by the Western allies.23 Questions concerning the state of the 
inner-German dialogue and the situation of Berlin continued to be 
object of regular discussion between Bonn and its allies.24 With the 
cumbersome presence of its wall and the Four Powers’ enduring duties 
regarding its destiny,25 the former capital of the German Reich 
                                                          
23 As U.S. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hartmann explained to the head of 
the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, van Well, in December 1975, the three 
powers “strongly recommended” to the West German federal government to inform 
them “more extensively and more regularly” about its talks and negotiations with the 
GDR. It was, indeed, important that they could gain knowledge in due time of questions 
affecting them closely. See: Ministerialdirektor van Well, z.Z. Brüssel, an das Auswärtige Amt, 
12.12.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 382, p. 1801. The request of more exhaustive and 
regular consultations had been already directed to the FRG by the three powers in June 
1975, as they had complained about the reticence of the new Schmidt/Genscher 
government in providing information about its moves towards East Berlin: see 
Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Gehlhoff, 2.06.1975, in , 1975, vol. I, Doc. 144, p. 661. 
24 One important permanent forum of discussion on German-German and Berlin 
questions was provided by the routine of regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the 
FRG, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which traditionally took place in conjunction with the 
gatherings of NATO Council of Ministers. The coordination between the Bundesrepublik 
and the three Western partners was two-way: on the one hand, Bonn was offered the 
possibility to be involved and have voice in the decisions regarding Berlin – for whose 
status the three powers shared the responsibility with the Soviet Union; on the other 
hand, Bonn was asked to involve the Western partners in the pursuit of its bilateral 
relations with the GDR. 
25 The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers – France, the U.K., the U.S. and the 
USSR – over the future of the former German capital and of Germany as a whole were 
reconfirmed in the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. For the text of the 
agreement, see: J. Nawrocki, ed., Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Staaten in 
Deutschland: Entwicklungen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Berlin: Holzapfel 1986). 
13 
 
embodied that persistent interweaving of two world wars’ legacies, 
Cold War dynamics, and symbolic and everyday repercussions of the 
East-West division, which continued to shape the complexity of the 
German question. The Four Powers’ responsibility for Berlin and 
Germany as a whole represented the counterweight to Bonn’s 
economic predominance in Europe.26 Fears of a return of the “German 
power”,27 worries about the re-emergence of the neutrality-option for 
the FRG28 and suspicion about inner-German rapprochement continued 
to influence the European partners’ hearts and minds.29 
All these factors represented elements of continuity marking the 
unfolding of West German foreign policy – even though with different 
nuances – throughout the whole duration of the Cold War. As it will 
emerge from the analysis in the course of the next chapters of the 
present work, these restrictions affected the conduction of the West German 
CSCE policy and were consciously taken into account by the Auswärtiges 
Amt when formulating and implementing its détente strategy. 
 
                                                          
26 Botschafter Freiherr von Braun, Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt, 9.02.1976, in AAPD, 1976, I, 
Doc. 43, p. 186. 
27 See, for instance: K.P. Schmid, “Wenn Debré an Deutschland denkt. Angst vor Bonns 
Übergewicht in Europa“, in Die Zeit, 33/1975, 8.08.1975. 
28 Worries about the return of the “neutrality option” for Germany’s settlement were 
alimented by the growing popularity of protests against the NATO double-track decision 
of West German pacifist and anti-nuclear movements in the early Eighties: their requests 
challenged indeed the validity of the bipolar order. Bonn’s attempts to safeguard the 
dialogue with the East in times of renewed bipolar confrontation were target of the 
Western partners’ suspicions as well. As stressed in a cablegram sent from Brussels to the 
Foreign Office in Bonn, there was some fear in the Western Alliance that the FRG’s efforts 
to continue its Ostpolitk would make the federal government hostage of the Eastern 
requests. See: Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtiges Amt, 16.02.1981, in 
AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 42, p. 237. 
29 Emblematic of those suspicions was the statement of Italian Foreign Minister Giulio 
Andreotti, who in 1984 claimed that: “Everybody agrees that the two Germanys should 
have good relations. It should be clear, however, that pan-Germanism is something that 
must be overcome. There are two German states and two German states must remain”. 
See: J.M. Markham, “For both East and West two Germanys is better”, in The New York 
Times, 23.09.1984. 
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The constitutional moment of Bonn’s Eastern policy 
Besides the existing elements of continuity, West German foreign 
policy had undergone a major transformation during the first half of 
the Seventies, which paved the way to its following developments. The 
real turning point had been marked by the return to power of the Social 
Democrats of the SPD in 1969 – in coalition with the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) – for the first time since the era of the Weimar Republic. 
New Chancellor Willy Brandt brought along the experience he had 
collected by serving three years as foreign minister in Kiesinger’s 
coalition government (1966-1969) and devised together with his 
collaborator Egon Bahr a new approach to relations with the GDR, the 
Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries.  
Bonn’s new Eastern policy was inspired by the idea of “change 
through rapprochement” – Wandel durch Annährung – which 
overturned Adenauer’s traditional conception of relationship with the 
Soviet bloc: the solution to the German question was no more the 
precondition for a normalisation of relations with the Eastern countries, 
but rather a policy of dialogue and multiple contacts with the East 
would lay the favourable grounds for the overcoming of Germany’s 
and Europe’s division.30 Within few years since its start, West German 
Ostpolitik reached a series of important diplomatic achievements: a 
complex of agreements – the so-called Eastern Treaties – were signed 
with Moscow and Warsaw (1970), East Berlin (1972) and Prague (1973); 
the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was attained in 
1971; the ratification of the Basic Treaty with the GDR by the Bundestag 
in 1973 paved the way to the de facto normalisation of relations with 
East Berlin, to the exchange of “Permanent Representatives” between 
the two German states, to the participation of both countries in the 
CSCE in Helsinki and to a new season of regular inner-German 
contacts. The “age of Treaties” marked the constitutional moment of 
the FRG’s relations with the Eastern bloc: it set the ground for their 
ensuing developments and provided the irreversible foreign political 
                                                          
30 T. Judt, Postwar, p. 497. 
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legacy inherited by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt after the resignation of 
his predecessor in 1974. 
The conduction of bilateral relations with the Eastern countries was 
flanked by the pursuit of negotiations for a Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe at a multilateral level. They were both 
constituents of the same détente project directed to the future aim of 
building a new order of peace and overcoming bipolar division on the 
European continent through the steady multiplication of East-West 
diplomatic, economic and human contacts. Hence, Eastern policy, inner-
German dialogue and multilateral détente were integral part of the same 
foreign political project which established progressively itself as a deep-seated 
West German foreign political paradigm; their mutual interactions are 
object of analysis of the following chapters. 
In the name of responsibility 
According to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, it was only in the 
Seventies that the FRG discovered its interest for world politics.31 In the 
course of the decade the country was called upon to take on greater 
international responsibilities. This was a consequence, in part, of the 
success of the German model (Modell Deutschland): the FRG affirmed 
itself as an example of relative economic, social and political stability 
against a background of diffuse crisis.32 It was a consequence, too, of 
the successful achievements of Bonn’s Ostpolitik and of the age of 
Treaties. The 1972 Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR opened 
the door to the full participation of both German states in international 
organisations and diplomatic forums. On 18 September 1973 the FRG 
and the GDR became full members of the United Nations (UN): after 
many years of participation as an observer country,33 the achievement 
                                                          
31 H. Schmidt, Außer Dienst. Eine Bilanz (München: Siedler, 2008), p. 92. 
32 W. Jäger, W. Link and J. Fest, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
33 The FRG had obtained the status of observer country in 1955: not defined in legal 
terms, the observer status represented a fundamental informal device to overcome the 
formal obstacles to the West German full membership and permitted to the FRG to enjoy 
a meaningful relationship to the UN’s work. See: A.G. Mower, “Observer countries: 
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of the aim of the full membership marked for the FRG the symbolic 
completion of its long process of postwar international emancipation. 
The West German first experience as non-permanent rotating member 
of the UN Security Council in the years 1977-1978 enhanced drastically 
Bonn’s possibilities to play a role of responsibility in world affairs and 
faced West German diplomacy with new important tasks.34  
In 1977 West German Foreign Minister Genscher claimed in front of 
the federal Parliament – the Bundestag – that: “quoting Max Weber: 
foreign policy requires ethics of responsibility and not ethics of 
conviction. [...] We [the West Germans] share the responsibility 
towards what happens in the world”.35 The term “responsibility” 
became the keyword of West German foreign policy during the second 
half of the Seventies.36 References to the concept recurred frequently in 
public speeches, interviews and analyses in these years. Its repetition 
served a double purpose: first, to support the FRG’s ambitions to play a 
more influential role on the international stage; second, to make a clean 
break with Germany’s past irresponsible Machtpolitik which had 
dragged Europe into two world wars. The assumption of greater 
responsibilities in foreign policy was oriented both towards the 
present/future (by Bonn’s engagement in the fields of détente, UN 
policies, human rights, North-South relations, development policies 
towards the Third World, in the stabilisation of the processes of 
democratisation in Southern Europe, in the creation of an European 
Political Community) and towards the past (by dealing with the 
international repercussions of Germany’s recent history, particularly 
                                                                                                                               
Quasi Members of the United Nations”, in International Organization, 20.2, Spring 1966, p. 
266.  
34 For a detailed analysis of the West German experience in the UN Security Council, see: 
C. Freuding, Deutschland in der Weltpolitik. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als nichtständiges 
Mitglied im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen in den Jahren 1977/78, 1987/88 und 1995/96 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000). 
35 Vorbereitung der Bundestagsdebatte zur Regierungserklärung (außenpolitischer Teil), 
17.01.1977, in PAAA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.  
36 To the popularity of the term contributed the publication in 1979 of the renown essay 
“The imperative of responsibility” (Das Prinzip Verantwortung) by West German 
philosopher Hans Jonas. 
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with the emergence of public discussions about Nazi crimes and 
Holocaust37).  
Given the peculiar characteristics of West German foreign policy, 
multilateral cooperation provided the adequate framework wherein the 
FRG could pursue greater international responsibilities and expand its 
room of manoeuvre. In the course of the Seventies West German learnt, 
indeed, to make a more conscious and effective use of the possibilities 
offered by multilateralism.38 Bonn tried to take proactive initiatives 
within the major forums of international cooperation at its disposal – 
the G7 summits, the EEC, the UN, and the CSCE. Hence, multilateral 
détente represented an important field where West German diplomacy could 
take more assertive international initiatives within the framework of a vaster 
policy of growing international responsibility. 
 
Literature review and contribution of the work 
The prosecution and development of the FRG’s multilateral policy 
of détente after the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act have been 
largely ignored by historical research on the Cold War. A number of 
reasons have contributed to the lack of publications addressing this 
subject. 
                                                          
37 The acclaimed American television series “Holocaust”, first broadcasted on the U.S. 
NBC television in 1978 and aired on German television in 1979 marked the global return 
of Holocaust and boosted a public debate in the FRG on issues of Nazi crimes and 
German responsibilities towards the past. See, amongst the numerous newspaper articles 
on this subject: “Holocaust: Die Vergangenheit kommt zurück”, in Der Spiegel, 5/1979, 
29.01.1979; D. Strothmann, “Wie eine Schrift an der Wand. Alles gesehen, nichts gewusst 
– war das möglich?“, in Die Zeit, 06/1979, 2.02.1979; J. H. Schoeps, “Kein Ausweg aus der 
Schuld? Die „Holocaust“-Serie und ihre Wirkung auf die Deutschen“, in Die Zeit, 47/1982 
19.11.1982. The West German Foreign Office as well was compelled to deal with the 
public and international consequences of the debate on Holocaust stimulated by the TV 
series. See: NBC-Fernsehserie “Holocaust”, 12.04.1978, in PA AA, NEWYGK, Bd. 23.207. 
38 “The rapid West German learning process in the use of multilateralism” is a central 
theme of Hakkarainen’s book on the formative years of the West German CSCE policy; 
see: P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975 
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011). 
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First, the investigation of the West German multilateral policy of 
détente has suffered from the same destiny of the study of the CSCE 
process. The historical significance of the European détente endeavour 
was neglected for years by historiography on the Cold War and 
International Relations. With the exception of Wilfried Loth’s work 
“Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung” published in 
1998,39 the years between 2005 and 2010 saw a relative revival of the 
CSCE process.40 All these works focus on the origins of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the diplomatic preparation 
of the first conference in Helsinki and on the significance of the 
Helsinki Accords. Only in recent times, the international developments 
marking the era of crisis of détente have attracted a considerable 
amount of historical interest: within the blooming of publications on 
the so-called Second Cold War, few studies on the later developments 
of the CSCE process have got a little space as well.41 A very limited 
                                                          
39 W. Loth, Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung (München: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998). The German historian has analysed the CSCE process against 
the vaster framework of the development of détente throughout the whole duration of 
the Cold War in his work: W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950-
1990 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
40 Amongst the most notable publications, see: O. Bange and G. Niedhart, eds. Helsinki 
1975 and the transformation of Europe (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008); J.M. 
Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, pp. 198-218; W. Loth and G.H. Soutou, eds., 
The making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-1975; C. Meneguzzi 
Rostagni, ed. The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal (Padova: Cedam, 2004); A. 
Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki 
CSCE (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2009); P. Villaume and O.A Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron 
Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965-1985, 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010); A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. Neunlist, 
eds., Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75 
(London: Routledge, 2008). 
41 See, for instance: S. Savranskaya, “Human rights movement in the USSR after the 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the reaction of the Soviet authorities, in The crisis of 
Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985, ed. L. Nuti, pp. 26-40; D. Selvage, 
“The politics of the lesser evil: the West, the Polish crisis, and the CSCE review 
conference in Madrid, 1981-1983”, ibid., pp. 41-54; T. Fischer, “The N+N as Catalysts of 
the CSCE Process, 1972-1983”, in Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, 
Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965-1985, eds. P. Villaume and O.A Westad, pp. 
143-178; A. Romano “More Cohesive, Still Divergent: Western Europe, the United States, 
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number of works have been devoted to the analysis of the CSCE review 
meetings in Belgrade (1977-1978) and Madrid (1980-1983): they are 
collective volumes, whose case studies offered a detailed view on the 
diplomatic unfolding of both follow-up conferences.42 By providing 
separate analyses of single aspects of the CSCE review conferences they 
lack, notwithstanding their accuracy, a comprehensive historical 
account of the vaster evolution of the process as a whole. 
Second, the historical analysis of West German diplomatic efforts 
within the process of multilateral détente in the years 1975-1985 has 
been affected by the general trends regarding the study of Germany’s 
Cold War history. Scholars have predominantly focused their attention 
on two periods/topics: i.e. on the developments of the postwar time 
which brought to the formation of two separate German states in 
1949;43 and on the major turning point marked by the return to power 
of Social Democrats and the launch of Brandt’s new Ostpolitik.44 
                                                                                                                               
and the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting”, European Integration and the Atlantic 
Community in the 1980, eds. K.K. Patel, K. Weisbrode, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), pp. 39-58. 
42 V. Bilandžić, D. Dahlmann, and M. Kosanović, eds., From Helsinki to Belgrade. The first 
CSCE follow-up meeting and the crisis of détente (Bonn: University Press, 2012); H. Altrichter 
and H. Wentker, eds., Der KSZE-Prozess. Vom Kalten Krieg zu einem neuen Europa, 1975 bis 
1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011); M. Peter and H. Wentker, eds., Die KSZE im 
Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012). 
43 Noteworthy works on post-war Germany and the German question during the first 
Cold War period are: W.G. Gray, Germany's Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East 
Germany 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); N. 
Lewkowicz, The German question and the origins of the Cold War (Milano: IPOC, 2008); W. 
Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question and the founding of the 
GDR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).  
44 Amongst the most recent and remarkable contributions on Ostpolitik and its various 
aspects, see: G. Bernardini, Nuova Germania, antichi timori: Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza 
europea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013); C. Fink and B. Schäfer, Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European 
and global responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); H. Haftendorn, 
“German Ostpolitik in a Multilateral Setting”, in The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany 
and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe, eds. H. Haftendorn, G.H. Soutou, 
and S.F.Wells jr, pp. 209-228; A. Hofmann, The Emergence of Détente in Europe. Brandt, 
Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik (London: Routledge, 2007); G. Niedhart, 
“Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal Republic’s relationship with the West”, in The 
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Moreover, a large part of works on Cold War Germany has been 
affected by the cumbersome presence of the revolutionary events of the 
years 1989/1990 which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. With particular regard to Bonn’s policy of dialogue 
with the East,45 there has been an overwhelming flood of historical 
studies on the formative Brandt years, which have insightfully gone 
through a variety of different aspects and implications – domestic, 
bilateral, international – of Ostpolitik. This burgeoning has been 
paralleled by a relative scarcity of works on the ensuing developments 
during the years of the Schmidt administration and the first years of the 
Kohl administration. Analyses addressing this subject tend to 
concentrate on mere bilateral aspects – mostly at the level of German-
German, West German-Soviet, West German-American relations –, 
neglecting the significance of their large-scale interactions with the 
broader international dynamics and Cold War developments. This lack 
of studies can probably be explained, first, by the widespread idea that 
Ostpolitik was characterised by lesser ideal inspiration and smaller 
realisations after Brandt’s resignation; second, by the pronounced 
technical character marking inner-German bilateral negotiations after 
1973; and third, by the common impression that the West German 
Chancellery’s attention was devoted in these years to other foreign 
political domains (management of international economy, security 
issues, transatlantic relations, crisis management). Studies on the 
realisations of West German foreign policy during the decade have 
been mostly written by contemporary commentators and policy 
analysts; they have been subject of diplomats’ and politicians’ memoirs; 
they have been included into general handbooks addressing West 
                                                                                                                               
making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-1975, eds. W. Loth and 
G.H. Soutou, pp. 117-132; M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil. East Germany, Détente and 
Ostpolitik (Chapell Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); A. 
Wilkens, “New Ostpolitik and European Integration: concepts and policies in the Brandt 
era”, in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. P. 
Ludlow (London et al.: Routledge, 2007). 
45 Bonn’s policy of dialogue with the East is meant here in a broad sense by referring 
both to its bilateral dimension (Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik) and multilateral 
dimension (Entspannungspolitik). 
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German foreign policy on its whole.46 They undoubtedly provide a 
large amount of interesting information and standpoints; they are 
however deficient in historical approach.  
Third, the idea that West German initiatives in the field of the CSCE 
represented merely a multilateral coverage of Bonn’s bilateral Ostpolitik 
and Deutschlandpolitik has contributed to overlook their original 
aspects. The most notable and comprehensive analysis of the evolution 
of a West German distinct CSCE policy has been offered by Petri 
Hakkarainen in his valuable work “A State of Peace in Europe. West 
Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975”. The Finnish historian focuses on the 
use that the Brandt/Scheel government made of the CSCE during its 
first years of negotiations in order to achieve the priority goals of the 
Eastern Treaties and of Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. In his 
analysis he put a particular stress on the process of “Europeanization” 
that Bonn’s Ostpolitik went through in Helsinki.47 Another important 
contribution to the formative years of Bonn’s CSCE policy is provided 
by Senoo Tetsuji in his work devoted to Bahr’s conception of the CSCE 
as intermediate step for a construction of new European order and for 
the overcoming of Europe’s and Germany’s division.48 The 
                                                          
46 One of the most comprehensive account of the FRG‘s political history is provided by 
the six volumes of the collection Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, edited by Karl 
Dietrich Bracher; an important section of each volume is dedicated to the analysis of West 
German foreign policy during the respective period under study. With regard to the 
years of the Schmidt and Adenauer administration, see respectively: W. Jäger, W. Link 
and J. Fest, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland; A. Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium: 1982-1990 (München: DVA, 2006); 
Creuzberger, Westintegration und Neue Ostpolitik. Die Außenpolitik der Bonner Republik 
(Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2009); Lappenküper, Ulrich, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1949 bis 1990 (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008); H. 
Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung. 
47 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975; see 
also: P. Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement: the FRG and the Nexus 
between Western CSCE Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik, in Origins of the European 
Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-1975, eds. A. Wegner, V. Mastny and 
C. Neunlist (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 237-258. 
48 S. Tetsuji, Ein Irrweg zur deutschen Einheit? Egon Bahrs Konzeptionen, die Ostpolitik und 
die KSZE 1963-1975 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2011). 
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investigation of the later evolution of the West German CSCE strategy 
is limited to two contributions by German historians Matthias Peter 
(focus on the FRG)49 and Oliver Bange (focus on the parallel strategies 
of the FRG and the GDR)50 published within two collective volumes 
dedicated to continuation of the process of multilateral détente after 
Helsinki.  
Building upon the existing literature, the present dissertation 
intends to offer a vaster picture of the evolution of Bonn’s CSCE policy 
over the decade 1975-1985 as a West German priority foreign political 
domain. By challenging the view according to which the West German 
initiatives in the field of multilateral détente should be interpreted as a 
mere multilateral completion or protection of the achievements and 
possibilities of the bilateral dialogue with the East, the investigation 
aims at highlighting their original significance, too, against the 
background of the changing Cold War dynamics. Undoubtedly, Bonn’s 
efforts to rescue multilateral détente in the late Seventies and early 
Eighties were directed to preserve the prosecution of its bilateral 
cooperation with the East – and the concrete achievements of the inner-
German dialogue in particular – in face of the escalating Cold War 
tensions. However, pursuing a proactive CSCE policy became 
increasingly important per se. Quite significantly, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, who leaded the West German Foreign Office from 1974 until 
1992, when looking back at the long years of his office has defined the 
CSCE process as “the heart of Bonn’s foreign policy strategy in the last 
                                                          
49 M. Peter, “Konferenzdiplomatie als Mittel der Entspannungspolitik: Die KSZE-Politik 
der Regierung Schmidt/Genscher, 1975-1978”, in Der KSZE-Prozess. Vom Kalten Krieg zu 
einem neuen Europa, 1975 bis 1990, eds. H. Altrichter and H. Wentker, pp. 15-28; M. Peter, 
“Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der Bundesregierung in den 
Krisenjahren 1978–1981”, in Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und 
gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990, ed. M. Peter and H. Wentker (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2012), pp. 59-82. 
50 O. Bange, “An intricate Web. Ostpolitik, the European Security System and German 
Unification”, in Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-
75, eds. A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. Neunlist, pp. 39-52; O. Bange, “’Keeping Détente 
Alive’. Inner-German Relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker”, in The 
Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985, ed. L. Nuti, pp. 230-243. 
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fifteen years of Cold War’s East-West relations”.51 Hence, the findings 
of this research suggest looking with greater attention at the interaction 
between the complex of Deutschlandpolitik-Ostpolitik-Entspannungspolitik 
and at the attempts of pursuing an overall more autonomous foreign 
policy by the FRG. 
By investigating the process of transformation, adjustment and 
implementation of a West German realistic policy of détente in the 
specific field of the CSCE, the present work aims at highlighting its 
peculiar significance within the broader process of assertion of a more 
influential West German foreign policy. Second, it intends to enrich the 
understanding of these transitional years in the history of the 
Bundesrepublik. Third, it wishes to contribute to a more accurate 
interpretation of the late Cold War developments which paved the way 
to the end of Germany’s and Europe’s division.  
Furthermore, this dissertation adds to the slowly increasing number 
of studies by Italian scholars on German postwar history, which has 
been relatively overlooked in Italy for years:52 the author hopes to 
contribute to the consolidation of this growing trend and to the 
deepening of the understanding of Germany’s recent history in her 
country of origin. 
Finally, considering that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act has 
celebrated this year its round anniversary, namely the fortieth; that 
primary sources on the development of the CSCE process after Helsinki 
have been becoming increasingly accessible to scholars in the last few 
years under the thirty-year rule; and that recent international 
developments in Europe urge to rediscover the historical roots of the 
policy of dialogue with the Soviet Union and the past experience of 
détente in times of serious East-West tensions, new publications on the 
                                                          
51 P.G. Kielmannsegg, Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1990 (München: 
Pantheon, 2007), 224; H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, (Berlin: Siedler, 1997), p. 300. 
52 This point has been made by historian Antonio Varsori in his introduction to 
Bernardini’s work Nuova Germania, antichi timori. Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza europea. 
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topic of the CSCE are to expect – which the present work aims at 
adding to.  
 
Approach and Sources 
This dissertation treats of the West German policy of détente as it 
was devised, adjusted and implemented at the multilateral level by the 
Auswärtiges Amt. Therefore, it adopts an historical approach mainly 
centred on the investigation of national foreign policy, which however 
takes a careful look at the domestic implications of foreign political 
decisions and their interweaving with broader international 
developments. Investigating such interconnections is particular 
important in the case of the FRG’s détente policy due to some 
peculiarities which characterised it. First, the policy of East-West 
dialogue strongly affected West German vital national interests. 
Second, West Germans were particularly mindful of the process of 
détente and sensitive to its development, as a large part of its 
achievements touched directly their everyday lives: hence, public 
expectations represented a factor that the West German Foreign Office 
had to take into due account when conducting its CSCE policy. Third, 
the enduring limitations to the country’s sovereignty and the openness 
of the German question made Bonn’s pursuit of East-West dialogue 
more exposed to international instabilities and uncertainties.  
Whereas the conduction of inner-German relations and of bilateral 
relations with the Eastern countries was marked by the political 
imprint of the Chancellery, decisions in the field of the CSCE were 
predominantly made by the Auswärtiges Amt under the stable and long-
lasting guidance of Foreign Minister Genscher. This was partly due to 
the nature of the CSCE process: as a broad, semi-permanent 
multilateral framework, it involved the expertise of diplomats used to 
long and strenuous negotiations. Moreover, Genscher’s special interest 
in the CSCE and the multilateral policy of détente contributed to the 
great efforts invested by West German diplomacy into this foreign 
policy field. Hence, the investigation of the evolution of Bonn’s CSCE 
25 
 
policy in the years 1975-1985 offers a glance not only at the process of 
international emancipation of the FRG within the international arena, 
but at the process of relative emancipation of the Auswärtiges Amt from 
the Chancellery within the realm of East-West policies. 
For these reasons, the thesis is based on the investigation of a wide 
range of primary sources – namely strategic papers, internal analyses, 
diplomatic papers, reports of ambassadors, speeches and interviews – 
from the Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office – 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA). During the long 
months of research, it has been possible to analyse a large amounts of 
archival materials, many of those have been disclosed only in recent 
times. The research is focused on the investigation of the following 
records:  
- the records of the Office of the Minister (B1), of the Office of the 
State Secretaries (B2) and of the Planning Staff (B9), which 
provide a vast load of information about the planning of Bonn’s 
détente strategies, the internal and diplomatic preparation of the 
CSCE meetings, the evaluation of their unfolding and results, as 
well as about the continuous work of analysis of international 
developments carried out by the officers of the Foreign Office; 
- the records devoted to the relations with the U.S. (B32; 
NEWYGK), France, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria (B24), 
which offer a detailed picture of the “Western dimension” of 
Bonn’s foreign policy; 
- the records dedicated to the relations with the Eastern countries 
(B42) and to the discussion of foreign political issues with the 
GDR (B38), whose materials have consented the investigation of 
the diplomatic initiatives undertaken towards the East in the 
field of multilateral détente, as well as of Bonn’s assessments of 
ongoing developments within the Soviet bloc;  
- the record of the Press Office (B7), which collect speeches, 
interviews, articles, public appearances of the foreign minister 
and his collaborators. 
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On their whole, this variety of archival documents provides a 
comprehensive picture of the development of the FRG’s multilateral 
détente policy during the decade between 1975 and 1985, by disclosing 
useful details about the load of conceptual and diplomatic work 
accomplished by West German officers and diplomats. The parallel 
analysis of bilateral talks and negotiations with both the Western allies 
and the Eastern countries highlights the coherence underpinning the 
arguments and ideas put forward by Bonn when discussing about 
détente with its different partners. The frequent references to the 
process of European détente in the course of bilateral talks and public 
speeches confirm the crucial importance the CSCE process had for West 
German foreign policy in these years. Moreover, public contributions, 
speeches and interviews contribute to the understanding of the public 
and domestic side of the international pursuit of détente.  
Research in the archive of the German Foreign Office has been 
supported by the examination of published sources, in particular of the 
West German diplomatic documents included in the collection "Akten 
zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. In addition, 
research activities conducted at the Newspaper Archive in Berlin 
Westhafen – Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek – have provided a vast 
amount of newspaper and magazine articles from the Seventies and 
Eighties (from Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, the F.A.Z., Welt am Sonntag). They 
represent a valuable insight into the mood and the perception trends of 
the West German public opinion, by enriching the understanding of 
Zeitgeist. 
 
Structure of the work 
With regard to the structure, the dissertation is divided into five 
main chapters, organised chronologically.  
In Chapter 1 the analysis moves from the seminal moment marked 
by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, whose legacies influenced 
significantly the following developments of the FRG’s CSCE policy. 
The problems linked to the Helsinki Agreement’s implementation 
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process began to depict the landscape wherein the first review 
conference of Belgrade would unfold. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical definition of the concept of 
“realistic détente” by the West German Foreign Office and its tempted 
implementation at the first CSCE follow-up meeting of Belgrade. The 
Belgrade CSCE represented a severe test and an important learning-
step for West German multilateral diplomacy, which was confronted 
with disappointing results and urged to reflect on its miscalculations. 
Both the lessons learnt at Belgrade and the changing climate of East-
West relations urged the Auswärtiges Amt to start an internal reflection 
aimed at rethinking its détente policy for the following years.  
Chapter 3 marks the ideal centre of the dissertation: it shows how 
issues of military security played a pivotal role in diplomatic and 
public debates in the time interval between Belgrade and Madrid. 
These debates interacted with the preparation of the second CSCE 
follow-up meeting, by influencing importantly the formation of the 
conference agenda and the partial revision of the West German CSCE 
strategy.  
To the long unfolding of the Madrid CSCE is dedicated Chapter 4. 
The conference works were beset by two major international crises: the 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the 
open challenge launched by oppositional groups to the governing elite 
in Poland, which unfolded in the course of 1980-1981 and pivoted in 
December 1981 as martial law was imposed by General Jaruzelski. 
West German diplomatic efforts at the turn of the decade were directed 
to protect the process of détente from the return of East-West 
confrontation: Bonn’s CSCE policy in times of crisis gained flexibility 
and pragmatism and asserted itself as an anti-cyclical policy. 
In Chapter 5, after investigating the West German contributions to 
the first phase of the Stockholm’s Conference on Disarmament, the 
analysis turns to assess the state of the CSCE process ten years after 
Helsinki: 1985 was a year of important anniversaries, whose 
celebrations revealed the persistence of past legacies affecting the 
conduction of West German foreign policy. As European détente 
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celebrated the tenth anniversary in 1985, a new major shift was taking 
place on the international stage, marked by Gorbachev’s seizure of 
power in the Soviet Union and the ensuing restart of the superpower 
dialogue. 
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“Entspannungspolitik bedarf des langen Atems”53 
Per Fischer, Head of the West German delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up 
Meeting in Belgrade  
 
 
Chapter 1 
The Seminal Moment in Helsinki: Laying the 
Foundations for a Multilateral Policy of Détente 
(1975-1976) 
 
Introduction  
The first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reached 
its final stage at the end of July 1975, after two years and a half of 
intense negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki. On 1 August the heads of 
state and government of the thirty-five participant states gathered in 
the Finnish capital to sign the conference final document, i.e. the so-
called Helsinki Final Act, fruit of laborious compromise.54 The CSCE 
was the first and most resounding achievement of the multilateral 
process of European détente. Its convening had been the result of a 
long formation process. After the first embryonic proposal for a Pan-
European Conference on Security issued by Soviet Foreign Minister 
                                                          
53 “The policy of détente requires a long breath” [transl.] 
54 For a detailed analysis of the unfolding of negotiations which brought to the signing of 
the Helsinki Final Agreement and for a historical assessment of the first CSCE at 
Helsinki, see: H. Altrichter and H. Wentker, eds. Der KSZE-Prozess. Vom Kalten Krieg zu 
einem neuen Europa, 1975 bis 1990; O. Bange and G. Niedhart, eds. Helsinki 1975 and the 
transformation of Europe; J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, pp. 198-218; W. 
Loth, Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung; C. Meneguzzi Rostagni, ed. 
The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal; A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to 
European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE; A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. 
Neunlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-
75. 
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Molotov in 1954, the idea of creating an East-West forum to discuss 
security issues in Europe had been relaunched by the Warsaw Pact 
through in its 1969 Budapest Appeal. A series of new conditions had 
encouraged the Western Alliance’s decision to accept, this time, the 
Eastern invitation to cooperation. First, unlike older proposals, the 
Budapest Appeal did not preclude the participation of the U.S. and 
Canada, allowing Western Europeans to open to cooperation with the 
Eastern bloc by preserving the unity of the Alliance. Second, a new 
interest for a policy of East-West dialogue had begun to spread across 
Western Europe in the course of the Sixties: the promotion of political 
détente had been included amongst the future tasks of the Western 
Alliance in the 1967 Harmel Report.55 Third, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam 
on the one hand and the Soviet crackdown on Czechoslovakia 
paralleled by the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations on the other 
hand prompted the superpowers to turn to mutual cooperation and 
dialogue.56 Last but not least, the FRG’s unprecedented drive to 
intensify diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe fostered by Social 
Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt’s through his new Ostpolitik 
project urged the Western allies not to stand aside watching.57  
Notwithstanding these new favourable conditions and the 
widespread cooperative spirit informing East-West relations in the 
                                                          
55 A. Varsori, “Gli anni Sessanta: La crisi della NATO”, in Le crisi transatlantiche. 
Continuità e trasformazioni, eds. M. Del Pero and F. Romero, p. 43. 
56 R.D. Schulzinger, “Détente in the Nixon-Ford years”, The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge, et al.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 373-394; S. Savranskaya and W. Taubman, “Soviet 
foreign policy, 1962-1975”, ibid., pp. 134-157; S. Radchenko, “The Sino-Soviet split”, ibid., 
pp. 349-372. 
57 For the assertion of Bonn’s new Eastern policy, see: A. Baring and M. Görtemaker, 
Machtwechsel. Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (München: Dt. Taschenbuch Verl., 1984); C. Fink and 
B. Schäfer, eds. Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and global responses; H. Haftendorn, 
Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung; H. Haftendorn, , 
“German Ostpolitik in a Multilateral Setting”, in The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany 
and the United States in the Shaping of the new Europe, eds. H. Haftendorn, G.H. Soutou and 
S.F. Wells, pp. 209-228; A. Hofman, The emergence of détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and 
the formation of Ostpolitik (London: Routledge, 2007); M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil. 
East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973. 
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early Seventies, the achievement of a diplomatic agreement in Helsinki 
was not taken for granted. During the long months of CSCE 
negotiations the participants’ divergent interests and views clashed and 
risked many times to compromise a fruitful conclusion of the 
conference. It is not surprising, hence, that the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act was welcomed as a success – even though for respectively 
different reasons – by political elites both in the East and the West. 
More varied were public reactions towards the conference’s outcome. 
While some looked with preoccupation at the possible repercussions of 
the dialogue with the traditional enemy or were simply sceptical about 
what had been achieved in Helsinki,58 for others Helsinki represented 
the first realisation of that “spirit of détente” which would usher in a 
new era of East-West peaceful cooperation.59  
The Helsinki CSCE represents a divisive matter of historical analysis 
as well. Historians have disagreed about the significance of the 
conference, especially with regard to the late developments of the Cold 
War and to its conclusion. Amongst others, Jussi Hanhimäki has 
defined the signing of the Helsinki Accords as a seminal moment in 
Europe’s Cold War.60 Similarly, the creation of the CSCE has been 
assessed as a major landmark in the Cold War era by Akira Iriye in his 
work dedicated to the rise of the global community in the postwar 
decades.61 However, a large part of historical research in the field of 
Cold War and International Relations overlooked the Helsinki 
endeavour for years. The 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act was 
traditionally considered as the peak and the end of the détente era; the 
significance of its following developments was clouded by the 
cumbersome presence of the returning bipolar confrontational course 
                                                          
58 French publicist Raymond Aaron stigmatised the CSCE as a “comedy”: “Never before 
a conference had lasted so long and involved so many diplomats, to reach at the end such 
poor and ridiculous results”. See: C. Bertram, “Ein Schliengerkiel für die Entspannung. 
Bilanz und Ausblicke zehn Jahre nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985. 
59 For an overview of Western public reactions towards the results of the CSCE in 
Helsinki, see: A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, pp. 32-37. 
60 J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 212. 
61 A. Iriye, Global Community. The role of international organizations in the making of the 
contemporary world (Berkley et al.: University of California Press, 2002), p. 136. 
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marking the advent of the so-called “second Cold War”. One possible 
reason for this common disinterest has been identified by Angela 
Romano in the “disproportion between efforts and achievements” 
marking the CSCE negotiations, which lasted for many months, 
involved large delegations from a great number of countries and ended 
with the signature of solemn but not legally binding documents.62 The 
negative accounts of the Helsinki endeavour by some outstanding 
contemporary commentators did probably contributed to influence the 
trends of the following historical research, too. The pronounced 
compromise character of the Helsinki Final Act did certainly open the 
way to ambiguities and misinterpretations which emerged with 
evidence in the aftermath of the conference. The (dis)proportion 
pointed out by Romano appears, however, more varied if we look more 
closely at the specific expectations, efforts and achievements of the 
individual CSCE participant countries.  
The assessment of the historical significance of the Helsinki CSCE 
assumes a peculiar meaning in the case of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The FRG was the engine of European détente and one of the 
leading actors of the CSCE. Great efforts were invested by Bonn into 
multilateral negotiations; they were rewarded by the inclusion of 
specific West German interests in the conference final act.63 West 
Germans had greatest interests in a positive conclusion of the 
conference and most reasons to be satisfied for the compromise 
achieved in Helsinki.64 The CSCE was, in a way, as it will be analysed 
in the course of this work, largely a (West) German question. Even 
though its role within the overall unfolding of the following Cold War 
developments had not to be overrated, the Helsinki Final Act did mark 
                                                          
62 A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, p. 17. 
63 The FRG’s role in fostering the inclusion of human issues in the CSCE negotiation 
agenda has been analysed in detail by Sara Lamberti Moneta in her dissertation. See: S. 
Lamberti Moneta, Helsinki Disentangled (1973-75): West Germany, the Netherlands, the EPC 
and the Principle of the Protection of Human Rights, PhD thesis (University of Trento: 2012). 
64 For an insightful analysis of West German diplomatic work at negotiations in Geneva 
and Helsinki, see: P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 
1966-1975. 
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a fundamental watershed for West German foreign policy. In the years 
ensuing the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the CSCE became indeed a 
foreign policy priority for the Bundesrepublik. CSCE matters were 
constantly addressed by the diplomatic work of the West German 
Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt, in the years between 1975 and 
1985. During the months of preparation of the follow-up conferences in 
Belgrade and Madrid, the CSCE was central item of analyses within the 
West German Foreign Office, of debates within the Western Alliance 
and negotiations with the Eastern countries. This persistent attention 
contributed to reinforce the processual nature of the CSCE, whose 
possibility of continuation had been provided by the Helsinki Final Act 
through the inclusion of the mechanism of review conferences. 
Notwithstanding setbacks and moments of disappointment, the CSCE 
established itself for Bonn as a continuous forum of East-West 
multilateral dialogue. 
In this chapter, the analysis moves from a brief review of the main 
elements of novelty marking the diplomatic endeavour of the first 
CSCE, in order to focus on the main achievements reached by West 
German diplomacy at Helsinki. The successful outcome of the 
conference contributed to reinforce Bonn’s confidence in its foreign 
political means. Besides offering the adequate framework to 
multilateralise the aims and contents of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, the CSCE 
asserted itself after 1975 as a foreign political priority per se. The 
perception of a West German victory at Helsinki was puzzled by the 
uncertainties and setbacks of the ensuing implementation process. The 
problematic unfolding of the implementation process unveiled, indeed, 
the existence of conceptual divergences and ambiguities sealed in the 
Helsinki Accords. As Eastern countries adopted more pronounced 
ideological and defensive stances on the CSCE in the wake of Helsinki, 
the West German Foreign Office directed its diplomatic efforts to 
reinforce coordination within the Western caucus, put pressure for 
implementation on the Soviet bloc countries and observe carefully the 
ongoing developments in the Eastern bloc. 
 
34 
 
The Helsinki CSCE as a “curious diplomatic enterprise” 
Looking at the developments of the first three Cold War decades, 
the CSCE appears as an unprecedented event. The peculiar character of 
the conference was highlighted by the contemporary analysis 
published in the West German journal of international politics Europa-
Archiv, where the CSCE was defined as “the most curios diplomatic 
enterprise of the century”.65 Several factors contributed to its 
uniqueness in the postwar international history. 
A first element of novelty consisted in the composition of the 
conference: with its thirty-five participants, the CSCE was the first Pan-
European multilateral meeting since World War II.66 Whilst European 
in its name and in its aims, the CSCE encompassed a vast geographical 
area, in which the conceptual borders of the Western bloc coincided 
with the borders of the Western Alliance, including the U.S. and 
Canada. The involvement of the group of European neutral and non-
aligned countries (NNAs) was intended to open European cooperation 
to the demands of the non-aligned movement and to overcome a strict 
bipolar logic.67 Both aims remained largely unrealised: the nature and 
the functioning of the CSCE, as in Helsinki as in the course of the 
following review meetings, never managed to overcome the 
predominant East-West logic. Bipolarity informed Helsinki’s 
conference aims, negotiation issues and alliance schemes. Indeed, the 
conference was since its origins – and continued to be in its following 
developments of the Seventies and the Eighties – a product of the Cold 
War. The CSCE provided evidence for the fact that Cold War was still 
ongoing in Europe, notwithstanding the temporary cooperative spirit 
marking East-West relations; and that Europe still remained a main 
                                                          
65 C. Bertram, “Ein Schlingerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblick zehn Jahre 
nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 26.07.1985. 
66 J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 212. 
67 For the analysis of the role played by NNA countries at the CSCE, see: T. Fischer, 
Neutral Power in the CSCE. The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Final Accords 1975 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); and T. Fischer, “Bridging the Gap between the East and the 
West. The N+N as Catalysts of the CSCE Process, 1972-1983”, pp. 143-178. 
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stage of bipolar confrontation, notwithstanding the trends of 
globalisation marking the recent Cold War developments.68  
Second, peculiar were the meaning and the structure of the Helsinki 
Accords. Their signing marked a founding moment for East-West 
relations. Similarly to a constitutional Charta, the conference final 
agreement addressed, indeed, both the rules of the game and the 
contents of cooperation in Europe. Werner Link has defined the CSCE 
as a replacement for a European peace conference and the Helsinki 
Final Act as the replacement for a European peace treaty.69 The West 
German Foreign Office ventured to compare the role of the conference 
to the 1815 Congress of Vienna: Helsinki marked the first attempt in the 
postwar era to define common rules and principles of interstate 
behaviour for a modus vivendi on the European continent.70 The opening 
declaration of principles, which sealed the participants’ commitments 
to the respect of some shared rules in the conduction of their mutual 
relations, was followed by a series of substantial recommendations for 
cooperation. These were grouped in three main areas, also known as 
the Helsinki’s three Baskets. Basket I contained arrangements of 
political nature in the field of traditional security, with the main focus 
on the so-called confidence-building measures (CBMs): the signing 
states committed themselves to announcing their military manoeuvres 
and to inviting other participant states to attend as observers. Basket II 
dealt with issues of cooperation in the economic, scientific and 
technical fields and in the area of environmental protection. Basket III 
focused instead on the human dimension of cooperation, encompassing 
                                                          
68 The unfolding of bipolar confrontation on the global scale, i.e. in the Third World, has 
been insightfully analysed by Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad (O.A. Westad, The 
Global Cold War: Third World interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006)). On the process of globalization of the Cold War 
during the Seventies, see also M. Guderzo and B. Bagnato, eds. The Globalization of the 
Cold War. Diplomacy and local confrontation, 1975-1985 (London et al.: Routledge, 2010) 
69 W. Link, “Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Schmidt, 1974-1982”, in 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 5/II: Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982. Die Ära 
Schmidt, eds. W. Jäger and W. Link, p. 297 
70 Eingangserklärung des Herrn Bundesministers auf dem Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen. Erster 
Entwurf, 23.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506. 
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a series of commitments concerning the facilitation of human contacts, 
information and cultural cooperation.71 
Third, the Helsinki Final Act contained the grounds to consolidate 
the CSCE as a process. Basket IV ensured the continuation of the CSCE, 
by calling for follow-up meetings to verify the implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act and eventually negotiate its further improvement. 
The mechanism of review conferences granted a certain degree of 
continuity without institutionalisation. This had been a Western 
request: rejecting the Soviet proposal for the creation of a permanent 
body – which might turn into an instrument to merely freeze what had 
been achieved in Helsinki72 – Western Europeans aimed at shaping 
East-West cooperation as a continuous but dynamic process. All thirty-
five delegations decided to meet again two years later in Belgrade in 
order to evaluate the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions and 
discuss new possible ways of East-West cooperation. Hence, the 
Helsinki Final Act introduced an important element of novelty in East-
West relations by opening a new season of conference diplomacy. The 
Helsinki CSCE was ensued by three follow-up meetings in Belgrade 
(1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983) and Vienna (1986-1989); a Conference 
on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe in Stockholm (1984-86); and plenty of meetings of experts on 
issues of peaceful arbitration, economic cooperation, cultural exchange 
and human rights. The diplomatic work pursued during and in 
preparation of these meetings took the shape of a thick weave of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations which multiplied the occasions 
for contact and gathering. As the West German Foreign Office observed 
in the fall of 1975, from the clauses of Basket IV derived a series of new 
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diplomatic tasks and possibilities which all participants, both in the 
West and in the East, were faced with.73  
Fourth, even though the dispositions of the Helsinki Act lacked 
legal binding force, they had high political value. The political 
significance of Helsinki’s commitments was confirmed by the decision 
of most delegations to be represented by their respective heads of state 
and government at the signing ceremony. Being the Helsinki Final Act 
an agreement reached on the basis of free and good will, everything 
concerning its implementation was left to the willingness of the signing 
countries. Arguing that the Helsinki Accords restrained the foreign 
policy choices of its participants in the years to come would be 
exaggerated. The fulfilment of its commitments posed, however, a 
question of mutual trust and introduced an additional element of 
reciprocal control. If political leaders were interested in continuing 
East-West dialogue in Europe, they should, at least publicly, confront 
themselves with the commitments made in Helsinki. 
Last, to the peculiar character of the Helsinki Final Act contributed 
also its unusual public relevance compared to other international 
agreements. All member states committed themselves to publishing 
and distributing the text of the document. The fulfilment of the 
Helsinki’s commitments became an issue of public diplomacy. The 
relationship between the CSCE Final Act and the public opinion 
developed in the aftermath of Helsinki at three different levels. First, 
the commitments sealed in the Helsinki Accords became an 
authoritative reference for European citizens who could appeal to them 
in order to legitimise their requests to their leaders. This practice took 
place most of all in Eastern Europe, were dissidents used the Helsinki 
provisions in the field of human rights and human contacts to 
challenge directly their governments. In the wake of the conference, 
Helsinki monitoring groups were founded in the Soviet Union and 
similar groups were formed in other Eastern European countries.74 As 
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highlighted by Nye, the Helsinki Final Act legitimized discussions on 
human rights behind the Iron Curtain and had consequences that were 
unforeseen by those who signed it.75 Second, the public meaning of the 
Helsinki Final Act coincided with its instrumental, propagandistic use 
towards public opinions. Governments in both blocs used the 
document – or, more correctly, their respective or partial interpretation 
of the document – to gain public support for their own international 
strategies and foreign policy decisions. As it will be analysed in the 
next chapters, this was the case, for instance, of the U.S. administration 
under President Jimmy Carter, who would appeal to the provisions of 
the Helsinki Agreement to pursue its public struggle for human rights; 
or the case of the West German federal government, which at the turn 
of the decade would need concrete détente improvements to present to 
the national public opinion in order to counterbalance unpopular 
decisions in the field of military security. Third, the public resonance of 
the CSCE was used by the advocates of détente – in particular by 
Bonn’s diplomacy – as a tactical tool to persuade its allies and Eastern 
counterparts, when necessary, to continue cooperation.  
 
Assessing the West German victory in Helsinki 
In the direct aftermath of Helsinki, sentiments in the Bundesrepublik 
featured a mix of enthusiasm and prudence towards the outcome of the 
CSCE. Expectations that Helsinki would open new possibilities and 
scenarios opened for East-West cooperation were widespread, but, as 
Chancellor Schmidt warned few days after the conclusion of the 
conference, excessive enthusiasm should be toned down: big changes 
were not to be expected in the imminent future. According to Schmidt, 
the prosecution and improvement of détente rather depended “on the 
possibility to take concrete steps forward, starting from the common 
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foundations we have laid together, which can do justice to the hopes of 
people”.76  
However, there were many good reasons for the West German 
federal government to be satisfied with the outcome of the Helsinki 
CSCE. The West German delegation had invested great diplomatic 
efforts in multilateral negotiations, as it has been insightfully analysed 
by Hakkarainen in his work dedicated to the West German role in the 
first seminal phases of the process of multilateral détente.77 Bonn’s 
efforts were paid off by some important achievements which 
responded to West German primal interests and were perceived, as a 
consequence, as important national victories. The perception that the 
Helsinki CSCE had been a successful endeavour contributed to enhance 
Bonn’s confidence in its diplomatic possibilities and means. It probably 
reinforced also the decision of the West German Foreign Office to focus 
on the pursuit of a proactive multilateral policy of détente in the years 
to come: after Helsinki the CSCE process asserted itself as a priority 
field of action of Bonn’s diplomacy. 
In May 1972 the Auswärtiges Amt had drafted a document which 
provided the guidelines for the course the West German delegation 
would pursue at the CSCE negotiations.78 The paper identified some 
core interests which the West German diplomatic action would focus 
on: first, elaborating some common principles for the reinforcement of 
the international legal grounds of peaceful coexistence in Europe; 
second, intensifying human contacts, exchanges of information and 
economic cooperation between the blocs; third, creating forms of 
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interaction between political and military security; fourth, protecting 
the interests of the city of Berlin, which should not become object of 
negotiations; fifth, preserving the cohesion of the Western Alliance.79 
All those conference aims were the extension of the FRG’s main 
national and international interests. They all addressed the main 
dimensions of the German question at the beginning of the Seventies. If 
we look at the outcome of the conference, we can observe that all West 
German conference aims were, in principle, achieved. Hence, the 
experience of Helsinki encouraged Bonn’s idea that the CSCE provided 
an adequate stage for the FRG to successfully pursue its own foreign 
policy interests at the multilateral level. 
Fostering human and security aspects of détente 
In the declaration on the CSCE issued in front of the federal 
Parliament, the Bundestag, on 27 July 1975, the West German federal 
government confirmed its intention to use the chance offered by the 
CSCE “for the sake of the peoples living in divided Germany and in 
divided Europe and for the sake of peace in the continent”.80 The 
statement was the answer to the harsh criticisms coming from the 
opposition of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social 
Union (CDU/CSU), which strongly opposed the new policy of dialogue 
with Eastern Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.81 Beyond 
rhetoric, the inclusion of a “human chapter” in the Helsinki Final Act 
was a first important achievement for Bonn. Basket III was considered 
as the operative extension of the recognition of individual and 
collective human rights, sealed in the inclusion of Principle VII 
(“Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief”) and VIII (“Equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples”) in the preamble of the Final 
Act. The FRG had been, together with the Netherlands, the first 
advocate of human contacts within the EPC, struggling to make them 
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accepted as a common Western interest.82 Human contacts represented 
indeed a West German vital national interest: as long as millions of 
Germans still lived beyond the Iron Curtain, in the GDR and in the 
other Eastern countries, enhancing their possibilities of contacts with 
the West represented a tangible improvement in their everyday lives. 
As Hakkarainen highlights, “Basket III was not a symbolic tool to be 
used for propaganda purposes. [...] It was precisely due to 
Deutschlandpolitik reasons that improving contacts between people was 
one of the main ideas of West German CSCE policy.”83 Multiplying 
human contacts amongst European citizens would, moreover, 
contribute to that progressive rapprochement between the East and the 
West: this was the ideal aim and theoretical ground of the paradigm of 
“change through rapprochement” which represented the cornerstone of 
the Social Democratic new Ostpolitik, as it had been conceived and 
pursued by Brandt’s coalition government since the end of the Sixties 
and as it had been inherited and continued under his successor Helmut 
Schmidt since 1974. 
Contributing to the progressive reinforcement of the mutual trust 
necessary to construct a safer and peaceful atmosphere in Europe was 
also the ideal purpose of the confidence-building measures included in 
Basket I. Similarly to human contacts, CBMs were consistent with 
Bonn’s ideal aims and concrete interests. Indeed, the West German 
federal government attributed great importance to the provisions of 
Basket I.84 Because of the country’s geopolitical situation and its 
dependence on the allies for the provision of its own security, the FRG 
supported any initiatives in the field of security which contributed to 
make East-West relations more relaxed, transparent, calculable and less 
subject to the monopoly of the superpowers. The incorporation of 
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military aspects of security within multilateral détente should be 
completed, according to the West German idea, by favouring the 
beneficial interaction between the CSCE and its military side, namely 
the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), 
whose preliminary talks had started in 1973 in Vienna. The aim of 
integrating both frameworks worked only partially: as CSCE and 
MBFR negotiations were pursued in parallel, the first rapidly overtook 
the second. Negotiations in Vienna proceeded through the years at a 
very slow pace, were subject to frequent interruptions and susceptible 
to the mood swings of the relationship between the superpowers.85 No 
significant achievement was accomplished on the front of the MBFR 
and the planned conference in Vienna parallel to Helsinki was never 
realised. 
Involving the U.S. in European détente 
Preserving the unity of the Western Alliance had been one of West 
German main goals at the negotiations for the first CSCE. Bonn 
achieved two important results in Helsinki on this front: first, the 
involvement of the U.S. in the affairs of European détente; second, the 
multilateralisation of its own conference aims through the coordination 
within the Western caucuses.  
Washington had never hidden its scarce enthusiasm and a certain 
degree of annoyance for the European endeavour of the CSCE. The U.S. 
détente project devised by State Secretary Henry Kissinger was 
directed to reach a balance of power with the Soviet Union, reduce the 
costs of superpower competition and freeze the bilateral status quo. By 
trying to take advantage of some elements of Soviet weakness – namely 
its problematic relationship with China – the U.S. administration aimed 
at finding a solution to its own weaknesses after the debacle in 
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Vietnam.86 Within the U.S. overall international strategy, the CSCE 
represented a less important “European thing” which Washington 
desired to conclude quickly, trying to avoid any confrontation with the 
Soviet Union which could endanger the unfolding of the superpower 
dialogue.87 The American delegation at the CSCE had showed little 
interest in the negotiations in Geneva and had left the lead of the 
initiative to the group of the Community’s country, i.e. the EC-Nine.88 
Not only were the aims and the language of European détente alien to 
the U.S. administration, but Washington seriously feared that the CSCE 
would end up with a final imbalanced outcome in favour of the East. 
Undoubtedly, the Soviet acceptance of the U.S. participation in the 
CSCE had had the meaning of an implicit recognition of the U.S. role of 
responsibility over the Western part of Europe. But it was only the 
Soviet availability to make some concessions on human rights and 
human contacts which finally convinced the U.S. administration that 
the final conference outcome was far more favourable to the West than 
expected during negotiations.89 A shift occurred in Washington’s 
assessment of the CSCE after Helsinki: the U.S. Congress approved the 
Final Act and the Ford Administration started to engage itself for its 
implementation.  
In the analysis of the state of East-West relations after Helsinki 
drafted by the West German Foreign Office in September 1975, the 
changing attitude of the U.S. administration towards the CSCE was 
identified as one major aspect of novelty. Ford’s speech at the signing 
ceremony in Helsinki marked indeed, in Bonn’s view, the return of the 
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U.S. to the role of leader of the Western bloc.90 Washington’s more 
convinced involvement in the CSCE was perceived as an important 
step towards a greater American engagement in the process of 
European détente.91 The U.S. possible decoupling from European 
affairs had traditionally been a main source of worry for federal 
governments in Bonn. With the launch of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the 
question of the U.S. involvement had assumed the new meaning of 
Washington’s necessary backing to West German initiatives of dialogue 
with the East.92 As the Helsinki Final Act opened a new front of 
multilateral détente wherein Bonn’s federal government aimed at 
playing an active role, the U.S. backing was determinant. From the 
analysis paper of the Auswärtiges Amt emerged a certain degree of 
confidence that the American commitment to the CSCE would 
reinforce the West’s position in East-West cooperation after Helsinki. 
Bonn’s optimism can appear fallacious and somewhat naïf, particularly 
if assessed against the background of the following developments the 
CSCE process, the transatlantic relationship and East-West relations 
would go through. West German confidence was undoubtedly 
nourished by the gust of enthusiasm surrounding the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act. It has to be observed, however, that a convergence 
of interests between the projects of U.S. and European détente was in 
place in the months after Helsinki. Their respective conceptual 
constructions and ultimate goals remained different. But their 
interaction was more complex than the traditional view of a 
pronounced contraposition between superpower détente and European 
détente seems to suggest: the two processes run in parallel, diverged 
and found occasions of entente, depending on specific interests and 
international junctures. 
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Coordinating with the West and multilateralising national 
interests 
Besides the U.S. involvement in the dynamics of European détente, 
the coordination with the other Western partners – both within the 
group of the EC-Nine and NATO – was a matter of satisfaction for 
Bonn. The CSCE negotiations had been the first test for the new born 
mechanism of coordination amongst the foreign policies of the EC-
Nine, i.e. the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and for the 
coordination between the EPC and NATO frameworks.93 Preparing the 
Helsinki CSCE had been one of the most important operative tasks of 
the EPC.94 Cooperation amongst the EC-Nine was pursued at different 
levels: amongst national delegations in Geneva and Helsinki, within 
the committee of political directors and at the regular meetings of 
foreign ministers.95 A representative of the European Commission 
participated in negotiations in Geneva and spoke for the Nine when the 
Community’s common interests were at stake.96 All Western proposals 
were first voted within the CSCE ad hoc group and then communicated 
to the NATO group, where they were rediscussed and adjusted 
according to the aims of the whole Alliance.97 During negotiations in 
Geneva and Helsinki and then after 1975, the FRG managed to obtain 
the inclusion of its main requests in the fields of human contacts and 
movements – concerning particularly issues of family reunification, 
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working conditions of journalists and convening of a scientific forum – 
in the list of Western proposals. To this purpose, the West German 
diplomacy had skilfully used the mechanism of coordination between 
the EPC and NATO, obtaining first the EC partners’ support to its 
proposals in order to achieve joint positions for the ensuing discussion 
within NATO.98 Thanks to the mechanism of the EPC, Bonn managed 
to transform primary West German interests into shared Community’s 
aims. It is not a coincidence that the FRG had been, since the relaunch 
of the project of European Integration in 1969, one of the most 
convinced advocates of the idea of coordinating the EC members’ 
foreign policies by supporting more ambitious federalist stances.99 As 
the EC partners had discussed how to coordinate their conducts at the 
CSCE negotiations, the French had initially opposed to use the EPC 
framework for the pursuit of East-West dialogue. Paris’ resistance 
reflected the fear that a multilateral Western action would limit and 
weaken its deep-seated bilateral diplomacy towards the Soviet bloc.100 
Whereas France tried to avoid embedding its foreign policy at the 
multilateral level, multilateralism was instead for the FRG a question of 
necessity. 
It was at the CSCE negotiations that West German international 
interests with regard to East-West cooperation became fully 
multilateralised. As highlighted by Hakkarainen, the CSCE provided 
West German diplomacy with “unprecedented opportunities to utilise 
multilateral mechanism to pursue its national interests”101. The 
successful coordination within the Western Alliance displayed at the 
negotiations in Geneva did mark a watershed for the FRG’s foreign 
policy. Even though Bonn’s multilateral action was displayed on 
multiple stages – at the EC, at the UN, at the new-born economic 
summits of leading advanced economies, whose season was 
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inaugurated in November 1975 at Rambouillet – the CSCE represented 
a central stage to pursue multilateralism due to the centrality of East-
West dialogue within the West German foreign political complex. For 
this reason the coordination within the Western caucuses experienced 
at the Helsinki CSCE was, notwithstanding some problems and flaws, 
assessed very positively by the West German Foreign Office in the 
aftermath of the conference. When pointing out that, not only had the 
CSCE confirmed the unity of the Western Alliance, but it had provided 
a factor of further Western integration too,102 the Auswärtiges Amt was 
also implicitly addressing the successful integration of its own foreign 
policy aims into the framework of Western interests. 
The West German call for improving cooperation within the 
Western caucuses is a recurrent theme in the strategic papers of the 
Auswärtiges Amt. This constitutes one element of continuity in the 
unfolding of West German CSCE policy. Bonn committed itself to 
coordinating its CSCE aims with the Western partners both during the 
preparation of the CSCE follow-up meetings and during negotiations in 
Belgrade, Madrid and Stockholm. Preserving the West’s unity at the 
CSCE would remain a West German priority also in times of major drift 
within the Alliance. In the months ensuing the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act, Bonn’s Western political efforts were directed to the task of 
agreeing a common Western strategy with regard to the process of 
implementation and review of Helsinki’s commitments.103 
Keeping the German question out, keeping the German question 
open 
In West German foreign policy the commitment to Western 
coordination was one face of the coin, the commitment to the dialogue 
with the East the other. The CSCE provided Bonn with the opportunity 
to merge its Westpolitik and Ostpolitik into the same multilateral 
framework. In no other Western European country were the pursuit of 
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dialogue with the East and the coordination with the Western Alliance 
as strictly interwoven as in the West German case. Multilateralising the 
couple Ostpolitik-Westpolitik served a double purpose. On the one hand, 
Western partners were reassured, as the CSCE provided them with 
possibilitis to embed and monitor Bonn’s bilateral initiatives; on the 
other hand, the CSCE widened the FRG’s international room of 
manoeuvre, by offering West German diplomacy an additional stage to 
pursue its national interests. The main contents of Bonn’s Ostpolitik – 
economic cooperation, human contacts, and security issues – were 
multilaterally sealed in Helsinki. 
Besides being one of the propulsive forces of the CSCE, the FRG 
constituted its geopolitical centre as well. The CSCE was a product of 
the Cold War and divided Germany was the symbolic epicentre of the 
conference. Quite significantly, the most famous picture of the signing 
ceremony in Helsinki portrays the leaders of the two German states, 
West German Chancellor Schmidt and East German General Secretary 
of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Honecker talking friendly while 
sitting close to each other at the centre of the conference room. Albeit 
the German question was symbolically intrinsic to the CSCE – and 
several provisions of the Helsinki Final Act addressed issues strictly 
related to the German question – the West German diplomacy worked 
on keeping the specific aspects concerning inner-German relations out 
of the CSCE negotiation table. The 1972 signing of the Basic Treaty with 
the GDR – part of the complex of the so-called Eastern Treaties 
including also the 1970 agreements with Moscow and Warsaw – 
opened a new season of inner-German relations. The inner-German 
relations were characterised by peculiarities which did not allow 
framing them as normal international relations between sovereign 
states. Both the peculiar nature and the fragility of the inner-German 
relationship convinced Bonn of the opportunity to avoid them to 
become item of multilateral negotiations. This aim was achieved in 
Helsinki and remained a trademark of Bonn’s following CSCE policy. 
The state of inner-German relations represented a frequent issue of 
Bonn’s bilateral informal talks with the Western partners and the 
Eastern countries. Inner-German issues were discussed by the FRG and 
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the GDR in the margins of the conference in Helsinki, Belgrade and 
Madrid. But the specific contents of the inner-German dialogue were 
not multilateralised. Similarly, after the 1971 signing of the 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the rights and responsibilities of 
the Four Powers over the German capital and Germany as a whole 
were not item of debate at the CSCE.  
If the specific aspects of the inner-German relationship were to be 
excluded from multilateral negotiations, there was an issue which 
addressed the heart of the German question and whose inclusion in the 
conference final act West German diplomacy struggled for: i.e. the 
recognition of the possibility to change peacefully national borders in 
Europe. The West German delegation made the successful conclusion 
of the CSCE dependent on its inclusion in the list of principles of 
European détente: its mentioning in the Preamble of the Helsinki Final 
Act represented Bonn’s most important diplomatic victory at the CSCE 
negotiations.104  
The issue of borders had always been a central dimension of the 
German question.105 In the history of Europe, the borders of the 
German nation had represented an object of dispute with Germany’s 
neighbouring countries, by alimenting geo-political instability at the 
centre of the continent. Germany’s division had been the resulted of the 
defeat of WWII and had been consolidated by the ensuing Cold War 
developments, asserting itself as the cornerstone of Europe’s bipolar 
settlement. Any solution to the German question would inevitably pass 
through the modification of the inner-German border. Consequently, 
any discourse regarding the possible change of borders in Europe 
addressed, directly or indirectly, the German question. Issues related to 
borders in Europe – their inviolability, their securing, the conditions for 
their modification – could not but be at stake at a conference whose 
mandate consisted not only in favouring cooperation amongst its 
participants, but also laying the grounds to safeguard security on the 
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continent. The Soviet Union had not hidden its main interest in 
obtaining through the CSCE the definitive recognition of Europe’s 
territorial order as it had come out from WWII.106 To the Soviets and 
their allies – in particular to East Germans – it was important to attain 
in Helsinki a sufficient multilateral guarantee over the territorial status 
quo in Europe. This would neutralise those ambivalent elements 
regarding the issue of borders contained in the bilateral treaties signed 
with the FRG. Such ambiguities undermined, indeed, the full and 
incontestable recognition of the existence of two German states: the 
possibility for the FRG to issue unilateral declarations on “German 
unity” conceded by the Moscow Treaty and the Basic Treaty; the 
reference, contained in the Quadripartite Agreement, to the rights and 
responsibilities of the Four Powers over Germany as a whole; and the 
inclusion in the Moscow Treaty of a logic connection – the so-called 
“bridge sentence” – between the recognition of the principle of 
inviolability of frontiers and the preceding commitment to the principle 
of renouncing the use of force.107  
The same duality of interests sealed in the Eastern treaties was 
reproduced also in the list of guiding principles for the East-West 
modus vivendi in Europe of the Helsinki Final Act’s Preamble. The West 
German federal government needed a compensation for the recognition 
of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe the Eastern countries longed 
for: namely, inviolability had not to exclude the possibility for their 
change under certain conditions. Hence, the West German delegation 
directed its diplomatic efforts to avoid that the Helsinki principles 
might prejudice the possibility for a future change of the inner-German 
border, i.e. the possibility for a future solution to the German 
question.108 To this purpose, Bonn’s Foreign Office demanded the 
fulfilment of a series of requirements which would allow shaping the 
Helsinki Principles according to its (inter)national interests. First, the 
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principle of inviolability of frontiers had to be tied to the principle of 
renouncing the use and threat of force. Second, the possibility of their 
peaceful change should be explicitly mentioned in the Preamble of the 
Final Act. Third, all principles should have equal rank and their 
interpretation should take into account the other principles. Fourth, the 
declaration of principles should not have a legally binding character, 
i.e. it would not be subject to the principle of “lex posterior derogate lex 
priori”.109 The vital importance of all parties’ interests at stake dragged 
on negotiations on the principle of inviolability of frontiers until the 
very end of the conference and forced delegations to make hard 
concessions.110 The final outcome was a compromise that was 
satisfactory for the FRG. The principle of inviolability of frontiers was 
placed where the West German delegation wanted it – i.e. after the 
principle of renouncing the use and threat of force. Despite the lack of 
an explicit bridge sentence connecting both principles, an implicit tie 
between them was secured by their positioning. The equal rank of all 
principles was implied by declaring that “all principles are of primary 
significance”.  
Most importantly, the West German delegation had managed to 
obtain the inclusion in the Helsinki Final Act of the following floating 
formulation: “The participating states consider that their frontiers can 
be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means 
and by agreement”. The option of the peaceful change of existing 
national borders was directly connected with the “state of peace in 
Europe” that the FRG aimed at creating through the pursuit of its 
détente policy.111 Conservative aspects of the Helsinki Final Act had 
been counterbalanced by the introduction of a dynamic element of 
change which was consistent with the ideal horizon of West German 
Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik. As the West German federal 
government declared in front of the Bundestag, inviolability of frontiers 
meant that changes of borders imposed through coercion were 
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forbidden; this not excluded, however, the possibility itself of change 
under peaceful conditions.112 Even though Germany’s division was not 
explicitly mentioned in the Helsinki Final Act, it represented the first 
implicit target of the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers. As 
Hakkarainen has highlighted, the recognition of the possibility of a 
peaceful change of frontiers in Europe had the meaning to leave a small 
back door open to the future solution to the German question.113  
The West German federal government did not hide the German 
political relevance of the “peaceful change of frontiers” in the aftermath 
of Helsinki. The link between the dynamic elements of the CSCE 
process and the possibility for a future German reunification was 
repeatedly mentioned in public statements and official speeches since 
the summer of 1975. It was an answer to those in the FRG who saw in 
the outcome of the CSCE an additional multilateral recognition of the 
division of their nation. Hence, the Helsinki Final Act provided the 
West German federal government with an additional tool to address 
publicly the issue of the future solution to the German question. The 
CSCE marked, indeed, a multilateralisation of the public discourse on 
the German reunification. Whilst references to the future overcoming of 
Germany’s division almost disappeared from the contents of the 
bilateral Ostpolitik, the CSCE process offered the fertile ground for 
reiterating the discourse on German reunification, by framing it within 
the broader discourse on the long-term goals of European détente. 
To sum up, the Ostpolitik of the West German federal government 
became fully multilateralised at Helsinki. Once set in place, the CSCE 
provided the main framework which entangled Bonn’s bilateral 
Eastern policy, completed it, solved its main imminent problems – i.e. 
coordinating Ostpolitik and Westpolitik and keeping open the public 
discourse on German reunification – and long-term problems – i.e. 
providing, at least in principle, for the possible solution to the German 
question. 
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Puzzling the West German victory in Helsinki 
The dispute over the principle of inviolability of frontiers provided 
evidence for profoundly divergent interests and aims with which the 
Eastern and Western countries approached the CSCE. As Garton Ash 
has highlighted, whilst the Helsinki Accords represented for the East 
the “sealing of Yalta”, they marked in the Western view the starting of 
a process aimed at “overcoming Yalta”.114 As multifaceted document, 
result of laborious mediations and mutual concessions, the Helsinki 
Final Act had inevitably the character of a compromise. Its provisions 
contains ambiguities which opened the way to different interpretations 
in the East and the West. It is not surprising, hence, that initial 
triumphalism surrounding the successful conclusion of the conference 
was soon replaced by growing uncertainties when the CSCE 
participant states moved to the phase of the implementation of the 
Helsinki Accords. 
Internal papers of the Auswärtiges Amt reveal Bonn’s awareness that 
the implementation path would be long and insidious. An internal 
analysis drafted in September 1975 highlighted that both the Western 
and the Eastern countries would be faced with difficulties when 
compelled to put into practice the commitments made in Helsinki.115 
Bonn looked with particular attention to the ongoing developments 
beyond the Iron Curtain. The first implementation steps undertaken by 
the Soviet bloc’s countries with regard to the publication of the 
Helsinki Accords were less coordinated than expected. Few months 
after its signing, the text of the Helsinki Final Act had been published 
in the USSR, the GDR, the CSSR and Romania, whilst Poland, Hungary 
and Bulgaria remained inactive.116 It was evident that the 
implementation of Helsinki’s substantial provisions, particularly in the 
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fields of Basket III, would represent a great challenge for the Eastern 
European leaders. The Auswärtiges Amt suggested, therefore, that the 
West should necessarily display as much patience during the 
implementation process as it did during negotiations. Once the 
“constitution” of European détente had been signed, a double problem 
of implementation and interpretation arouse. It was easily predictable 
that the constitutional principles of the East-West modus vivendi would 
be object of divergent interpretations in the two blocs. Despite its 
compromise character, the declaration of principles reflected to the 
largest extent Western ideas of détente: it was to expect, hence, that 
Eastern countries would take on a defensive attitude in the aftermath of 
the conference. Bonn expected that its main diplomatic achievement, 
i.e. the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers, would be ignored or 
challenged by the Soviet bloc by adopting selective interpretations of 
Helsinki’s principles and focusing on the respect of the participants’ 
respective “laws, traditions and customs”.117 Predictably, the appeal to 
the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs (Principle VI) would 
be used to hinder any Western imitative directed to the enforcement of 
the dynamic aspects of the CSCE. As West German State Secretary 
Gehlhoff discussed with his French colleague De Courcel few days 
before the signing ceremony in Helsinki, particularly West German 
détente initiatives would be probably condemned as attempts to 
pursue the German reunification in violation of Helsinki’s principles.118 
West German predictions were well-founded. Eastern and Western 
delegations in Helsinki had limited themselves to sharing a general 
interest in finding some common rules which would stabilise their 
mutual relations. A shared vision of the meaning and aims of the 
project of European détente was never developed: the existence of this 
core misunderstanding was well shown by the divergent arguments 
used by the two blocs to claim their respective victory at the CSCE. 
Political leaders both in the East and in the West presented to their 
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public opinions different assessments of Helsinki’s achievements that 
could suit their own international and national interests best. 
Particularly in the Eastern bloc the Helsinki Final Act was largely used 
as tool of ideological struggle. The Soviet commitment to the CSCE 
provided Eastern leaders with additional arguments to reinforce the 
USSR’s image as a peaceful power. On the other side, any Western 
criticism directed towards the Eastern countries in the aftermath of the 
conference was publicly blamed for being contrary to the letter and 
spirit of Helsinki.119 The West’s decision to make a compromise with 
the East over rules for the bipolar modus vivendi was used as a tool of 
Eastern propaganda in support of the argument of the West’s endemic 
crisis and growing weakness.  
Eastern victorious claims levered up some aspects of the Helsinki 
Final Act which the Soviet bloc had good reasons to believe to be the 
main beneficiary of. The Helsinki Accords provided indeed the Soviet 
Union and its allies with the international prestige ad tutelage they had 
long sought. In particular, Principles I (“The participating States will 
respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well all the 
rights inherent in and encompassed by sovereignty, including in 
particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial 
integrity”) and VI (“The participating states agree to refrain from any 
intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal 
and external affairs falling within domestic jurisdiction of another 
participating State, regardless of their mutual relations”) meant for 
Moscow the confirmation of Potsdam’s settlement of Europe and the 
definitive guarantee of the inviolability of the Soviet sphere of 
influence. The parallelism between 1945 Potsdam conference and 1975 
CSCE was recurrent in Eastern assessments: both conferences shared 
the common aim of defining Europe’s clear-cut geopolitical settlement 
and providing for the tools of its securing.120 The German question 
could be considered in the Eastern view as definitively closed: as a 
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signing country of the Helsinki Final Act, the GDR had achieved at the 
CSCE that multilateral acknowledgement of its existence as sovereign 
country and its equality with the FRG which marked the culmination of 
the recent process of international recognition started with the signing 
of the 1972 Basic Treaty with Bonn. On the whole the Helsinki Final Act 
provided the Soviet Union with a multilateral reassurance against its 
endemic geopolitical insecurity. As Tony Judt put it: “not only were the 
political division of post-war Europe now officially and publicly 
accepted, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the GDR and 
other satellite regimes officially conceded; the Western powers had for 
the first time foresworn all ‘armed intervention or threat of such 
intervention against another participating State’”.121  
According to Moscow’s conservative idea of détente, in the 
aftermath of Helsinki the stress was put predominantly on the static 
aspects of the Final Act. As West German Ambassador at NATO Krapf 
reported in September 1975, a restrictive interpretation of the Helsinki 
Final Act was being propagated by Eastern mass-medias. The Eastern 
interpretation displayed the following characteristics: a pronounced 
stress was put on the significance of the Helsinki Accords in 
recognising the validity of the principle of peaceful coexistence and 
contributing to the prosecution of international class confrontation; the 
clause of the “peaceful change of national borders” was not mentioned; 
hierarchical distinctions were introduced amongst Helsinki’s principles 
and baskets, by ascribing to them different degrees of importance; the 
implementation of the multilateral commitments of the CSCE was 
made independent by the pursuit of bilateral relations between the 
conference’s participants.122  
According to the analysis of the West German Foreign Office, the 
East’s restrictive approach to the implementation and interpretation of 
the Helsinki Final Act revealed the emergence, in the aftermath of the 
                                                          
121 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, p. 501. 
122 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, 
vol. II, doc. 275, p. 1278. 
57 
 
conference, of a more general defensive attitude towards détente.123 
Whereas during negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki Brezhnev had 
shown a less ideological attitude – by renouncing to frame 
developments on the front of the CSCE into the Soviet ideology and 
interpreting them rather as the result of all participants’ common 
efforts for dialogue – a shift towards more pronounced ideological 
stances occurred in the Soviet CSCE strategy in the months ensuing the 
signing of the Final Act. This renewed ideological turn unveiled in 
Bonn’s view a certain degree of unsafeness and weakness of the Eastern 
bloc.124  
Besides anti-Western press campaigns, matters of greater concern 
for Bonn were some worrisome signals coming from East Berlin. On 7 
October 1975 a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Support 
was signed between the Soviet Union and the GDR.125 Its signing 
confirmed that the principle of “peaceful coexistence between states 
with different social systems” was valid only for the Eastern countries’ 
external relations with the West. 126 With regard to intra-bloc relations, 
the Brezhnev Doctrine remained in place and overrode the application 
of the Helsinki’s principles.127 Few weeks before the signing of the 
treaty with Moscow, SED General Secretary Honecker had publicly 
addressed the question of the implementation of Basket III with words 
which left little room for West German hopes to improving human 
contacts with East Germans. As Honecker cleared up while speaking in 
front of East German soldiers of the National People’s Army (NVA) in 
September 1975, the GDR would not tolerate any openings 
representing disguised attempts to introduce espionage, sabotage or 
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ideological diversion in the country under the cloak of “freedom of 
information” and “human contacts”.128 In December 1975 
correspondent of the West German magazine Der Spiegel Jörg R. Mettke 
was expelled by the GDR; his expulsion was followed a year later by a 
similar measure taken by East German authorities against 
correspondent of West German television channel ARD Lothar Loewe 
who had often denounced the shootings of East German citizens at the 
inner-German border.129 In both cases, expulsions were justified by East 
German authorities as necessary measures to contrast defamation of the 
country’s organs and leaders.130 In response to the increasing 
permeability of the East-West border which the signing of the Helsinki 
Agreements had further encouraged, East Berlin pursued a strategic 
course which merged the continuation of the policy of ideological 
demarcation from the FRG (Abgrenzungspolitik) launched by Honecker 
in 1971 with efforts to impose restrictive interpretations of Helsinki´s 
provisions. The GDR was the country in the Eastern bloc which was 
most exposed to the detrimental consequences of a rapprochement 
with the West which ultimately aimed at changing the European 
geopolitical settlement. Whilst the Helsinki Accords had provided the 
East German state with international prestige and a consolidation of 
profitable economic cooperation with the West, decisions in the field of 
human contacts contained hidden dangers which might undermine the 
existence of the socialist model itself in the long-run. Ideological 
competition flanked diplomatic cooperation within East Berlin´s 
Westpolitik. Quite significantly, East German Minister for State Security 
(STASI) Mielke spoke of the necessity to pursue a “harsher form of 
class struggle” after Helsinki.131 
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Notwithstanding existing nuances of standpoints from country to 
country, the Soviet bloc as a whole adopted a common approach 
towards the Helsinki Final Act that the Auswärtiges Amt summarised as 
it follows: discretionary interpretation of the Declaration of Principles, 
with the purpose of conserving the status quo of Europe’s settlement; 
and restrictive approach towards the implementation of Basket III, 
directed to the protection of Eastern European societies from external 
influences.132 As the GDR’s Ministry for State Security had foreseen, 
Basket III turned out to be the greatest challenge for Eastern leaders. 
Some steps to implement Helsinki’s commitments in the human field 
were made in the East: for instance, transit taxes were lowered, more 
working visas for Western journalists and more authorisations to the 
import of films and books from the West were conceded. As Peter has 
highlighted, concessions of this sort were made by the Eastern leaders 
with the main purpose of providing the impression that they were 
committed to fully implementing all parts of the Final Act.133 Western 
requests for the fulfilment of additional provisions in the field of 
human contacts were steadily parried by the Eastern leaders by 
appealing to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. 
Principle VI – conceived by the West with the aim of banning external 
coercive interventions in the domestic jurisdiction of the (Eastern) 
participant countries, particularly thinking back to the past experiences 
of 1956 Hungary and 1968 Prague – was indeed largely used in the 
Soviet bloc to hinder Western demands for greater circulation of 
persons, ideas and information.134 The weight of Basket III’s clauses had 
been somewhat underestimated during negotiations by the Eastern 
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delegations which had held them to be declarations of intents directed 
to pleasing Western public opinion rather than enforceable clauses. 
What they had not fully foreseen was, most importantly, that the 
commitments made in Helsinki with regard to human rights and 
human contacts would turn into a significant tool for domestic 
pressure. In the months after Helsinki, Eastern European leaders were 
faced with a largely unexpected burgeoning of circles, groups, 
organisations, initiatives of dissidents and citizens demanding the 
fulfilment of Helsinki’s obligations in the human field.135 The Helsinki 
Final Act became the most important weapon at disposal of dissidents 
and citizens in Eastern Europe – organised as “Helsinki movements” – 
to legitimise their demands for liberalisation of their societies. 
At the beginning of 1976 the West German ambassador in Moscow 
reported the existence of serious worries in the USSR about the 
“euphoria for liberalisation” that the Helsinki process might 
generate.136 Indeed, demands for reforms of socialist societies increased 
in the first months of 1976 during the preparation of the Conference of 
Communist and Workers’ Parties in Europe. The unfolding of the 
conference’s preparation was strictly intertwined with the 
developments on the front of the CSCE. To Helsinki groups’ requests 
for liberalisation added the demands for reforms coming from some 
Western communist parties. The alternative “euro-communist project” 
had taken a more defined shape in the mid-Seventies. The Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) had launched, with the support of the French 
and the Spanish communists, a call for a more modern, efficient and 
human form of socialism resting upon the acceptance of political 
pluralism and democratic rules.137 The euro-communist theses 
challenged the compactness of the socialist movement, by aiming at 
realising a new form of “socialism with a human face” in Western 
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Europe as an alternative to the model of real socialism governing 
Eastern European societies.138 It became soon clear to the Soviet 
leadership that the upcoming Conference of European Communist and 
Workers’ Parties in East Berlin would inevitably turn into a terrain of 
direct confrontation between the Soviet orthodoxy and the euro-
communist alternative.139 After the Chinese schism and the uncertain 
developments of Portugal’s transition, the USSR feared that Euro-
communism could create another Mediterranean front within the 
communist movement, able to endanger the Soviet undisputed 
leadership.140 Moreover, memories of the 1968 Prague Spring were still 
very vivid: there was some fear that the euro-communist demands 
might spread to East European parties and societies, particularly 
amongst the young generations, whose liberalisation requests had been 
encouraged by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The conference in 
East Berlin, which initially scheduled for the immediate aftermath of 
Helsinki with the mandate of working out a common position of the 
communist movement on the prosecution of East-West détente, was 
postponed to the summer of 1976.141  
The West German Foreign Office observed with great attention the 
ongoing developments in the Soviet bloc between the second half of 
1975 and the first half of 1976. The preparation of the Conference of 
Communist and Workers Parties in Europe was assessed in Bonn as the 
main reason of Soviet ideological and defensive attitude towards the 
CSCE process.142 From the papers of the Auswärtiges Amt emerg the 
West German awareness of the precariousness marking the 
achievements reached in Helsinki. Moscow’s difficulties and worries 
contained indeed an element of potential danger for the prosecution of 
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East-West cooperation. There were the margins, however, to use such 
elements of weakness to the Western advantage in order to force the 
Soviet bloc to implement Helsinki’s commitments and make further 
concessions. In the aftermath of Helsinki the CSCE process looked open 
to possible future developments in different directions. The goal of 
shaping its prosecution according to West German interests faced 
Bonn’s CSCE policy with some tasks: continuing to analyse carefully 
political developments beyond the Iron Curtain; pursuing good 
bilateral relations with the East and using them to foster the full 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act; and, most importantly, 
refining an effective concerted Western strategy. 
 
A concerted Western strategy for the process of implementation 
The uncertainties marking the first phases of Helsinki’s 
implementation track raised questions in Bonn about which direction 
the CSCE process could and would take after Helsinki’s seminal act. 
The Eastern bloc’s selective approach towards the interpretation and 
the implementation of the Final Act’s provisions compelled the 
Western Alliance to respond with adequate, concerted initiatives.143 
West German diplomatic efforts were directed, in the second half of 
1975 and throughout 1976, to fostering a comprehensive and balanced 
implementation of all chapters of the Helsinki Final Act in concert with 
the Western partners.  
As the members of the EC-Nine’s newly-established working group 
on the CSCE confirmed on 12 September 1975 in Venice: “Cornerstone 
for a successful implementation of the Helsinki Final Act is the 
coordination within the frameworks of the EPC and NATO. The West 
will prepare carefully for Belgrade and advance concrete proposals, in 
order not to lose the initiative”.144 The traditional EPC’s voting 
mechanism had been replaced in September 1975 through the 
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establishment of a working group with an extensive mandate in the 
field of East-West dialogue, with the purpose of reinforcing political 
coordination amongst the EC-Nine with regard to détente policies.145 Its 
tasks mainly focused on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords: 
the working group was in charge of monitoring the CSCE participants’ 
respective implementation efforts; it should deal with the multilateral 
implementation of Helsinki’s provisions within the competent 
multilateral frameworks (ECE, UNESCO, etc.); and it was intended to 
favour the exchange of information amongst the Nine with regard to 
their bilateral Eastern policies.146 The FRG fostered the idea of 
establishing an “information pool” on the implementation of the Final 
Act also within NATO.147 Similarly to the EC-Nine’s working group, 
NATO’s “information pool” would be entrusted with the main task of 
improving coordination through a continuous exchange of information 
amongst the Western partners, both at the bilateral and multilateral 
level.148 In the aftermath of Helsinki, Bonn fostered with conviction any 
initiative directed to reinforcing and institutionalising the foreign 
political cooperation within both Western caucuses. The West German 
commitment to the consolidation of a Western concerted détente policy 
remained still valid after the FRG had obtained the official multilateral 
legitimisation of its Eastern policy at the Helsinki CSCE. As the CSCE 
process gradually asserted itself as a major West German foreign policy 
priority per se, the multilateral coordination with the Western Alliance 
took on new significance for Bonn. 
The FRG’s insistence on improving Western coordination in the 
field of East-West dialogue collided with France’s reluctance. The 
pursuit of the special relationship between Bonn and Paris was one of 
the cornerstones of the FRG’s international action in the years of the 
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Schmidt government. Its burgeoning was largely due to the personal 
bonne entente of the West German Chancellor with French President 
Giscard d’Estaing.149 However, it turned out to be more problematic 
when issues of détente and security policies were at stake.150 In these 
areas Paris was willing to preserve its autonomous sphere of action.151 
As West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has highlighted in his 
memoirs, the contradiction between the French and West German 
security policy interests could never be solved.152 With regard to the 
dialogue with the East, France was jealous of its tradition of good ties 
with Moscow – the politique à l’Est – started by Charles De Gaulle in 
early 1964.153 And after all, Paris had never hidden a certain annoyance 
towards the conduction of détente as a NATO policy under the U.S. 
leadership.154 As West German Ambassador at the NATO headquarters 
Krapf reported to the Auswärtiges Amt, France´s bilateral Eastern policy 
had returned to be in the foreground of the country’s overall détente 
strategy after Helsinki.155 At the meeting of the NATO Council on 19 
September 1975, the French ambassador openly expressed scepticism 
towards the U.S. proposal of conducting regular consultations on the 
implementation of the Helsinki Accords within the Atlantic Alliance: 
being the CSCE concluded, there was no need for further multilateral 
consultations.156 With the exclusion of France, the U.S. proposal 
encountered the favour of all other NATO’s countries. The positive 
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moment of transatlantic convergence over détente continued during 
the fall of 1975. Consultations within NATO focused on some 
problematic aspects of the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions in 
the field of security. Their manifold tasks included: the regular 
exchange of information about the implementation steps taken by the 
Soviet bloc, with particular regard to CBMs and the interconnected 
field of MBFR; the careful analysis of all agreements signed both at the 
bilateral and multilateral level within the CSCE framework; regular 
consultations about the conduction of more targeted public policies and 
public relations, with the aim of reinforcing the image of NATO’s role 
as main actor of détente, in response to Eastern propagandistic anti-
Western campaigns. 157  
According to Bonn’s viewpoint, the main political task the Alliance 
had to cope with in order to enhance its relative weight within the 
process of implementation of Helsinki’s commitments was twofold: 
strengthening internal coordination and putting pressures on the 
Eastern countries. The area of confidence-building measures offered 
best chances to pursue this dual strategy.158 Basket I’s CBMs were the 
quintessence of the trends marking the implementation process in the 
aftermath of Helsinki: they were subject to divergent interpretations in 
the West and in the East; they were used for propagandistic purposes; 
and their implementation featured mixed results. The West German 
federal government fostered an extensive interpretation and a full 
implementation of the dispositions of the Helsinki Accords in the field 
of CBMs. Bonn’s special interest in Helsinki’s Basket I was not 
surprising, considering that most of NATO’s military manoeuvres took 
place on its national territory.159 But it was fuelled also by another 
reason: namely, focusing on the implementation of Helsinki’s “security 
chapter” served to support the idea that security and political aspects 
of détente were closely interwoven within the CSCE. Against the Soviet 
attempts to impose a clear-cut separation between political détente and 
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military détente, the importance of pursuing a balanced 
implementation of all aspects of the CSCE, was unceasingly repeated in 
West German strategic analyses, public statements and diplomatic 
talks.  
According to the commitments made in Helsinki, Bonn announced 
two military manoeuvres taking place on its territory in the summer of 
1975 – “Grosse Rochade” in August and “Certain Track” in September 
of the same year. All CSCE countries were invited to send observers: 
fifteen governments answered positively to the West German 
invitation, none of whom belonging to the Eastern bloc.160 No 
manoeuvres were instead signalised by the Warsaw Pact’s countries. A 
propagandistic campaign was rather started by the Eastern countries 
blaming NATO for violating the spirit of détente by conducting 
military manoeuvres in the direct aftermath of the conference 
conclusion. In the case of CBMs, similarly as in other fields of the 
CSCE, the implementation game between the East and the West was 
played both in the field of concrete realisations and public receptions. 
As West German Ambassador Krapf analysed in September 1975, 
Western initiatives should not be limited to putting pressure on the 
Warsaw Pact’s countries for fully implementing Helsinki’s dispositions 
on security matters. They should rather be flanked by adequate public 
answers to Soviet attacks. It was necessary, hence, to collect more 
information about military manoeuvres in the Eastern countries in 
order to evaluate them together with the NATO partners and pursue 
then a targeted press and information policy directed to counteracting 
Soviet propaganda.161 
The USSR gave first notice of a military exercise in Transcaucasia 
only in January 1976.162 Only five of all CSCE signing countries were 
invited to observe, namely Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and 
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Yugoslavia, i.e. the countries confining with the exercise area.163 A 
second Warsaw Pact’s military manoeuvre was announced by Hungary 
in April 1976. 164 It was a poor result, against the seven military 
manoeuvres notified by NATO in the months between the summer of 
1975 and the spring of 1976. Eastern European countries had chosen the 
way of a “minimal implementation”. As the West German Foreign 
Office observed, they had decided to give no notice of manoeuvres 
involving less than 25,000 men; not to respond to invitations to send 
their observers to manoeuvres held by members of the Western 
Alliance; and to invite to attend their manoeuvres under the guise of 
observers only representatives of neighbouring states.165 
 
Time for a first assessment of the CSCE 
Six months after the signing of the constitutional act of the CSCE, 
West German MPs of the majority fractions of SPD and FDP presented 
a parliamentary enquiry, in which they asked for elucidations on the 
state of Helsinki Final Act’s implementation and on the federal 
government’s expectations for the first follow-up conference in 
Belgrade.166 It was time for the federal government to make a first, 
interim assessment of what had been achieved so far on the front of the 
CSCE. The answer to the parliamentary enquiry came in May 1976. 
Hence, according to the federal government, the implementation path 
displayed mixed results.167 Unlike in the case of CBMs, Basket II – and 
particularly economic cooperation – was the field where most concrete 
improvements ensued the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Facilitations 
to East-West trade and business had been introduced. Several Western 
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enterprises had obtained the authorization to open foreign 
representations in the Soviet bloc. In February 1976 COMECON’s 
countries accepted the invitation to negotiation advanced by the EEC in 
November 1974: a significant development whose way had been paved, 
according to the West German federal government, by the signing of 
the Final Act.168 Positive developments were paralleled, however, by 
Eastern pronounced reluctance to mention explicitly the Helsinki Final 
Act in negotiations, talks, protocols, and agreements.169 
Encouraging steps had been made in some fields of Basket III as 
well, with particular regard to the matter of family reunification. The 
number of Eastern citizens visiting their families in the West or 
obtaining permissions to leave their countries for family reasons 
increased steadily after the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Some 
concrete measures, as the decision of decreasing fees for passports and 
visit permissions, were also welcomed in Bonn as small but positive 
steps in the direction of favouring the multiplication of East-West 
human contacts. Small facilitations were also introduced on the front of 
working conditions of Western accredited correspondents in the Soviet 
bloc’s countries. A cultural agreement had been signed by the FRG 
with Bulgaria in November 1975, a similar agreement was under 
negotiation with Poland and promising conditions existed for opening 
negotiations on cultural matters also with Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia.170  
In all fields of the Helsinki Accords, encouraging developments 
were opposed by uncertainties and reluctant stances. Eastern proofs of 
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good will were counterweights by attempts to curb cooperation at 
minimal levels. By assessing the first results of the implementation 
process ten months after the signing of the Final Act, the West German 
federal government was faced with the perennial question about the 
glass being half full or half empty. Notwithstanding the difficulties and 
ambiguous trends which emerged during the first months of 
implementation, Bonn approached Belgrade with a great deal of 
confidence in the potential for improvement inherent in the CSCE 
process. As Genscher stated in front of the Bundestag, the CSCE 
represented a chance: “nothing more, but nothing less too”.171 The West 
German federal government remained convinced that the Helsinki 
Final Act represented a forward-looking program: processes of change 
within Eastern societies and in East-West relations could not but be 
slow and gradual. No radical and rapid transformations were to expect 
in the short run, as it was unceasingly repeated by Genscher and his 
officers in official documents and public statements. 
One year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, former West-
German Chancellor and father of Bonn’s new Eastern policy Willy 
Brandt, interviewed by Bonn’s correspondent of the Soviet newspaper 
Prawda and asked to assess the role of the CSCE, observed that the 
influence of the conference on international politics had been more 
limited than expected. It was however undoubted, continued Brandt, 
that uncertainties in international affairs would be much more 
dangerous if not contrasted by the presence in Europe of stabilising 
factors as the CSCE.172  
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“Wenn die eine Seite der anderen Seite, die an der Brücke weiterbauen will, keine 
Antwort auf die Frage gibt, wie es weitergehen soll, dann bleibt die Brücke unvollendet 
und erreicht das gegenüberliegende Ufer nicht. Wir sind nicht dafür, dass Brücken 
abgerissen werden – im Gegenteil: wir wollen, dass Mauern durchlässigen werden.“173 
Dispatch of the West German delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting 
in Belgrade, November 3, 1977 
 
“Is not peace in the last analysis a matter of human rights?” 
Arthur Goldberg quoting J.F. Kennedy, inaugural address of the U.S. 
delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade, November 4, 1977 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Putting the FRG’s Realistic Policy of Détente to 
the Test: West German Diplomacy at the First 
CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade (1977-1978) 
 
Introduction: Domestic and international developments paving 
the way to the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade 
According to the third article of Helsinki Final Act’s Basket IV 
dedicated to the “Follow-up to the Conference”, all thirty-five 
participant states of the CSCE would meet again in 1977 in Belgrade to 
review and improve the process of European détente. The preparation 
of the first CSCE follow-up meeting unfolded within an international 
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context marked by the progressive deterioration of East-West 
cooperation. Whilst Europeans were celebrating the triumph of détente 
on their continent, the superpowers continued their confrontation in 
the Third World, by fighting proxy wars in Angola (1975-76) and 
Ethiopia (1977-78).174 During 1976 the language of détente lost 
popularity in the United States, where the political debate was 
dominated by the ongoing presidential election campaign during 
which the grounds for a major foreign political turn were laid. In the 
meanwhile, the Soviet Union started stealthily a program of renovation 
of its nuclear arsenals on the European continent. The beginning in the 
mid-Seventies of what historians have referred to as the “crisis of 
détente” unfolded slowly and regarded in the first place and foremost 
the relationship between the superpowers.  
A great hint to the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet diplomatic ties 
was given by the unexpected change of power in Washington. Whilst 
1976 federal elections in the FRG largely reconfirmed the ruling 
government of Schmidt/Genscher, testifying to the existence of a broad 
popular support for West Germany’s successful economic model – the 
Modell Deutschland – and for the recent achievements of the federal 
government’s policy of détente, American electors opted for a political 
change.  
The idea underpinning Kissinger’s foreign political project in the 
Nixon and Ford years was that superpower détente served the purpose 
of managing reduced bipolar competition in times of perceived 
American declining hegemony.175 According to Zubok, the declining 
phase of détente in the United States had begun in 1975 independently 
from specific international developments, when the concept became 
increasingly target of criticism of politicians both in the Republican and 
                                                          
174 For an analysis of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, see O.A. Westad, The Global Cold 
War: Third World interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
175 For an account of the years of the “American crisis”, see: F. Romero, Storia della guerra 
fredda. L’ultimo conflitto per l’Europa (Torino: Einaudi, 2009), pp. 227-238 .  
72 
 
Democratic ranks.176 The rejection of Nixon-Kissinger’s overall foreign 
and domestic political agenda was at the core of the program of moral 
regeneration launched by Ford’s opponent Jimmy Carter. Carter’s 
promises of renewal, which originated from the desire to break with 
the years of disillusionment that had followed the Vietnam War and 
the Watergate scandal, brought the former governor of Georgia to win 
the presidential elections in November 1976.  
The promised turn concerned the contents and style of U.S. foreign 
policy too.177 Carter’s inauguration in January 1977 was marked by the 
announcement of the pursuit of a new international policy course, 
which aimed at enhancing transparency, morality, commitment to 
disarmament and centrality of human rights in foreign policy.178 It was 
with regard to the last aspect in particular that Carter showed 
immediately the seriousness of his intentions. A series of resounding 
initiatives in support of Soviet dissidents were taken by the new 
American administration during its first months of activity. Carter’s 
idea of dealing with Moscow through a more open diplomacy was 
limited foremost to the practice of denouncing publicly ongoing 
violations of human rights perpetrated by Soviet authorities. According 
to Wilfried Loth, three main factors were behind Carter’s human rights 
struggle: first, the idea of a mission that the U.S. President was entitled 
to, in order to extend the values of democracy and relaunch the U.S. 
image in the world; second, the strategic vision of his Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski who aimed at destabilising the Soviet domination 
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over Eastern Europe;179 and third, the exploitation of the international 
human rights campaign for domestic purposes.180 Washington’s 
assertiveness on human rights contributed to push this issue to the top 
of the international agenda in the course of 1977, as the Western 
Alliance was busy with the preparation of the CSCE follow-up meeting 
in Belgrade. The cumbersome presence of human rights issues 
complicated the achievement of a Western agreement over the future 
direction of the process of détente, boosted mutual mistrust between 
the superpowers and had important repercussions on the unfolding of 
the Belgrade CSCE. 
The West German federal government looked with concern at the 
new developments in the U.S. administration’s international strategy. 
The continuation of East-West détente required a certain degree of 
international stability that the redefinition of the cornerstones of the 
superpower dialogue seemed to endanger. The cooling-off of Soviet-
U.S. relations added to other factors of instability which complicated 
the background against which Bonn’s Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik 
moved in the second half of the Seventies. The troubled 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in the Eastern bloc had been 
paralleled by a renewed stronger ideological turn in Soviet foreign 
policy. Moscow was providing large support to Communists in 
Portugal where a difficult process of transition to democracy was 
ongoing and had got wide-ragingly involved in the Angolan civil war. 
New initiatives in the field of rearmament were undertaken by the 
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Warsaw Pact which started the replacement of its old intermediate-
range nuclear weapons stationed in Eastern Europe by more modern 
SS-20 missiles. Inner-German relations were going through difficult 
moments due to Moscow’s rigid Berlin policy, East Berlin’s repressive, 
domestic political course and repeated incidents at the inner-German 
border.181 
By assessing which possible scenarios and diplomatic tasks West 
German foreign policy would be faced with in the course of 1977, the 
Auswärtiges Amt maintained, however, its confidence in the 
opportunity of continuing European détente. The validity of the 
process initiated by the Helsinki CSCE seemed to find confirmation in 
some encouraging developments taking place on the front of East-West 
cooperation. The number of permits to leave the country conceded by 
Soviet authorities within the framework of family reunification had 
noticeably grown. Bonn’s improved relations with Poland had borne 
their fruits as well: after the signing of bilateral agreements regulating 
mutual cooperation in various fields in 1975-1976, a growing number of 
Germans living in the neighbouring country had got the possibility to 
leave for the FRG (23.306 in 1976 against 7.041 in 1975). Economic 
relations with all Eastern countries had improved, notwithstanding the 
restrictions to trade exchange imposed by the poor solvency of the 
Eastern partners.182 Bonn’s Ostpolitik had benefited from the favourable 
intertwining of bilateral and multilateral initiatives since the summer of 
1975. The good moment of détente marked by the conclusion of the 
CSCE was utilised by the West German federal government to improve 
bilateral relations with all Eastern countries. Between November and 
December 1975 Schmidt and Genscher visited the USSR, Bulgaria and 
Romania.183 CSCE issues continued to be object of discussions and 
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analysis with the Eastern leaders throughout 1976:184 bilateral talks 
offered to Schmidt and Genscher the occasion to reiterate the 
importance of a prompt implementation of Helsinki’s commitments 
and of a further development of the CSCE process.  
 
Reinforced by the electoral victory in October 1976 and looking to 
the upcoming appointment with the CSCE follow-up meeting in 
Belgrade in October 1977, the West German federal government 
worked on the continuation of multilateral détente in the course of the 
year. The tasks deriving from the implementation of Helsinki’s 
provisions and the preparation of the Belgrade CSCE stimulated a 
conceptual reflection on the definition of a Western common concept of 
détente. As it will be analysed at the beginning of this chapter, 
Genscher’s concept of “realistic détente” contributed significantly to 
the debate within the Western Alliance. The theoretical and strategic 
preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was faced with 
increasing transatlantic divergences over the West’s foreign political 
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priorities, with particular regard to the international role of human 
rights issues. Bonn’s efforts were directed, as the chapter investigates, 
to fostering its conference aims within the Western Alliance and 
protecting the transatlantic harmony in front of the eyes of the public 
opinion. Whereas the CSCE preparatory meeting in the summer of 1977 
displayed encouraging results, the main conference in Belgrade turned 
soon, after its start in autumn, into an occasion for reviewing existing 
divergences. After analysing West German diplomatic attempts to 
attain substantial achievements by pursuing a “middle-course” 
strategy at negotiations in Belgrade, the chapter ends by reviewing the 
main lessons West German détente policy had to draw from the 
disappointing outcome of the first CSCE follow-up meeting.  
 
Fostering a Western common concept of détente 
In the months which followed the conclusion of the CSCE in 
Helsinki the West German federal government repeatedly argued – in 
front of the Bundestag, in public statements on the press and on 
occasion of bilateral meetings with other Western and European 
leaders – that there was no reasonable alternative to the prosecution of 
détente. The question of how to improve and shape further the process 
of European détente was at the centre of the West German Foreign 
Office’s attention throughout 1976. Once Bonn’s bilateral Ostpolitik had 
been fully multilateralised at Helsinki, the CSCE policy asserted itself 
as its inextricable completion. But it represented also the adequate field 
wherein the Auswärtiges Amt could pursue its ambitions to play a 
strategic role in the international – and especially European – arena. 
Not only did the CSCE policy offered to the Foreign Office good 
chances of diplomatic success – as the experience of negotiations in 
Helsinki and Geneva had showed. It represented also one important 
field where Genscher and his servants could chase their aspirations of 
autonomy with respect to Schmidt’s Chancellery, which held the lead 
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of international initiative in other crucial fields – as Ostpolitik, inner-
German dialogue, economic cooperation.185 
The great number of internal analyses and strategic papers of the 
West German Foreign Office dedicated to issues of Entspannungspolitik 
reveals Bonn’s interest in attaining a better definition of détente both 
from the theoretical and the practical point of view. More precisely, 
West German efforts were directed, first, to work out a Western 
common concept of détente; and second, to decide which next strategic 
steps the multilateral policy of détente should focus on, in preparation 
of the upcoming first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade. 
To détente and its continuation was dedicated NATO’s Spring 
Conference which took place in Oslo in May 1976.186 The Western 
partners’ different definitions of détente were discussed at the meeting 
of the Alliance’s foreign ministers. Whilst U.S. Secretary of State 
Kissinger spoke of a strategy of “peace through strength” and French 
minister of foreign affairs Sauvagnargues of a “sort of containment 
through dialogue”, Genscher advocated his idea of a “realistic policy of 
détente” (realistische Entspannungspolitik).187 The theoretical conception 
of a realistic policy of détente served the purpose of contrasting the 
critical views of those in the FRG who considered the foreign minister 
of the Schmidt government as a “brakeman” of East-West dialogue.188 
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Realism was, moreover, a trademark of Schmidt-Genscher’s tandem: 
Realpolitik became in the second half of the Seventies the social-liberal 
coalition’s keyword and the antidote to multiple international and 
domestic crises.  
During NATO’s Spring Conference the West German foreign 
minister stressed that a realistic détente policy was the only possible 
strategy to follow. The potentiality of the CSCE process remained valid, 
even though setbacks were to expect in the months and years to come. 
Genscher’s “realistic détente policy” rested upon three cornerstones.189 
First, the existing interaction between the pursuit of security and 
détente policies: Genscher’s formula originated from the need to find 
an adequate answer to the Soviet idea that the tasks of political détente 
had been completed for good at Helsinki and what remained for East-
West dialogue to deal with was merely a “policy of military détente”. 
Second, the unity of action of the Western Alliance: the coordination 
with its partners remained for the Bundesrepublik a question of principle 
– i.e. anchoring its initiatives towards the East to the allies’ approval – 
and of winning strategy – i.e. preventing The Soviet bloc from 
distinguishing between countries more and less willing to cooperation 
within the Western caucus and implementing a consequent divide et 
impera strategy. Third, the understanding of détente as a continuous 
and dynamic process: the stress on the processual nature of the CSCE 
should compensate the West’s rejection of any form of 
bureaucratisation which would lower its high political value and 
openness to change. The three pillars of the conceptual construction of 
Bonn’s “realistic détente policy” were elaborated by the Auswärtiges 
Amt on the basis of the experience collected during negotiations in 
Geneva and Helsinki. They all responded to the FRG’s vital foreign 
policy needs. The concept that Genscher proposed to the Western allies 
was, hence, the outcome of the process of reflections and 
conceptualisation carried out in Bonn’s Foreign Office in the aftermath 
of the Helsinki CSCE. 
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Genscher’s formulation contributed importantly to the debate on 
détente within the EPC’s working group on the CSCE. As part of their 
preparatory work for the first review conference of Belgrade, the EC-
Nine agreed upon a rough common concept of détente. This included 
the three dimensions of the West German realistic policy of détente and 
completed them by recalling the principle of renouncing the use and 
threat of force – with the aim of addressing openly the invalidity of 
Brezhnev’s doctrine in the Soviet bloc – and the principle of the power 
of individuals – a formulation encompassing both human rights and 
human contacts. From a pragmatic viewpoint, détente dialogue was 
conceived as a complex of flexible diplomatic tools which could be 
used in different forms and at different levels according to 
circumstances. Amongst the possible tasks that détente dialogue could 
take, the Nine mentioned: the regulation of practical problems; 
decisions on armament limitations; forms of partial cooperation; the 
preservation of the modus vivendi; crisis management.190 
The EC Nine’s working group on CSCE continued to work on the 
refinement of a common concept of détente in the course of 1976. The 
main ideas produced by the debate were summarised on 27 January 
1977 in the strategic paper “Elements for a definition of détente”. In this 
paper the EC-Nine postulated the principle of “geographic and 
thematic indivisibility” of détente. Not only were détente commitments 
in different areas bound together (“thematic indivisibility of détente), 
but participant states committed themselves to conforming to détente 
principles when acting in different geographic areas, i.e. outside 
Europe too (“geographic indivisibility of détente”). The EC-Nine 
advocated, moreover, the idea that cooperation should be strengthened 
in those areas where East-West divergences did not impede to realise 
concrete improvements; instead, some moderation was required when 
dealing with more divisive issues – as highly ideological or military 
questions – in order not to endanger the overall prosecution of 
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cooperation.191 Hence, Western European countries developed an 
operative concept of détente, which entailed clear indications about the 
strategy they were intended to follow at negotiations in Belgrade. The 
feasibility of such operational guidelines was put to a hard test at the 
first CSCE follow-up meeting. 
 
Fostering a Western common agenda for Belgrade 
The definition of a common concept of détente was interwoven with 
the identification of a joint agenda for the prosecution of the CSCE 
process in Belgrade. Agreeing upon what the process of détente was 
and what it meant implied to decide what concrete steps had to be 
taken to shape its continuation. Bonn’s diplomatic efforts throughout 
1977 were dedicated to both aims. The working out of the West’s 
concerted strategy for conference was flanked by an accurate 
preparation within the West German Foreign Office in coordination 
with other federal ministries competent on specific aspects of the CSCE. 
The Auswärtiges Amt led the activities of the inter-ministerial group in 
charge of setting up the West German strategy, whose regular meetings 
paced Belgrade’s preparation works. 
Approximate indications for the mandate of the follow-up meetings 
were contained in the provisions of Helsinki Final Act’s Basket IV. 
According to its second article, the process initiated by the first CSCE 
should be continued by proceeding, first, to a thorough exchange of 
views on the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions; second, to 
negotiations for deepening multilateral cooperation; and third, to an 
eventual agreement on the future development of détente.192 The first 
CSCE follow-up conference had a dual mandate: its tasks were directed 
both “towards the past” and “towards the future” – i.e. reviewing what 
had been realised so far and negotiating further realisations. The 
contents of the FRG’s preparatory works for the conference reflected 
                                                          
191 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Engels, 2.02.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. 
I, doc. 17, p. 101 (footnote). 
192 The full text of the Helsinki Final Act is available at: http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?. 
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such duality of tasks as well. During 1976-1977 the West German 
Foreign Office dealt, on the one hand, with the pursuit and the 
assessment of the ongoing implementation process (as it had been 
analysed in conclusion of the preceding chapter); on the other hand, 
with the elaboration of concrete proposals to raise in Belgrade.193  
 Bonn’s approach to the definition of Belgrade’s agenda rested upon 
some general considerations. The detailed identification of the aims of 
the conference would be largely dependent on the state of the Helsinki 
Final Act’s implementation. If participant states would prove to have 
already put in practice large part of Helsinki’s dispositions, the way 
would be open for deepening and extending the contents of East-West 
détente significantly. Otherwise, a serious debate over the reasons of 
the impediments to the implementation would be inescapable. In 
Bonn’s view, direct confrontations were however to be avoided in 
Belgrade, as they would damage particularly the Bundesrepublik and 
discredit the value of détente in front of the eyes of the public opinion. 
To give new stimulus to negotiations, it was necessary to find some 
matters which could attract the interest of all participants. All 
proposals for deepening multilateral cooperation could not be detached 
from the contents of the Helsinki Accords: the Final Act provided 
indeed for the binding grounds for all further improvements.194 
According to West German predictions, the CSCE follow-up 
meeting in Belgrade would serve as a first test for the willingness of its 
participants to continue cooperation.195 Bonn’s eyes were fixed on the 
Eastern countries. After the early developments of the implementation 
process had unveiled the serious difficulties the Eastern leaders were 
faced with after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a question was 
put to the attention of the West German Foreign Office: on which issues 
should the West focus, in order to test the Soviet bloc’s commitment to 
                                                          
193 Protokollnotizen „Sitzung der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgrupp KSZE im Auswärtigen Amt 
am 23. November 1976“, 30.11.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665. 
194 Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozesses in Europa, 15.04.1976, in PA AA, 
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389. 
195 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der 
KSZE-Beschlüsse), 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665. 
82 
 
the continuation of multilateral détente? The field of confidence-
building measures seemed to provide, again, the adequate answer to 
West German diplomatic needs. As initiatives in this field coming from 
the neutral and non-aligned countries were to expect in Belgrade, the 
Western Alliance should be prepared to react united and to take a 
proactive attitude.196 According to the instructions provided by the 
Auswärtiges Amt to the West German representation at the NATO 
quarters in July 1976, concrete proposals for the improvement and 
extension of the existing provisions on CBMs stayed at the centre of 
Bonn’s agenda for Belgrade.197 They encompassed the following tasks: 
improving the criteria for the notification of military manoeuvres, by 
anticipating the temporal deadline for announcements; extending the 
obligation of notification to other categories of manoeuvres which had 
been left out of Helsinki’s Basket II; putting into practice Basket II’s 
dispositions concerning the announcement of big manoeuvres over 
25,000 units; defining clearer rules for regulating manoeuvres’ 
observation.198 
Besides being amongst the FRG’s priorities at the CSCE,199 CBMs 
had benefited in Helsinki from the good cooperation with the 
delegations of the NNA countries; they had moreover compelled the 
Soviet bloc to get involved by addressing its traditional interest for 
security. The Auswärtiges Amt aimed at replicating Helsinki’s 
experience at the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, by forcing the Eastern 
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countries to negotiate for the extension of Basket II’s existing 
provisions. Bonn’s intentions to relaunch the initiative in the fields of 
CBMs collided, however, with the growing scepticism of the 
superpowers towards the CSCE. On the occasion of bilateral 
consultations on CSCE with the USSR in June 1976, Bonn had 
registered the Soviet contrariety to further negotiations in the fields of 
CBMs. The distinction in principle made by Moscow between political 
and military détente had concrete repercussions on the Soviet strategy 
for the follow-up conference in Belgrade. In the Soviet view, after the 
topic of CBMs had been completed for good in Helsinki, negotiations 
on additional aspects of military détente should take place in Vienna. 
Likewise, on the other side of the Atlantic, Washington expressed 
reluctance towards Bonn’s proposal of extending the obligations of 
notification to big military manoeuvres.200  
Whereas NATO was the adequate framework to elaborate concerted 
initiatives on security aspects of détente, Bonn’s diplomacy worked 
during the months of 1977 to collect the Western partners’ necessary 
support to its proposals for Belgrade with regard to other issues and 
within other caucuses as well. The coordination on the Western front 
was displayed at a large scale. CSCE issues were discussed at all levels 
at disposal of Bonn’s diplomacy, namely: within the EPC’s Working 
Group on the CSCE; within the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives at the EECs in Brussels and in coordination with the 
Community’s institutions; within NATO’s Political and Economic 
Committee; within the Group of the EC-Nine at the Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva; at UNESCO in Paris and at 
its 1977’s annual conference in Nairobi; within the Council of Europe – 
which had gradually turned into a useful forum of coordination with 
the non-aligned countries; at the bilateral level through rounds of 
consultations on the CSCE with Europe’s non-aligned and Eastern 
countries.201 
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Preparing the first CSCE follow-up conference continued to be one 
important operative tasks of the EPC.202 The Nine’s possible strategies 
to follow in Belgrade were discussed throughout 1976 and 1977 by the 
representatives of the Working Group on the CSCE and of the EPC 
Political Committee, and by the Nine’s heads of stated and 
governments.203 On 27 January 1977 Working Group on CSCE 
transmitted to NATO its report on the state of the preparation of the 
Belgrade CSCE, according to the established procedure of coordination 
between the smaller and the larger Western caucuses. The document 
summed up the Nine’s guidelines for their conduct in Belgrade. They 
reiterated their commitment to preserving the balanced and harmonic 
nature of the Helsinki Final Act which remained the irrevocable 
grounds for all next realisations.204 The foreign ministers of the Nine 
charged the EPC Political Committee with the task of elaborating 
substantial proposals for negotiations in Belgrade. Western initiatives 
could eventually aim at opening new fronts in the CSCE cooperation, 
without otherwise diverting the attention from the implementation of 
Helsinki’s provisions.205 To the Nine’s January’s report, two additional, 
important strategic papers followed in the course of 1977. In the first – 
“Main Themes and Catalogue of Mains Points for Belgrade”206 – the 
Nine submitted a list of detailed proposals for the follow-up 
conference. In the second – “Proposals for improving implementation” 
                                                                                                                               
Protokollnotizien „Sitzung der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgrupp KSZE im Auswärtigen Amt am 
23. November 1976“, 30.11.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665. 
202 The CSCE represented, according to Romano, the main task of the CSCE. This view 
has been challenged by Ferrari, who argued that the preponderance of the CSCE policy 
within the sphere of action of the EPC should not be overestimated. See, respectively, A. 
Romano, “The main task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering détente in 
Europe”, pp. 123-142; and L. Ferrari, Speaking with a Single Voice. The Assertion of the EC as 
a Distinctive International Actor, 1969-1979. 
203 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 9.2.1977. Hier: Die EPZ im 
Hinblick auf das Belgrader Treffen, 8.02.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688. 
204 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 9.2.1977. Hier: Die EPZ im 
Hinblick auf das Belgrader Treffen, 8.02.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.  
205 Ibid.  
206 Main Themes and Catalogue of Main Points for Belgrade, 01.07.1977, in PA AA, 
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.  
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– the proposals of the Nine were reviewed and grouped into different 
categories: first, the ones deriving directly from the Helsinki’s 
provisions and therefore considered more likely to be put on the 
negotiations table; second, the ones to raise as floating ideas during 
negotiations, with the twofold aim of testing the other participants’ 
willingness to cooperate and offering narrow openings for the 
unblocking of negotiations in difficult situations; third, the ones 
destined for mere tactical uses, i.e. in order to contrast undesirable 
Eastern requests.207 These two papers – which reflected the Nine’s will 
to speak with a single voice in Belgrade – were a fruit of compromise 
between two main opposite views. On the one hand, the British and the 
Dutch advocated an assertive approach towards the focal issue of the 
implementation of Helsinki’s dispositions on human rights in the 
Soviet bloc. On the other hand, the majority of the Nine favoured more 
pragmatic and balanced approaches to negotiations. A compromise 
between these two standpoints was found by extending the 
British/Dutch proposal for in-depth review debates to the whole 
complex of the Helsinki Final Act. 208  
 
Clashing visions and strategies of détente 
Whilst coordination amongst the EC-Nine was proceeding at a good 
pace, it was more difficult to find an agreement over a convergent 
strategy for Belgrade with the U.S. new administration. In 1977 bilateral 
relations between Bonn and Washington entered a phase of troubles 
and misunderstandings. Mutual discord marked particularly the 
personal relationship between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and West 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.209 The feeling that 
administrations in Bonn and Washington were speaking different 
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languages concerned also the conduction of détente policy and the 
diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up conference.  
Transatlantic coordination with regard to the continuation of the 
process of détente had suffered from the presidential election campaign 
and the power change in Washington. As the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs of the West German Bundestag observed, several crucial 
questions concerning the Western strategy at the Belgrade CSCE were 
still unanswered at the beginning of 1977.210 No decisions had been 
made about what concrete initiatives NATO’s delegations would 
undertake in Belgrade to relaunch East-West cooperation. There was 
overall agreement only on some general points, limited to the part of 
the conference’s mandate directed “towards the past”. First, Western 
delegations should be firm on stressing their disappointment about the 
incomplete implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the Eastern bloc. 
Firmness should not degenerate, however, into sterile confrontation.211 
Second, it had to be made clear that the process of implementation, 
though gradual, should be pursued with continuity by all signing 
countries.  
With regard to this aspect, Bonn had recognised encouraging 
signals coming from the Soviet bloc in Brezhnev’s speech held in Tula 
on 18 January 1977, two days before Carter’s inauguration. The Tula 
speech contained innovative passages regarding the Soviet security 
doctrine which had the meaning of a positive signal of opening 
towards possible cooperation sent by Brezhnev to the new U.S. 
administration.212 Bonn hoped that Moscow’s implementation of a 
more defensive security strategy would be paralleled by a less 
ideological attitude towards cooperation in the field of security and 
more generally towards the détente process.213 As Peter has 
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highlighted, the Soviet leadership feared – not without good reasons – 
that relations with the new American administration would be 
dominated by human rights issues.214  
With regard to the Belgrade CSCE, there were good reasons to fear 
that the upcoming review conference would turn into a stage of public 
condemnation of Eastern violations of human rights. The development 
of a growing drift between Bonn’s and Washington’s views of the 
process of détente, with particular regard to human rights issues, were 
observed and reported by the correspondents of the West German 
press in the U.S.215 The public and political interest for human rights 
pivoted in the West during 1977. It was not a novelty of the post-
Helsinki time: human rights issues had been a crucial item of debate at 
the Helsinki CSCE as well.216 But what changed in the months 
preceding the beginning of the follow-up meeting in Belgrade was the 
prominent role that human rights issues took on in the international 
political agenda. The acceleration of this trend was first due to a series 
of resounding initiatives undertaken by Carter and his entourage in the 
field of the promotion of human rights. Within the first months of the 
Carter administration, the State Department protested publicly against 
the arrests of Soviet dissidents Alexander Ginsburg and Juri Orlow, 
initiators of the Helsinki-observer-group in Moscow;217 the President 
sent personally a letter of support to Soviet dissident Sakharov and 
welcomed at the White House Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukowski, 
after his release from the Gulag; and the Congress created a special 
committee in charge of observing the state of the respect of human 
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rights in the Eastern European countries.218 As an additional 
confirmation of the new salience of human rights issues in international 
affairs, Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace 
in 1977.219 Throughout the year plenty of initiatives for the promotion 
of human rights were organised in Helsinki’s name in Europe. Seventy-
five MPs of different Western European countries supported Romanian 
dissident Goma and created the association “HAIG” (Helsinki 
Agreements Implementation Group), whose main task consisted in 
monitoring the respect of human rights in the Soviet bloc. Belgium’s 
President Tindemans proposed the creation of a “pan-European court 
for human rights”, in front of which the Soviet Union could be 
indicted.220  
Bonn’s possibilities to multilateralise and anchor its conference aims 
within the Western Alliance – i.e. to shape a Western strategy for 
Belgrade according to the West German idea of a “realistic détente 
policy” – were strongly hindered by the U.S. activism on human rights. 
It was clear to Bonn that the Carter administration would push the 
human rights item to the top of its agenda for the CSCE. In its internal 
analyses, the West German Foreign Office unceasingly stressed the 
importance of taking a cautious approach to human rights issues in 
Belgrade. Appeals to prudence were repeated both by Bonn’s 
government and the EC-Nine during the diplomatic preparation of the 
CSCE follow-up meeting.221 According to the Auswärtiges Amt, the 
focus on moaning about human rights in Belgrade would prove to be a 
counterproductive strategy. Theoretical discussions should be avoided 
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and replaced by a more pragmatic approach to negotiations.222 The 
West German government agreed in principle on the importance of 
Principle VII; Bonn’s primal interest remained however directed to 
safeguarding the possibility of obtaining further Eastern concessions in 
the fields of visa policies, family reunification and human contacts – 
areas in which the FRG led Western initiatives, by drafting and 
negotiating proposals.223 
Human contacts – conceived as an operative extension of the human 
rights principle – represented for the Bundesrepublik the concrete 
essence of the everyday coexistence with its Eastern neighbours. 
Facilitating flows of visits, contacts, phone calls, letters, newspapers etc. 
with millions of Germans living behind the Iron Curtain had certainly a 
less powerful public impact than resounding denounces of human 
rights violations regarding outstanding dissidents; however, they had 
undeniably more direct repercussions on the lives of European citizens. 
Quite significantly, during bilateral talks with Swedish Foreign 
Minister Söder in April 1975, Genscher highlighted that it was more 
important to got three people out of the East than to make of a fuss 
about one single person for propagandistic purposes.224 This argument, 
which had been, was and would be repeatedly brought forward by the 
Auswärtiges Amt, was used also to try to soften Washington’s 
intransigency on human rights.  
On occasion of London’s G7 summit in May 1977 human rights 
issues were discussed in relation to the upcoming CSCE follow-up 
meeting in Belgrade.225 Since the convening of the first economic 
summit of the most industrialised countries in Rambouillet in 
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November 1975, the routine of the meetings of the Group of Seven had 
turned into a platform of transatlantic coordination and foreign 
political discussion of utmost importance.226 For the FRG it represented 
the ideal multilateral forum to pursue its international interests and 
have a voice in international affairs by levering the strength of its 
economic preponderance. At the summit in London, the West German 
Chancellor tried to convince the U.S. President of the opportunity to 
pursue a moderate and pragmatic approach to human rights questions 
in Belgrade, with the goal “not to destabilise systems but to improve 
peoples’ concrete living conditions”. Schmidt provided some numbers 
in support to his idea of the process of détente: the West German 
federal government had contributed since Helsinki to achieve the full 
implementation of human rights for about 65,000 citizens coming from 
the Soviet Union, Romania, the GDR and other countries; similar 
results were to expect for further 40,000 citizens in 1977 and 50,000 for 
1978.227 Carter’s reassurances that the U.S. administration aimed at a 
cooperative and not divisive conference in Belgrade and intended to 
take constructive actions in order to accomplish the full 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, sounded encouraging but 
somewhat ambiguous.228 More assertiveness was shown by Carter’s 
hardliner National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who chased away any 
illusions about Washington’s second thoughts by explaining to West 
German Ambassador in Washington von Staden that the U.S. 
administration saw the question of human rights from a “more global” 
point of view than Bonn’s federal government.229 Human rights issues 
were the focal item of U.S.-West German consultations held on 9 
September 1977 in view of the beginning of the Belgrade CSCE one 
month later. Against Bonn’s hopes, the round of bilateral talks did not 
shed light on how far the U.S. administration intended to pursue its 
struggle for the respect of human rights in Belgrade. It gave the West 
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German federal government to understand that the U.S. delegation at 
the Belgrade CSCE would be likely to take two actions which both 
displeased Bonn. First, a marked stress would be put on the 
implementation of Principle VII. Second, the idea of naming single 
cases of violations, particularly the ones of prominent dissidents, 
during the review debate on the Helsinki Final Act was an option that 
Washington did not disregard.230  
The discrepancy between the standpoints of the U.S and the FRG – 
together with the majority of the EC-Nine, which were instead in 
favour of focusing negotiations on issues of human contacts and review 
discussions on broader categories of violations and cases – remained 
profound on the eve of the Belgrade CSCE. On 28 September 1977, few 
days before the starting of the first follow-up meeting, the heads of 
NATO’s delegations at the Belgrade CSCE met in Brussels to agree on 
the guidelines for the West’s behaviour at the conference. The two 
strategic papers drafted by the EC-Nine – “Main themes for Belgrade” 
and “Proposals for the implementation of the Final Act” – were 
approved.231 The decision represented a provisional agreement over the 
main general strategic lines the Alliance intended to pursue in 
Belgrade. But the details about the following concrete actions the 
Alliance would take, as well as about the real intentions of the U.S. 
delegation, remained largely undefined. 
 
Pursuing transatlantic harmony in public policy 
Notwithstanding West German-American divergences of views and 
strategies, for the Bundesrepublik it remained vitally important to keep 
the Americans involved in the CSCE process. The search for a 
transatlantic entente over a Western common strategy for Belgrade 
continued to be pursued by West German diplomacy as before as 
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during the follow-up meeting. Besides being a West German foreign 
policy priority, protecting the transatlantic harmony became 
increasingly a public political need as well. The public side of the West 
German diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting 
consisted in avoiding any public dissent with the U.S. administration. 
Even though divergences of foreign political views between Bonn and 
Washington had grown throughout 1977, transatlantic harmony and 
Western coordination needed to be defended in front of public 
opinions. Particularly, it was necessary to convince the public opinion 
that Bonn’s federal government agreed in substance with Washington 
upon the importance of engaging in the struggle for the respect of 
human rights in the Soviet bloc. 
Handling carefully the public dimension of Belgrade’s preparation 
responded to the need, first, of washing up perennial concerns that the 
FRG would undertake a foreign political single-handed course in the 
pursuit of East-West dialogue. Bonn’s international behaviour 
remained under scrutiny in the U.S., especially since incomprehension 
between Carter and Schmidt had become to emerge. Bonn’s critical 
stances on Carter’s human rights policy, in particular, were object of 
public discussion on the U.S. press.232 In June 1977 the West German 
Foreign Office asked its ambassador in Washington to carry out 
briefings with the German press correspondents in the U.S., in order to 
take precautions against increasing trends of depicting Bonn and 
Washington as drifting apart. Divergences of opinions should be 
softened in the press coverage and German readers should get the 
impression that Washington and Bonn shared an overall common 
political line for the management of East-West dialogue.233 A month 
later, as delegations of the CSCE participant states were in Belgrade to 
prepare the conference, U.S. chief delegator Sherer blamed the West 
German radio sender Deutschlandfunk for a reportage which “wrongly” 
disclosed the existence of a profound disagreement between the U.S. 
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and the West German delegations over human rights issues.234 Press 
releases claiming the “isolation of the U.S. delegation” at the 
preparatory meeting in Belgrade were paralleled by a report by Reuters 
pointing the finger at the leanings to unilateralism of the West German 
delegation, whose “fluctuating position” had been target of criticism of 
the British newspaper The Times too.235  
Pursuing an adequate public strategy responded, second, to Bonn’s 
need to deal with the requests coming from the domestic political 
opposition and public opinion. A special interest in the CSCE existed in 
the FRG: the Bundesrepublik had been the only country in which the 
CSCE had been item of parliamentary debate twice.236 Public 
expectations on the contributions the CSCE follow-up meeting in 
Belgrade would bring to the human rights cause could not be ignored. 
The minority fractions of the CDU/CSU put pressure on the federal 
government for greater commitment to human rights. After having 
strongly opposed the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the CDU/CSU 
pretended that Schmidt and Genscher followed Carter’s example of 
foreign political morality and adopted an offensive stance on human 
rights towards the Eastern countries as a precondition for the 
continuation of East-West cooperation.237 CDU/CSU’s insistence aimed 
at putting the federal government in a difficult position by pushing 
human rights issues to the top of the political agenda. It would not be 
easy, indeed, to justify in front of the public opinion the reasons of the 
FRG’s minor commitment to human rights compared to other Western 
partners. The Auswärtiges Amt assessed the existence of concrete risks 
that West German aims and intentions would be misunderstood by the 
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domestic public opinion and the allies.238 The Helsinki Final Act had 
raised great public expectations which played increasingly a focal role 
in the following developments of European détente. The 
unprecedented public interest in the CSCE negotiations, which marked 
the process of European détente since Helsinki onwards, faced all 
governments with new tasks in the realm of international public policy.  
On the basis of the experiences collected during the diplomatic 
preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting, the West German 
Foreign Office decided, in coordination with the Chancellor’s office, to 
embark in Belgrade on a strategy of balance which would mediate 
between different needs and thrusts. First, it was necessary to strike a 
balance between satisfying public expectations and avoiding excessive 
confrontations able to endanger the positive outcome of the 
conference.239 On the operational side, it meant to show firmness on 
Eastern responsibilities for the lacking implementation and violations 
of the Helsinki Final Act, by circumscribing them, however, to the first 
phase of the conference dedicated to review debates. Second, a middle 
course had to be undertaken between questions of principle – i.e. the 
need to preserve the credibility of the CSCE process – and pragmatic 
interests – i.e. achieving concrete improvements in East-West 
cooperation – both during review debates and substantial negotiations. 
Human issues in particular needed to be discussed, after having 
restated the importance of the principles underlying them, within the 
framework of concrete actions in the fields of Basket III.240 Third, 
intermediation had to be pursued between the divergent positions of 
the Western allies, particularly between the American and the French. 
Whereas the first mainly aimed at realising in Belgrade an exhaustive 
and comprehensive review of the implementation of Helsinki’s 
provisions, by focusing particularly on the state of human rights in 
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Eastern Europe, the second firmly opposed the scenario of turning 
Belgrade into a mere “conference in human rights”. Translated into 
practice, it meant to support Washington’s call for an in-depth review 
debate, without otherwise closing the possibility of multilateral 
cooperation with the Eastern countries.241  
The preparatory phase of the first CSCE follow-up meeting started 
on 15 June 1977 in Belgrade and ended eight weeks later, on 5 August 
1977. The thirty-five delegations reached an overall agreement over the 
conference’s dates, duration, agenda and main procedural questions, in 
order to permit works in Belgrade to flow without impediments. The 
relatively long duration of the preparatory meeting was due to the 
emergence of the first disagreements between the Western and the 
Eastern fronts. The West German delegation managed to push through 
its demand for a dual structure of the plenary debate, with a first 
temporally limited phase oriented “towards the past” – i.e. focused on 
the review of the process of implementation of the Helsinki Act – and a 
second phase directed “towards the future” – i.e. negotiations on 
substantial improvements and developments.242 The Auswärtiges Amt 
welcomed warmly the proactive mediation role carried out by the 
group of neutral and non-aligned countries – particularly by the 
Austrian, Swiss and Spanish delegations – which anticipated the 
dynamics that would mark the unfolding of the main conference some 
months later.243  
As regards the most divisive question of the conference’s duration 
and of the schedule of its end date, the Western interests prevailed over 
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Eastern demands for a short conference limited to a duration of three-
four weeks and with a fixed end date. The Western delegations, which 
aimed instead – with Bonn’s vivid support – at a sufficiently long 
conference with an open end, managed to get a practicable duration of 
indicatively sixteen weeks. The end of the first CSCE follow-up 
meeting was hence scheduled for the spring of 1978; the conclusion was 
however left open and tied to the adoption of a final document. The 
organisational agenda of the conference was roughly structured: after 
two weeks of plenary conference focused on review debates, the 
following weeks would be dedicated to negotiations within five 
working organs – respectively on Basket I, II and III, on Mediterranean 
questions, and on the final document and the terms of the convening of 
the second follow-up meeting.244 
Between the conclusion of the preparatory meeting in August and 
the beginning of the main conference in October 1977 no consultations 
with the Warsaw Pact countries took place. Bonn’s impression was that 
the Soviet Union and its allies – with the single exception of Romania245 
– would pursue a low-profile approach in Belgrade and focus their 
efforts on avoiding in-depth review debates – with particular regard to 
human rights issues – which would damage their international prestige 
and fuel dissidents’ demands.246 Still during bilateral CSCE 
consultations with the USSR in the early months of 1977, Bonn had 
registered Moscow’s will to avoid any spectacular conference which 
would compel the Soviet bloc to deal with the large shortcomings of its 
implementation of Helsinki’s provisions.247 According to West German 
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analyses, signals coming from Moscow suggested that the Soviet Union 
aimed at a short meeting with consultative character. Review debates 
should consist in a mere exchange of national reports on the state of the 
implementation process. The West German Foreign Office predicted, 
furthermore, that Eastern delegations would try to shift soon the focus 
of negotiations in Belgrade from implementation issues to general 
discussions over security and to Brezhnev’s proposal for a pan-
European conference on cooperation in the fields of energy and 
environment. 248 Therefore, it was to expect that the Soviet bloc would 
abstain from taking any proactive initiatives, by rather investing its 
efforts into a rapid conclusion of the conference.249 
The upcoming follow-up meeting in Belgrade looked like being an 
intermediate step in the CSCE process, split between the reconfirmation 
of Helsinki’s realisation and the possibility of paving new 
developments for the future follow-up meeting. According to Bonn’s 
predictions, the Belgrade CSCE would exercise a “preventive function 
of control” of the future behaviour of Eastern countries, wedging them 
further into the process of détente. An extraordinary final document 
was not, however, to be expected in Belgrade: therefore, it was 
convenient to approach the appointment of the first follow-up 
conference with pragmatism and not to pitch public expectations too 
high.250 
 
The Belgrade CSCE at its start: reviewing existing divergences 
On the eve of the opening of the plenary session at the Belgrade 
CSCE, positive signals coming from the superpowers alimented West 
German hopes that the conference would display a fruitful cooperation. 
Whereas it seemed difficult to replay the success of Helsinki, there was 
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enough room for confiding in the possible achievement of concrete 
détente improvements. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit in 
Washington in September 1977 had given the hint for the resurgence of 
the talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT II) and for a consequent 
overall improvement of the superpowers dialogue in all fields, after 
coolness had marked bipolar relations during the first months of the 
Carter administration.251 As the American magazine Newsweek 
reported, an officer of the State Department close to Cyrus Vance had 
commented that “If SALT is on, Belgrade will be a lot shorter and 
sweeter”.252 Even the authoritative Washington Post welcomed 
positively the apparent return of “new warmth marking the U.S.-Soviet 
ties”: “The stage is also set”, so the American newspaper, “for the 
opening in Belgrade on Tuesday of the review conference on European 
Security and Cooperation with the expectation that the U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation over human rights will be either avoided, or much more 
muted than originally anticipated”.253 The beneficial interaction 
between the unfolding of SALT II and CSCE negotiations – as the 
dependence of Belgrade’s fortunes on the superpowers’ willingness to 
cooperate – was not unknown to the West German federal government.  
The works of the first CSCE follow-up meeting started in the 
Yugoslav capital on 4 October 1977. According to the schedule agreed 
at the preparatory meeting, general plenary debates lasted two 
weeks.254 On 9 October was the turn of the West German delegation to 
issue its opening address. The Auswärtiges Amt had sent to Belgrade a 
high-profile delegation which was headed by Ambassador Per Fischer 
and included eight high-ranking servants of the Foreign Office, a staff 
of six collaborators, a press speaker, and some experts for specific items 
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of negotiation.255 After the long and careful diplomatic work carried out 
during 1976-1977 to promote the implementation of the Helsinki 
Accords and to prepare the first review conference, the moment had 
come for Bonn to present on a broad stage its plans for the continuation 
of the CSCE process. Hence, the head of the West German delegation 
restated in his opening address Bonn’s main views about the aims, the 
meaning and tasks of the CSCE, offering a small summa of the West 
German idea of the process of multilateral détente.256 
As Fischer stressed, détente had to be necessarily continued because 
there were no other available and pursuable alternatives. As Helsinki 
Final Act represented the cornerstone of détente in Europe, its correct 
interpretation and full implementation needed to be safeguarded. The 
Helsinki CSCE had initiated a long but continuous process whose main 
aim was making Europe safer and Europeans more human.257 A 
particular stress was put by Fischer on the human dimension of the 
CSCE, by giving once again clear indications about what West German 
priorities consisted in. The importance of human rights was evoked 
with reference to their historical and multilateral significance; their 
implementation and their respect were put into the hands of the shared 
responsibility of all member states.258  
When moving to the analysis of the state of implementation of 
Helsinki’s commitments, Fischer adopted the rhetorical strategy of 
balancing achievements and shortcomings: he started mentioning what 
had already been realised to proceed then by enlisting what was still to 
do. Severe and direct criticisms were not spared to the Eastern 
countries: concrete examples of setbacks and shortcomings of the 
process of implementation in the Soviet bloc were listed by the head of 
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the West German delegation.259 As the Auswärtiges Amt had decided 
when preparing its strategy for Belgrade firmness had to be displayed 
in the first phase of the conference. On this point there was agreement 
with the Western partners and the U.S. delegation.260 Bonn drew, 
however, a marked line between the “moment for firmness” and the 
“moment for pragmatism”, i.e. the “moment of (moderate) 
confrontation” and the “moment of negotiation”: once questions of 
principles would have been discussed and exhausted in the first phase 
of the conference dedicated to review debates, delegations had to put 
aside ideological contrapositions and make room for substantial 
negotiations in the ensuing phase of the conference.261 This clear 
separation proved soon to be difficult to implement: the confrontation 
over the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions affected in an harmful 
way the possibilities to build cooperation in the ensuing negotiation 
phase. 
After all delegations had issued their opening statements during the 
first week of plenary debate, the conference works moved to the tasks 
of reviewing implementation and presenting new proposals for 
cooperation at the level of subsidiary working committees. The 
divergent approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the 
Helsinki Accords, which had emerged in the aftermath of the first 
CSCE, continued to mark the East-West’s respective positions and 
strategies in Belgrade. It was not that surprising, hence, that review 
debates proceeded – as Fischer reported to Bonn – as a “dialogue of the 
deaf”.262 The spectrum of the respective interests took soon shape 
according the respective renown positions: on the one side, Western 
delegations focused the attention of review debates on CBMs, human 
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rights violations, existing obstacles to trade exchange, human contacts 
and issues in the field of information; on the other hand, Eastern 
delegations avoided any confrontation on human rights issues by 
appealing to the principles of non-interference (Principle VI) and social 
and political self-determination (Principle I) and put the stress on 
general disarmament issues, obstacles to imports in the West and 
positive realisations in the fields of culture.263  
The moderate tones which had marked the debates until that 
moment went through a dramatic change as Arthur Goldberg, head of 
the U.S. delegation, took the floor on 18 October 1977 at the session of 
the working committee on Basket III to direct a violent attack against 
the Czech government which had prohibited reporters to cover the 
ongoing trials against four members of the dissident group Charter 
77.264 Goldberg’s speech was a surprise to the Western allies. The works 
of the working committee had just started: the U.S. attacks appeared 
fully inappropriate as they harmed the construction of that favourable 
climate for substantial negotiations that the West German delegation 
longed for. Goldberg’s charges seemed to move in the direction of 
transforming Belgrade into a tribunal on human rights, a spectre often 
evoked by the Soviet Union and a scenario ruled out by the Western 
Alliance.265 A further reason of Western discontent – and of profound 
Czech irritation – was Goldberg’s decision to break off the diplomatic 
taboo of “not naming names” of specific guilty parties for human rights 
violations. The U.S. solo initiative clearly contradicted the Western 
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overall agreement over the strategic course to pursue in Belgrade. At 
the NATO meeting on 28 September 1977 the Western partners had 
expressed their common intention to avoid mentioning single cases of 
human rights violations in Belgrade, by prefer referring to larger 
categories of impediments.266 Few days before the inauguration of the 
conference Goldberg himself had personally reassured West German 
Foreign Minister Genscher about his intention to refer to human rights 
violations in the Soviet bloc through allusions and general examples, 
when addressing the issue in his opening speech.267 As the U.S. chief 
delegator had changed his mind within a couple of days and had 
communicated to the Western partners his intention to mention, during 
the general debate on Basket III the day after, a series of fresh violations 
of human rights perpetrated in the Soviet Union, a spontaneous 
“emergency meeting” of the NATO delegations had taken place under 
the West German direction. The majority of Western delegations had 
reconfirmed the common position expressed at the NATO meeting few 
weeks before. They had reaffirmed their shared belief that single cases 
were to be discussed in bilateral talks in the margins of the conference 
works; they had committed themselves to avoiding counterproductive 
confrontations on the human rights issue which would risk 
endangering the cooperative atmosphere of negotiations. U.S. chief 
delegator Goldberg had given his assent to the allies’ common 
position.268 Goldberg’s solo initiative on 18 October was perceived as a 
reiterated violation of the gentlemen’s agreement concerted with the 
Western allies.  
The West German delegation was in the difficult situation of being 
the first amongst Western delegations to intervene in the debate of the 
working committee after Goldberg’s attacks. Preserving the unity of the 
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Western front was Bonn’s first inevitable priority. The head of the West 
German delegation carried out its task and took Goldberg’s side. No 
rule of procedure had been infringed, he explained, as any participant 
have the legitimate right to address critical matters – as in the case of 
the ongoing human rights violations in Prague – in the debate of the 
working group. To the contrary, Belgrade provided the adequate forum 
to deal with the shortcomings of the implementation of Helsinki’s 
principles, included Principle VII.269  
The West German intervention served as an illustration for the 
middle-course approach Bonn’s Foreign Office had decided to pursue 
in Belgrade. Taking the U.S. delegation’s side did not rule out the 
possibility to keep the door open for negotiating with the East in a 
cooperative atmosphere. As Fischer reassured Eastern delegators, 
“frankness and constructiveness” did not contradict each other.270 The 
West German strategy seemed initially to reap some benefits: as Per 
Fischer reported to Bonn, albeit his delegation had openly stood up 
against the Prague’s trial and the Eastern deficits in the implementation 
of the Helsinki Accords, Eastern criticisms had not been directed 
against West Germans, but rather against the U.S., Canadian and 
British delegations.271 The developments of the first weeks of works in 
Belgrade unveiled what the preceding diplomatic preparation of the 
conference had already suggested: i.e. that the game at the Belgrade 
CSCE would be played not only between the East and the West, but 
within the Western Alliance as well. The considerations of diplomatic 
opportunity marking the Nine’s approach to review debates and 
negotiations appeared, indeed, not to form part of Washington’s 
strategy for Belgrade. 
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Dealing with the German political implications of the Belgrade 
CSCE 
Whilst the West German delegation attempted to circumscribe the 
detrimental consequences of the U.S. assertiveness on human rights at 
the Belgrade CSCE, Bonn’s federal government had to deal with the 
strong engagement for human rights of its parliamentary opposition at 
home. The CDU/CSU had opposed the signing of the Eastern Treaties 
in the Brandt era as well as the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The 
overall validity of Bonn’s détente policy towards East had been harshly 
questioned by the opposition parties during the national election 
campaign in 1976.272 The pursuit of a realistic dialogue with the East, 
neither at the bilateral or multilateral level, was an item of the 
minority’s political agenda. Not being interested in concrete 
improvements of the process of European détente, West German 
Christian-democrats aimed at putting the Eastern bloc on the defensive 
at Belgrade. They were, hence, on the same wavelength of hardliners in 
Washington: they appreciated the moral stances informing Carter’s 
international struggle for human rights and shared the idea of that part 
of the U.S. administration which aimed at turning Belgrade into an 
international trial on human rights.273 
CDU/CSU’s activism for human rights – which had intensified as 
the appointment of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was approaching 
– pivoted in November 1977, as MPs of the minority group announced 
their intention to hand a white book “on the state of human rights for 
Germans living in Germany and Eastern Europe” amongst delegations 
and journalists at the Belgrade CSCE. The initiative undertaken in the 
Yugoslav capital was flanked by the presentation of a parliamentary 
enquiry on the same themes, with the goal of opening a broad public 
debate in the Bundestag and in the country over the violations of human 
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rights and basic freedoms perpetrated by the Soviet bloc.274 The 175-
page document contained, first, a detailed list of charges directed 
against the GDR, the Soviet Union, the CSSR and Romania concerning 
violations of individual and collective human rights committed against 
German citizens; and second, a series of demands for the federal 
government and the other CSCE participants. The German political 
implications of the white book were clear, as an important part of the 
accusations were directed against the GDR – not accidentally, 
mentioned in the title by referring to the whole Germany. The initiative 
was, hence, twice as insidious for Bonn’s federal government: not only 
were negotiations in Belgrade in the deadlock, but the inner-German 
dialogue was undergoing difficult times as well.  
The affair of the white paper was handled carefully by the 
Auswärtiges Amt. According the assessment of the Foreign Office, the 
document offered a quite accurate analysis, but did not bring new 
evidence or information to the matter. The federal government was 
indeed familiar with the numbers and facts presented by the 
CDU/CSU, most of which had already been taken into account by the 
Foreign Office when formulating its contributions for the debate on 
human rights in Belgrade – by presenting them, though, in a less 
detailed and smoother manner. That part of the white paper’s 
reproaches which had not been included in the list of arguments for 
review debates and negotiations had been packed into the so-called 
“big baggage” for Belgrade, i.e. a chapter of the Western agenda 
containing a list of reserve arguments to use only in the case the 
exchange of blows with the East would become such violent to impede 
any positive conclusion of the conference.275 The West German Foreign 
Office firmly rejected the attempts of the domestic opposition to exert 
influence on the position of its delegation in Belgrade and tried to limit 
as much as possible the public resonance of its initiative. For this 
purpose, the federal government’s answer to the parliamentary enquiry 
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of the minority was postponed to 9 March 1978, after the scheduled 
conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting.276  
The initiative of the CDU/CSU touched a sore point of Bonn’s 
diplomatic strategy at the Belgrade CSCE – and more generally of its 
overall Ostpolitik. Prudence and pragmatism marking the West German 
approach to negotiations required a certain degree of secrecy and 
discretion. Any resounding initiative likely to incur big public attention 
had to be cautiously avoided as long as the federal government was 
dealing with delicate negotiations. Looking constantly after the 
relations with the press was one priority task of the West German 
delegation throughout the whole conference. It was important that 
detailed information about negotiations with the Eastern countries did 
not leak. Consequently, the public opinion was kept informed about 
the general unfolding of the conference and was informed in due time 
about the outcomes of negotiations, once an achievement had been 
secured.  
This general need for secrecy assumed further importance when 
dealing with inner-German questions: no details about the conduction 
of parallel talks with the East German delegation in the margins of the 
official conference works were provided by the West German 
delegation to the national press. With its evident German political 
implications, the white book of the CDU/CSU threatened to rouse at the 
multilateral level a dangerous confrontation over specific inner-
German matters – an eventuality that Bonn’s federal government, in 
accordance with the East German leadership, had tried to escape since 
the beginning of the conference. As preparing its strategy for Belgrade, 
the Auswärtiges Amt had dealt with the question of how to address 
inner-German issues at the CSCE follow-up meeting.277 In conformity 
with the approach adopted at the Helsinki CSCE, Bonn’s efforts 
continued to be directed in Belgrade to preventing the follow-up 
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meeting from turning into a multilateral conference over Germany. The 
main aspects of the CSCE regarding Bonn’s Deutschland- and 
Berlinpolitik were confined to some mentions within the general 
overview presented by the West German delegation in its opening 
address. General problems related to inner-German human contacts 
were roused by the Western delegation within the broader framework 
of review debates and negotiations on Basket III. A particular stress 
was put on those issues that were clearly important to Bonn for 
German political reasons – e.g. the questions of Western journalists’ 
working conditions in the Eastern countries, which had become a very 
sensitive matter after the reiterated expulsions of West German 
correspondents from the GDR.278 Specific bilateral matters, as for 
instance the issue of German citizenship, were put forward only 
allusively.279 Moreover, the practice – which had already been tested at 
the Helsinki CSCE – of handing confidentially lists of hardship cases 
concerning German citizens living in the GDR over the East German 
delegation, within the framework of informal contacts in the margins of 
the official conference, was continued in Belgrade.280 
 
Drafting the conference final document: a West German 
miscalculation 
At the beginning of November 1977 diplomatic works in Belgrade 
headed slowly towards the next phase of substantial negotiations for 
the conference final document. Review debates had brought poor 
results during the weeks of October; especially within the working 
committee on Basket III, discussions had remained stuck on sterile 
matters of principles. On the one hand, the EC-Nine had been 
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compelled to accept the embitterment of the confrontation on human 
rights issues after Goldberg’s hard intervention against the Czech 
government; on the other hand, Eastern delegations had refused to give 
any answers to specific questions posed by the Western counterparts.281  
In November 1977 review debates were progressively absorbed into 
the negotiations on possible concrete improvements of the Helsinki’s 
commitments. Eastern delegations complaint about the West’s lacking 
willingness to conclude discussions on implementation issues for good 
and move to the drafting of the final document. Notwithstanding the 
U.S. insistence on human rights violations, Eastern delegations had 
remained at the negotiation table: it was surprising, so Fischer reported 
to Bonn, how much the Soviet Union and its allies had been willing to 
tolerate.282 According to the analysis of the West German Foreign 
Office, negotiations had entered a phase in which any spectacular 
confrontation was to expect. However, Bonn still hoped to achieve in 
Belgrade satisfactory results, likely to be presented to the national 
public opinion as concrete improvements of the process of détente.283  
The greatest challenge for the West German delegation consisted in 
pursuing balanced improvements in all fields in order to hinder that 
selective improvements would dilute the political significance of the 
CSCE process. Each group of delegations had presented its own 
package of proposals for the final document. With the exception of 
Soviet requests in the field of disarmament and Romania’s proposals in 
the military field, the Eastern package focused on Basket II. The issue of 
CBMs, one of Bonn’s main priorities, was deliberately avoided by the 
Soviet Union: the Warsaw Pact, as reported by West German 
Ministerial Director Blech, had shown scarce interest in improving 
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CBMs from the beginning of the conference, by rather turning its 
attention to more propagandistic matters of disarmament and 
armament control which overlapped with the scope of the MBFR 
negotiations in Geneva.284 NNAs’ proposals addressed all three 
Helsinki Baskets with preponderance for military and economic issues. 
Western proposals aimed at improving the shortcomings of the process 
of implementation highlighted during review debates, with a 
pronounced stress on the human field. According to the division of 
work within the Western caucus, the NATO group presented proposals 
for the improvement of CBMs and the EC-Nine suggested a series of 
measures to increase cooperation in the fields of Basket II. Western 
delegations backed Bonn’s requests in the fields of Basket III, namely 
on issues of family reunification, facilitation of bureaucratic procedures 
for the release of visa and permits to leave the country, improvement of 
exchange of information and working conditions for journalists. The 
West German delegation extended its invitation to a meeting of experts 
in charge of organising the international scientific forum to be hold in 
Bonn in the summer of 1978. Furthermore, it gave notice of its wish to 
include in the Belgrade final document a passage on the common 
commitment to the international fight against hostage-taking.285 Matters 
of terrorism and its international connections concerned closely the 
Bundesrepublik which had gone through the fiercest season of terroristic 
attacks in the summer and autumn of 1977. The extreme-left militant 
group of the Red Army Fraction (RAF) had launched a violent attack 
against the state which threatened to endanger the stability of the West 
German political and social system, by opening scenarios of possible 
reactionary deviations. During the so-called German Autumn – 
Deutscher Herbst – tension in the country dramatically escalated, with 
the kidnapping and assassination of industrialist Martin Schleyer by 
the RAF and the hijacking of the Lufthansa airplane “Landshut” by the 
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Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine.286 Dealing with the terroristic 
challenge had become one of the main tasks of Schmidt’s government 
after the electoral turn in 1976, whose initiatives on the domestic front 
were flanked by the pursuit of a diplomatic broad consensus over the 
international fight against terrorism. The West German proposal for an 
international convention against the taking of hostages, put forward at 
the UN, received the large approval of the General Assembly.287 The 
West German parallel initiative at the Belgrade CSCE was directed to 
its support. 
Coming back to negotiations in Belgrade, the proposals for a final 
document presented by all delegations amounted on the whole to 
eighty at the end of November – a number which would grow further, 
exceeding the threshold of one hundred by 22 December 1977. They 
constituted a cumbersome stream, which hindered the pursuit of 
effective negotiations.288 It was clear to all delegations that the working 
mechanism of approval by consensus would prevent the largest part of 
them from being included in the final document. As Fischer reported to 
Bonn in December 1977, Western delegations would be compelled to 
discard some of their proposals, by fixing their priorities in due time in 
order to facilitate the advancement of negotiations.289 The Eastern bloc’s 
reticence to discuss any Western factual proposal served as renewed 
confirmation of its interest in a rapid and unsubstantial conclusion of 
negotiations. As the conference was heading to the Christmas break 
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without any significant improvement, the question of what results 
delegations aimed at achieving appeared to be strictly intertwined with 
the question of the conference duration. A new configuration of 
interests took shape over this question in December 1977. The West 
German delegation was the main advocate – on indication of the 
Foreign Office in Bonn – of the idea of remaining in Belgrade until 
substantial improvements of the détente process would be attained, i.e. 
at the inevitable cost of prolonging the conference by some weeks or 
months over the scheduled end. The West German position gathered a 
composite support: it received the full support of the Danish and 
Belgian delegations, whilst it was backed by the U.K., France and 
Canada only to a certain extent; on the same West German wavelength 
were also, for different reasons, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland and 
Sweden; within the Eastern bloc it were Romania and, more timidly, 
Poland and Hungary to show some interest in substantial decisions.290 
As negotiations were temporary suspended on 22 December 1977 and 
adjourned on 17 January 1978 with the task of drafting a final 
document, the head of the West German delegation admitted that it 
was impossible to predict which directions negotiations would take.291 
The unfolding of the last phase of the conference revealed to be very 
difficult once delegations returned to Belgrade after the Christmas 
break. West German hopes to prolong the duration of negotiations 
until the achievement of concrete results clashed against the definitive 
demonstration of the Soviet will to close the affairs of the CSCE follow-
up meeting as soon as possible. The Soviet delegation tabled on 18 
January 1978 a verbose draft for an unsubstantial final document which 
swept away all proposals presented until that moment and limited 
itself to accepting the Western suggestion of the city of Madrid as place 
for the next follow-up meeting.292 The meaning of the Soviet initiative 
was clear: there was no time for longer negotiations, no interest in 
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substantial achievements and no room for concessions on Western 
proposals. Moscow’s aimed at concluding the conference with a 
minimal document which would merely ensure the continuation of the 
CSCE process, without otherwise introducing new commitments for 
the thirty-five participants. As Fischer reported to Bonn, a shift had 
occurred in the Soviet approach during the three and a half weeks of 
break.293 The Soviet intentions were not surprising: since the 
preparation of the follow-up meeting it had been clear that the Western 
and Eastern ideas of the conference were largely divergent. But the 
Soviet bloc’s decision to remain in Belgrade after the embitterment of 
debates on human rights issues and to commit itself to presenting a 
number of proposals for a substantial final document until 22 
December 1977 had nourished West German hopes that, besides the 
respective pursuit of strategic purposes, a East-West compromise on 
concrete improvements was still possible.294 The experience at the 
Helsinki CSCE had taught to West German diplomacy that important 
results can be attained after troubled negotiations and notwithstanding 
profound divergences of visions. There was a main difference, 
however, between the first CSCE and its follow-up meeting: i.e. Eastern 
delegations had not brought strong interests to Belgrade. Overlooking 
this factor represented the core of Bonn’s miscalculation.  
 
The “Western struggle” for a final document 
In January 1978 it became evident that Eastern delegations would 
rather forego achievements in their areas of interests – Basket II, non-
first use of nuclear weapons, moratorium on joining alliances – than to 
make any concessions in the area of human rights and human 
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contacts.295 Things had taken too far: even though the whole 
responsibility of the crisis was not ascribable to the behaviour of the 
U.S. delegation, it was otherwise undoubted that Goldberg’s persisting 
insistence on keeping discussions on human rights open had 
significantly poisoned the constructive atmosphere that pragmatic 
negations would require.296 Although the presentation of the Soviet 
draft, Western and NNA delegations continued to pursue “business as 
usual” within the drafting committee, with the conviction that 
Brezhnev had not had the last word on the Belgrade CSCE yet.297 
Negotiations continued throughout February without bringing any 
significant contribution to the reconciliation of the respective 
irremovable positions. The list of negotiable proposals became shorter 
and shorter and possibilities for a substantial final document scarcer as 
weeks went by. The Soviets, backed by the East Germans and the 
Czech, limited their goals to the inclusion of references to “military 
détente” and “irreversibility of détente”.298 The EC-Nine continued to 
seek the support and intermediation of the NNA delegations in order 
to achieve at least some minimal concrete results.  
The Western struggle for a final document turned into a struggle 
within the West. The exacerbation of contrasts within the Western front 
complicated further the difficult advancement of the works of the 
drafting committee. As long as negotiations went on, the West German 
delegation continued to pursue its strategy of intermediation, not so 
much between Eastern and Western delegations but rather between the 
divergent interests of its partners. To Goldberg’s accusation that 
Europeans were too compliant to Soviet demands, Fischer replied that 
it was not about being “hard” or “weak”, but rather about pursuing the 
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right tactic to compel the Soviet Union to make concessions – a position 
the U.S. public opinion stigmatised as “indulgent”.299 The French 
delegation, inclined to sacrifice some Western requests and open to 
some Eastern proposals, surprised its partners with an unexpected solo 
initiative.300 On 15 February 1978 Fischer was informed by his French 
colleague Richer that a French draft for a final document would be 
tabled the day after. The French single-handed initiative, which 
according to Bonn’s assessment hailed from direct instructions of 
Giscard d’Estaing, violated the most important premise of Western 
coordinated behaviour at the CSCE that the foreign ministers of the EC-
Nine had agreed at the EPC meeting in Copenhagen.301 Dealing with 
the French initiative required West German diplomacy a good degree 
of spirit of compromise: notwithstanding initial irritation, the West 
German delegation opted for considering the French draft on a par 
with the other drafts tabled that far and continued to be committed to a 
Western joint draft. From the past experience at the Helsinki CSCE 
Bonn’s diplomacy had learnt that the French, after their solo initiatives, 
ended up falling into line with the Western partners.302 
Western attempts to pursuit a coordinated strategy continued to be 
beset by the French-American contrast. After a number of votes within 
the Nine’s and NATO’s groups and repeated consultations with the 
NNAs, the heads of NATO’s delegations managed to approve a short 
draft on 22 February 1978, which reproduced the contents of the 
document agreed by the foreign ministers of the EC-Nine on 14 
February in Copenhagen.303 Tension escalated after Goldberg’s 
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advanced a last minute request to include a reference to human rights 
in the short draft and Richer threatened to leave both NATO’s and the 
Nine’s groups.304 The state of negotiations – and of Western 
coordination – was such harmed to convince Western delegations to 
take advantage of the Soviet wish for a rapid conclusion of the 
conference.305 According to Fischer, NATO’s short document had good 
chances to meet the favour of the NNAs and influence the contents of 
the draft they were working on. Several NNA delegations had 
expressed indeed their support for the so-called “second option”, i.e. in 
the adoption of a short document in the form of a communiqué limited 
to securing the continuation of the CSCE process.306 The “second 
option” offered an exit-strategy from a probable conference failure. 
Things had gone too far: an intermediation of the NNA group 
represented the last possibility to break the stalemate and bring the 
conference to an acceptable conclusion.307 An initiative of the NNA 
delegations was necessary both for strategic and public political 
reasons: it was indeed important to Bonn that the responsibility for the 
proposal of a short, unsubstantial document would not be publically 
ascribable to the West.308 
The West German Foreign Office did not want to leave any stone 
unturned and attempted a last diplomatic initiative with Moscow 
before yielding to the inevitability of the “second option”.309 State 
Secretary van Well and West German Ambassador in Moscow Wieck 
undertook a parallel diplomatic mission with the goal of convincing 
their Soviet partners, Ambassador Falin and Vice-Foreign Minister 
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Firjubin, that the enhancement of the political value of negotiations in 
Belgrade through the involvement of the participant states’ deputy 
foreign ministers would possibly to break the stalemate. Van Well 
made clear to Falin that he was ready to fly to Belgrade at any moment, 
together with other Western vice-ministers. The same proposal had 
been directed by Foreign Minister Genscher to his Czech colleague.310 
Firijubin’s answer came few days later, on 26 February 1978: the Soviet 
vice-foreign minister confirmed that time for discussions was over. All 
positions were well-known and negotiations had shown that there was 
no adequate basis for a common agreement on substantial matters. A 
high-rank gathering of the thirty-five deputy ministers, as proposed by 
Bonn, had no sense at that point of negotiations.311 The failure of the 
late diplomatic initiative of the Auswärtiges Amt swept away any West 
German illusions of changing the course of the conference. At the end 
of February 1978 the West German delegation had to accept the 
evidence that a rapid conclusion of the conference with the adoption of 
a short final document was the only option left over.312  
During the first week of March there was only room left for the last 
attempts of some delegations – namely of Romania, Yugoslavia, Malta 
and Switzerland – to include their proposals in the final document. The 
West German delegation was the last in the Western caucus to give its 
approval, by leaving the responsibility to the Soviet Union to take 
position on the NNA and Romanian requests.313 As the first CSCE 
follow-up meeting was approaching to its end, the West German 
Foreign Office was looking to the aftermath of Belgrade by dealing 
with the problem of how to present the disappointing outcome of the 
conference in front of the national public opinion. 
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Dealing with a big disappointment: the West German assessment 
of the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade 
The first CSCE follow-up meeting ended with a unanimous 
agreement sanctioning the irreconcilability of interests that had marked 
the unfolding of the conference (“Consensus was not reached on a 
number of proposals submitted to the meeting”). The thirty-five 
delegations approved on 9 March 1978 a final document which, as 
Selvage has well summarised, “basically confirmed that the 
participating states had met to review implementation, had expressed 
different views and would meet anew in Madrid” on 9 September 1980 
for preparing the second follow-up meeting, whose beginning was 
scheduled on 11 November of the same year.314 Substantial provisions 
were limited to convening three meetings of experts which would hold 
in the aftermath of the conference – i.e. the meeting for arbitration of 
disputes in Montreux, the scientific forum in Bonn and the meeting of 
experts on Mediterranean questions in Valletta. The choice of the 
Spanish capital to host the ensuing follow-up meeting represented the 
only poor victory of the Western European delegations.315  
In the direct aftermath of the conference it was time for assessments 
in Bonn. What emerges from the West German evaluation of the whole 
Belgrade endeavour is a sort of operation of “diminishing expectations 
ex-post”. As already mentioned in the course of the chapter, the 
Auswärtiges Amt had been aware that existing conjectural and structural 
problems suggested limiting optimistic expectations on the eve of the 
conference inauguration. During negotiations, however, the West 
German delegation had hoped to replicate the successful experience of 
the Helsinki CSCE by pursuing a strategy of patient intermediation 
between conflicting interests. After the outcome of the conference had 
belied West German hopes, West German chief delegator Per Fischer 
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tied his final assessment to the consideration of what the conference 
could and should not have been: “Neither a new ‘Geneva’ or a new 
‘Helsinki’” – i.e. a renewed constitutional moment for the CSCE – “nor 
a new ‘European New York’” – i.e. a sort of general assembly on 
human rights.316 But considering the specific mandate of the follow-up 
meeting – exchanging views on the implementation of the Helsinki 
Final Act and deepening mutual relations amongst the participant 
states – Bonn had sufficient good reasons to be disappointed. To allow 
negotiations to succeed “the antagonists of the first phase should turn 
into cooperative partners in the second phase of the conference, and the 
identification of existing flaws should turn into mutually agreed 
decisions on how to solve such flaws”. Both circumstances failed, 
however, to happen. A real, constructive review debate, observed 
Fischer, had never taken place; and the transition to the second phase 
of the conference in charge of defining the conditions for the future 
development of the CSCE process had proved to be even more 
difficult.317  
According to Fischer, his delegation had brought to the negotiating 
table of the working committees a series of reasonable, pragmatic and 
not destabilising proposals for improvements in all three Baskets. 
Eastern delegations had refused cooperation on human rights and 
human contacts, by equating the two fields and rejecting both in toto. 
West Germans had repeatedly underlined the different nature of 
debates on Principle VII – which addressed questions of principle – and 
Basket III – which addressed concrete measures and different 
categories of people. Bonn’s diplomacy had never hidden, since the 
preparation of the follow-up meeting, its main interest in the 
improvement of human contacts and exchange of information with the 
East. The Soviet refusal to collaborate on Basket III was inacceptable for 
Bonn for several different reasons which involved matters of principle, 
foreign political interests and national needs. First, the Eastern selective 
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approach to the improvement of Helsinki’s provisions contrasted with 
the idea of integrity and balance underlying the CSCE process. Second, 
the rejection of any form of cooperation on Basket III jeopardised 
Bonn’s idea of pursuing rapprochement through the multiplication of 
occasions of contact, travel and exchange amongst European citizens. 
Third, at stake was the international prestige of the Bundesrepublik, 
which had invested many diplomatic efforts in the promotion of 
human contacts since the origins of the CSCE process, by revealing 
both to its allies and to the Eastern leaders that they represented a West 
German vital foreign policy interest.318 Fourth, public expectations of 
improvements in the human fields were very high in the FRG. Bringing 
home no significant achievements with respect either to human rights 
or human contacts would – and did – put the federal government in the 
difficult position of justifying its debacle at the Belgrade CSCE in front 
of the domestic opposition and public opinion. 
Even though a great deal of responsibility for the poor outcome of 
the conference was assigned to the intransigency of Soviet bloc, the 
West German assessment reveals the will to understand objectively, or 
at least take into account, the reasons of the Soviet behaviour in 
Belgrade. In Bonn’s view, the hardening of Moscow’s line was due, 
first, to the difficult state of American-Soviet relations. Second, the 
East’s resistance to negotiations needed to be analysed against the 
background of the inherent difficulties of the CSCE process, which had 
been put to its first test in Belgrade after the signing of the Final Act. It 
would be a mistake to interpret the poor performance at the Belgrade 
CSCE as a proof of the Soviet will to bury definitely European détente: 
the decision to schedule the second follow-up conference for 1980 
                                                          
318 Bonn’s diplomatic work to promote improvements in the fields of Basket III had 
continued during the conference. For instance, on occasion of a bilateral meeting with 
Soviet chief delegator Yuri Vorontsov, Fischer had let the Soviets know again that 
“concrete decisions on all three Baskets, and especially on human contacts, were 
indispensible to conclude the conference”. Drahtbericht von Fischer, 24.11.1977, in PA AA, 
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 115.085. 
120 
 
proved evidence against such hypothesis.319 Furthermore, the Foreign 
Office shared the French analysis which identified the reasons of the 
Soviet change of strategy in the course of conference in the rigidity 
marking the “end of the Brezhnev era” (sic), and foremost in 
Goldberg’s behaviour – who spent the months between October and 
March attacking steadily the Eastern countries.320 
In the internal analysis of the West German Foreign Office 
responsibilities for the conference’s failure were equally distributed 
between the two superpowers. Per Fischer, who had personally dealt 
with Goldberg’s assertiveness in Belgrade, admitted that the 
disappointing outcome of negotiations was ascribable, besides to Soviet 
rigidity, to the U.S. chief delegator’s harsh tones and obsession for 
human rights.321 The first CSCE follow-up meeting had developed from 
an occasion for improving détente into an attempt to savage both the 
East-West multilateral dialogue and the unity of the Western Alliance. 
As it had done when preparing the conference, Bonn committed itself 
to keeping up appearances in front of the public opinion in the 
aftermath of Belgrade: it was important not to stress the significant role 
that increasing divergence with Washington had played in the negative 
unfolding of negotiations and to avoid that Goldberg released public 
critical remarks against the Western European behaviour in Belgrade.322 
 There were technical elements, too, which had contributed to 
compromise the good unfolding of negotiations in Belgrade: review 
debates had been too long, too many proposals had been tabled, cross-
bargaining between the Helsinki Baskets had been scarce, coordination 
between the groups of the Nine and NATO had been problematic, 
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some cracks had started to show in the coordination amongst the Nine 
– particularly due to the French deviations from the common line.323  
Even though the FRG had experienced a major disappointment in 
Belgrade, the Auswärtiges Amt tended to smooth excessively negative 
assessments, both in internal analyses and public statements. The 
partial failure of the first follow-up meeting was justified in the name of 
its exceptional character. Belgrade was depicted as “the first checkpoint 
down a long road”.324 As follow-up conferences would become a 
regular constituent of the CSCE process, both its participants and 
public opinions would gradually get used to them and the spirit of 
cooperation would gradually increase.325 West German arguments did 
not forget to highlight the positive outcome attained in Belgrade: i.e. 
the Eastern commitment to meeting again two years later for a second 
follow-up meeting which bound them more tightly to the 
strengthening of East-West rapprochement. 326 Finally, the traditional 
claim according to which détente was a slow process which required a 
long breath and a far-sighted gaze turned into a central argument for 
condoning the Belgrade fiasco in front of the public opinion. 
 
Conclusions: Some important lessons for the FRG’s realistic policy of 
détente 
Defending the conference outcome in the aftermath of Belgrade 
meant for the West German foreign government safeguarding the 
grounds of its whole foreign political complex and its own 
international prestige. The recognition of the importance of pursuing 
dialogue itself in spite of concrete achievements included in the 
Belgrade final document (“states stressed the importance they attach to 
détente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in 
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spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered”327) was undoubtedly 
relevant for the prosecution of the European détente process. A large 
part of the positive historical account of the first CSCE follow-up 
meeting has rested upon this recognition.328 The circumstance that all 
delegations remained in Belgrade until the end of the conference and 
committed themselves to continuing the CSCE process by agreeing 
upon the date and place of the second follow-up meeting has not to be 
overlooked. If analysed against the background of the international 
developments which would occur in the ensuing years, the minimal 
outcome attained in Belgrade seems retrospectively to have provided 
an important anti-cyclical antidote against the renewed Cold War 
confrontation. Moreover, the Belgrade follow-up meeting contributed 
to shape the CSCE process as a dialectic process, by offering multiple 
occasions of debate – at the level of plenary session, within the single 
working committees and the meetings amongst experts, through the 
complex of bilateral talks in the margins of the main conference and 
diplomatic initiatives outside the conference – of undeniable diplomatic 
significance. 
However, positive re-examinations had not to prevent from 
reflecting on some mistakes and miscalculations that the West German 
approach entailed and the first CSCE follow-up meeting disclosed. 
Bonn’s federal government – and the Auswärtiges Amt in particular, 
which had the direct responsibility for the preparation of the 
diplomatic strategy at the CSCE – learnt some hard lessons in the 
Yugoslav capital. They would stimulate a partial rethinking of the 
CSCE strategy in the aftermath of Belgrade. 
First, the “realistic détente policy” had proved to be not that realistic 
once put in place. The West German approach to negotiations remained 
quite bound to principles, especially with regard to the proportioned 
                                                          
327 For the full text of the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting see at the link: 
http://www.osce.org/mc/40865?. 
328 See, for instance, the introduction to the collective volume edited by V. Bilandžić, D. 
Dahlmann and M. Kosanović, From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting 
and the Crisis of Détente. 
123 
 
character of the Helsinki Final Act. The call for balance turned into a 
demand for simultaneous improvements in all Baskets. Indirect 
consequence of this attitude was the huge stream of Western proposals 
which Western delegations, according to the reproach of the NNAs, 
limited themselves to informing the other delegations about.329 Putting 
aside for the moment the problems of coordination with the U.S., the 
EC-Nine had been incapable to narrow their priorities and agree upon 
the necessary sacrifices – a problem which the West German delegation 
was aware of, as analyses drafted during and after the conference 
reveal. The cohesion of the Nine showed its hidden flaws in Belgrade 
and was harmed repeatedly by the French single-handed initiatives. It 
was a serious blow to Bonn: the FRG was the country which most 
needed the EC to speak with one voice (preferably with its own voice) 
when dealing with the East. 
It was especially with regard to the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
allies that the FRG’s CSCE strategy displayed lacking realism. The 
Western biggest mistake – and the second important lesson Bonn was 
taught – was the incapability of involving any Soviet important 
interests at any phase of the conference. This represented the 
fundamental reason of the poor conference outcome. At the Helsinki 
CSCE Soviets had been compelled to significant concessions, as they 
had important interests at stake. At the Belgrade CSCE, to the contrary, 
Soviet goals were limited to protecting the Eastern bloc from Western 
pressures concerning the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions, 
defending its international prestige from Western attacks and securing 
the irreversibility of détente, i.e. the continuation of the superpower 
dialogue on arms control and economic cooperation with Western 
Europeans. These were the main explanations for the Soviet decision 
not to leave the conference notwithstanding Goldberg’s unceasing 
attacks. By focusing on unrealistic proposals which fell outside the 
scope of the conference – as the “non-first-use” of nuclear weapons or 
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the moratorium on the further enlargement of military alliances – 
Moscow confirmed its favour for an “empty” conference outcome.330 
Hence, the Eastern countries had good reasons to claim their victory at 
the first CSCE follow-up meeting in the aftermath of Belgrade, apart 
from traditional propagandistic purposes.331 
Third, West Germans learnt in Belgrade how detrimental the U.S. 
engagement in European détente could be. One of the reasons of the 
success in Helsinki had been the convergent momentum between the 
U.S. détente and European détente, which had been otherwise 
paralleled by a certain Washington’s disinterest for the European 
endeavour. Instead, the new U.S. administration had gone to Belgrade 
with the intention to play an active role. Carter’s strong interest in the 
first CSCE follow-up meeting was motivated by interwoven domestic, 
foreign political and public political reasons. As Goldberg explained to 
Fischer on occasion of an after-dinner talk in Belgrade at the beginning 
of February 1978, the U.S. administration had decided to take on an 
hard stance on human rights at the Belgrade CSCE in order to obtain 
the endorsement to the SALT II agreement of those reluctant 
congressmen who considered negotiations with Moscow as a proof of 
weakness.332 Whereas the CSCE was a secondary diplomatic stage for 
Washington – being important security issues discussed elsewhere – it 
provided an ideal international showcase for Carter’s public foreign 
policy. Turning the CSCE into the main framework for the pursuit of 
his struggle for human rights allowed Carter to take a more pragmatic 
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approach to SALT-negotiations. The U.S. priorities were clearly set: a 
gradual relaxation of East-West relations through growing human 
contacts should be deferred until the SALT II agreement would be 
achieved by the superpowers.333 The talk with Goldberg, in which the 
U.S. chief delegator unveiled openly for the first time Washington’s real 
goals, disclosed an inconvenient truth: U.S. détente and European 
détente had never been so divergent, with regard both to their aims 
and strategies. Bonn’s idea of a beneficial interaction between the CSCE 
and SALT negotiations was deeply challenged by the disclosing of 
Washington’s intentions.  
Finally, there was a fourth general lesson West German diplomacy 
had to draw from the Belgrade experience: i.e. it had to learn to deal 
with the cooling-off of superpower détente. As Chancellor Schmidt had 
declared in an interview in the summer of 1977, if Moscow and 
Washington would develop a deep conflict of interests instead of 
reaching an agreement on curbing their nuclear strategic armaments, 
this would inevitably limit the room of manoeuvre for Germany’s 
détente policy”.334 As international conditions had changed since the 
times when Bonn’s Entspannungspolitik had been conceived and 
achieved its first realisations, the prosecution of a realistic policy of 
détente required to rethink its strategy and adjust it to the new 
circumstances.  
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“Die Kräfte der Geschichte werden sich als stärker erweisen als ideologische Barrieren 
und gewaltsame Schranken”335 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, inaugural address at the Second CSCE Follow-up 
Meeting in Madrid, October 13, 1981 
 
 
Chapter 3 
The “Return of Military Security” and the 
“Return of the Cold War”: Adjusting the FRG’s 
Realistic Policy of Détente to International 
Changing Conditions (1978-1980) 
 
Introduction: Dealing with the legacy of Belgrade on the way to 
Madrid 
In the last phase of the troubled negotiations at the Belgrade CSCE, 
the delegations of the thirty-five participant states could reach an 
agreement upon the date and place of the CSCE of the second follow-
up meeting. They had decided they would meet again in November 
1980 in the city of Madrid. The appointment of the Spanish capital was 
a small victory for the West, which managed to impose its preference 
over the candidatures of Vienna and Malta. The choice of Madrid had a 
significant symbolical meaning for the EC-Nine: it sealed Spain’s full 
integration into the multilateral conference diplomacy after years of 
diplomatic isolation and was a recognition of the successful democracy 
transition efforts made by the country after Franco’s death in 1975.336 
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As pointed out by Judt, only in 1970 a visitor crossing the border from 
France into Franco’s Spain could not but be struck through the abyssal 
chasm separating the two sides of the Pyrenees.337 Ten years later, the 
young Spanish parliamentary democracy prepared itself to host the 
greatest European diplomatic forum. Détente had not been the only 
major event in the European affairs during the Seventies. The unfolding 
of the CSCE process was flanked in Southern Europe by the peaceful 
transition to democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain.338 Greece was 
the first of the three Mediterranean countries to apply for membership 
in the EEC in 1975, only one year after the fall of the dictatorship of the 
colonels, and the first to join on 1 January 1981. As the second phase of 
the Madrid CSCE started, the group of the Nine had enlarged to Ten. 
The West German Foreign Office directed its attention towards the 
preparation of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid in the direct 
aftermath of Belgrade. During his speech in front of the European 
Council in Copenhagen on 8 April 1978, West German Foreign Minister 
Genscher addressed the steps the Nine should undertake to prepare 
themselves accurately for Madrid.339 Turning the attention to the 
following appointment of Madrid was a part of the federal 
government’s strategy of sweeping away the disappointment for the 
outcome of Belgrade.340 But it revealed also that Bonn’s interest in 
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pursuing multilateral détente had remained unvaried notwithstanding 
the failure of its diplomatic strategy in Belgrade.  
The Auswärtiges Amt started an internal reflection aimed at 
rethinking the West German CSCE policy for the following years. As 
analysed in the last paragraphs of Chapter 2, the first follow-up 
meeting had taught some important lessons to Bonn. It had shown that 
there were several problems which were inherent in the CSCE process 
and needed to be dealt with. The legacy of Belgrade provided useful 
indications about how the West German – and Western – strategy for 
Madrid could be shaped better. As Genscher highlighted at the meeting 
of the European Council in Copenhagen, the second CSCE follow-up 
meeting had to be prepared more carefully and in due time within the 
Western Alliance. The coordination between the groups of the Nine 
and NATO, which had functioned problematically in Belgrade, had to 
be enhanced. Likewise, cooperation with the Eastern and the NNA 
countries should be improved. The last had lamented the scarce 
willingness of Western delegations to pursue real consultation on their 
proposals, by limiting themselves to informing other delegations about 
them. Therefore, the Nine had to discuss their positions with the other 
CSCE participants before the beginning of the conference on occasion 
of the rounds of bilateral talks which would be pursued in preparation 
of Madrid.341 Moreover, the Nine had to define more precisely their 
common goals in order to recover their ability to speak with one voice. 
The European partners’ different views and interests needed to be 
merged into one accepted strategy by avoiding to including them 
simply into an endless list of proposals – as it had happened in 
Belgrade, where Western delegations had given a significant 
contribution to the enormous stream of proposals which had paralysed 
negotiations. A better definition of Western priorities meant, according 
to the West German Foreign Office, diminishing the horizon of 
expectations as well. A clear dividing line needed to be drawn between 
attainable and unattainable achievements. Bonn committed itself to 
using the months between the first and the second CSCE follow-up 
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meetings to pursuit consultations with the Western partners, the 
Eastern counterparts and the NNA countries, in order to understand 
what respective interests were at stake; to examine the available room 
for bargaining; and to start discussing concrete proposals in advance. 
The aim was to arrive in Madrid with a sufficiently clear overview of 
the whole spectrum of interests and possibilities, which prevent the 
Belgrade stalemate from happening again at the second CSCE follow-
up meeting.342 
The experience of the Belgrade conference had convinced the West 
German Foreign Office that the relaunch of the CSCE process would 
pass through the enhancement of the political rank of the follow-up 
meetings, by envisaging the direct involvement of the foreign ministers 
of the thirty-five participant states at some point of the negotiations.343 
A similar initiative had been attempted by Bonn’s diplomacy – without 
success – in the last days of the Belgrade CSCE with the purpose to 
rescue negotiations from a certain empty outcome. The idea behind the 
West German proposal levered up considerations of international 
prestige, by implying that the higher the political involvement of the 
participant states, the greater their commitment to the success of the 
conference would be. Moreover, the enhanced political profile of the 
follow-up meetings would provide an antidote against the East’s 
traditional attempts to bureaucratise the CSCE process. The main 
question which Bonn’s diplomacy was faced with was how to convince 
the Soviets and their allies to get more involved in the development of 
multilateral détente. The struggle for elevating the political rank of the 
Madrid CSCE represented a central item of the West German 
diplomatic preparation of the second follow-up meeting.344 As works in 
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Madrid would begin in November 1980, Bonn would succeed to get the 
support if not of all but of many participant states. Foreign Minister 
Genscher would hold the inaugural address in the name of the West 
German delegation, followed by a few colleagues of the Western and 
NNA countries. The Eastern bloc – with the exception of Romania – 
would make the eventual participation of their foreign ministers in a 
second phase of the conference dependent on the outcome of 
negotiations.345 As the conference would come to an end in the fall of 
1983, after long months of difficult negotiations and repeated 
adjournments, also the foreign ministers of the Eastern countries would 
be present in Madrid to celebrate the adoption of the conference final 
document. 
Whilst fostering the reduction of the technocratic character of 
negotiations at the CSCE, the Auswärtiges Amt recognised otherwise the 
significance of the “minor” gatherings of experts, whose works flanked 
the diplomatic preparation of the Madrid CSCE. According to the 
dispositions of the Belgrade concluding document, three meetings of 
experts were convened in the months between the first and the second 
follow-up conferences. As regards the first, delegations of experts of all 
thirty-five CSCE participant states met in the Swiss city of Montreux 
between 31 October and 11 December 1978 to discuss matters of 
peaceful settlement of disputes.346 The second meeting, which had been 
strongly fostered by the Maltese delegation and had been accepted 
with little enthusiasm by the Western countries, dealt with 
Mediterranean questions and was hold in Valletta between 13 February 
and 26 March 1979.347 The third, “the scientific forum”, originated from 
a West German proposal and was held in Hamburg between 18 
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February and 3 March 1980.348 According to the West German 
assessment, the three meetings of experts were more significant for 
their bridging role than for their actual results. They represented an 
additional occasion of multilateral encounter which provided some 
interesting information about the development of the respective 
participants’ approaches to CSCE process. In the aftermath of the 
scientific forum in Hamburg, the West German Foreign Office stressed 
that the meeting had unfolded already in the view of the upcoming 
follow-up conference in Madrid. In particular, a shift in the overall 
CSCE strategy of the USSR had been observed; the Soviet behaviour at 
the scientific forum had reinforced Bonn’s impression that Moscow 
would take a more open and flexible attitude to negotiations in Madrid 
in respect to its performance at Belgrade.349  
As the West German Foreign Office was reflecting on how to 
relaunch the CSCE process, East-West dialogue was increasingly faced 
with security matters. As this chapter investigates, issues of military 
security played a pivotal role in diplomatic and public debates in the 
time interval between Belgrade and Madrid; they interacted with the 
preparation of the second follow-up conference by influencing 
importantly the formation of the conference agenda and a partial 
rethinking of the West German détente strategy. Moreover, as the 
analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 illustrates, both the preparation and the 
unfolding of the Madrid CSCE were deeply marked by two major 
international crises: the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 
December 1979 and the open challenge launched by oppositional 
groups to the governing elite in Poland, which unfolded in the course 
of 1980-1981 and pivoted in December 1981 as martial law was 
imposed by General Jaruzelski. Both crises boosted a further revision 
by the Auswärtiges Amt of its concept of realistic détente policy, in order 
to adjust it to the strained international context. Chapter 4 shows that 
those episodes of crisis seriously threatened the continuation of 
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détente; but, paradoxically, they opened new possibilities of 
cooperation by compelling CSCE participants to greater efforts to 
rescue the multilateral dialogue. In order to allow the détente process 
to continue, the FRG had to adjust its CSCE strategy to changing 
international conditions and domestic pressures. Flexibility, realism, 
and separation between principles and realisations characterised the 
revised détente policy of the Bundesrepublik which in these years went 
through a major political shift, marked by the gradual end of the 
governmental experience of the social-liberal coalition and the return to 
power of the Christian Democrats. 
 
New challenges for East-West relations in the field of military 
security 
Security had traditionally been a central matter of concern for the 
West German federal government. Lying on the Cold War border 
between antagonist blocs, the FRG had lived since its foundation with 
the awareness of being the most probable target of an eventual Warsaw 
Pact’s military attack against the West. Because of the limits imposed to 
its sovereignty, it was largely dependent on its allies for the provision 
of its own security. As a result, Bonn was very sensitive to any change 
of the military balance on the European continent. Hence, the 
proceeding of the USSR’s program of renovation of its nuclear arsenal 
in Eastern Europe through the deployment of long range theatre 
missiles of the newest generation (SS-20s) roused increasing worries in 
the Bundesrepublik. The holding of the nuclear balance in Europe was at 
risk due to the growing advantage of the Soviet Union in the so-called 
“grey area” between the strategic arms covered by SALT II and the 
effective strategic systems at Moscow’s disposal.350 Helmut Schmidt, 
who as federal defence minister in the years 1969-1972 had followed 
personally the unfolding of SALT I negotiations, was preoccupied with 
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the changing strategic conditions on the continent.351 Indeed, the 
exclusion of the SS-20s from the coverage of both SALT I and II 
provided the Soviets with a new alarming free room of manoeuvre. As 
Schmidt highlighted in his renowned London speech at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 28 October 1977, a 
gap was coming into being between the Eastern capability to attack 
through nuclear tactical and conventional weapons and the Western 
capability to answer.352  
After the inglorious affair of the neutron bomb had embittered U.S.-
West German relations between the summer of 1977 and the spring of 
1978 353 – as Carter convinced a reluctant Schmidt to accept the 
inclusion of the newest enhanced radiation weapon into the NATO 
arsenal; Schmidt hardly managed to convince his much more reluctant 
party to deploy the U.S. “inhuman bomb” on the West German 
territory; and Carter finally changed his mind and took back the 
proposal – 354 Bonn pressed for a greater U.S. commitment to their 
security. Traditional fears of an American decoupling and Soviet 
military supremacy were still present in Bonn notwithstanding the 
achievements of European détente. A “dual-track” policy was 
necessary to counteract the military disparity between the East and the 
West: NATO would modernise its nuclear arsenals in Europe, by 
meanwhile continuing to pursue negotiations on arms control.355 The 
concept was first discussed by U.S. President Carter, British Prime 
Minister Callaghan, French President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt 
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at the informal meeting on the island of Guadeloupe in January 1979 
and made inroads into the Western Alliance in the course of the year. 
The adoption of a dual-track strategy was officially sealed through 
NATO’s famous decision of 12 December 1979: Western foreign and 
defence ministers agreed on proceeding with the stationing of 
additional long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNFs) in Western 
Europe – the “armament track” – if East-West negotiations would not 
lead to a substantial reduction of the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe by 
1983 – “the disarmament track”.356 
Alongside the development of NATO’s new strategy and the 
achievement of the superpower agreement on SALT II, the West 
German federal government intensified its diplomatic efforts to 
reanimate negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 
(MBFR) in Vienna, which were proceeding at a slow pace. Whereas the 
superpowers held the monopoly on the discussion of strategic arms’ 
limitations, the MBFR talks represented am adequate multilateral 
framework where Bonn could address directly its vital interests in the 
field of security. West German proposals for the relaunch of 
negotiations in Vienna – which had been advanced by Chancellor 
Schmidt to President Carter in July 1977 and then approved by the 
NATO partners – became a cornerstone of the whole Alliance’s 
initiative.357 As West German détente interests had been fully 
multilateralised at the CSCE, Bonn similarly longed for securing and 
multilateralising its security interests at the MBFR talks. As security 
issues imposed themselves gradually as the central item of 
international debates in the years 1977-1978, Bonn committed itself to 
reinforcing the integration between the CSCE and MBFR frameworks. 
To this purpose, it proposed starting negotiations on the so-called 
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“associated-measures” which were an integral part of MBFR talks but 
had not been discussed in Vienna that far.358 Associated measures 
reinforced, indeed, Helsinki’s provisions on CBMs. The West German 
initiative was directed to adjust the scheme of the MBFR to the one of 
the CSCE, by extending the area of jurisdiction of associated measures 
to the European part of the Soviet territory. The operation was directed 
to create a beneficial interaction between negotiations in Vienna and 
Madrid and to enlarge the complex of instruments at disposal of 
European détente to deal with crisis management and conflict 
reduction.359  
As Peter has highlighted, in 1979 Bonn aimed at including at 
integrating the manifold dimensions of its international engagement in 
the field of security – namely, the modernisation of LRTNFs, the 
prosecution of MBFR talks, the support to the superpower arms talks 
and the implementation of CBMs – into a single improved strategy, 
capable to meet at best the new requirements of the security question 
un Europe.360 Security was far from being a discovery of the late 
Seventies: its protection had been strictly intertwined with the pursuit 
of East-West dialogue since the origins of the détente project. The 
interweaving of security and détente needs remained valid at the end 
of the decade: the new predominance of security questions changed the 
terms of the relationship, requiring the West German federal 
government to rethink partially its détente strategy.  
The decisions made by the West German federal government in the 
field of security had important political and public repercussions of the 
domestic front. The affair of the neutron bomb first and the prospect of 
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an upcoming deployment of new U.S. missiles in the FRG then, 
reinforced the impression of a large part of the West German public 
opinion that Schmidt’s government was not speaking the language of 
détente anymore. A public opinion poll conducted in 1981 by the 
Federal Press Office (Bundespresseamt) revealed that most of people 
interviewed interpreted NATO’s dual-track resolution as a decision on 
rearmament.361 West Germans had got used to the achievements of the 
dialogue with the East. Even its traditional opponents had begun to 
yield to the changed paradigm of Bonn’s foreign policy. The apparent 
political reverse of the West German federal government and its NATO 
partners aroused the formation of a broad oppositional front. At the 
turn of the decade a wave of protests raged in the FRG, whose 
immediate target was the deployment of U.S. missiles on the West 
German territory – similarly to ongoing protests in other Western 
democracies. The West German protest movement of the early Eighties 
encompassed, however, a more composite spectrum of identities and 
requests: peaceful and anti-nuclear stances, anti-American sentiments, 
requests of rethink the bipolar division of the world, needs to redefine 
the West German national identity.362 
As protests against the “return of hard security” intensified 
dramatically in the whole country, the relaunch of the CSCE process at 
the Madrid meeting became increasingly urgent for the West German 
federal government. It was necessary to counterbalance the decisions in 
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the security field with important results on the détente front. The 
implicit interweaving of security and détente should be pursued more 
explicitly, both in the relations with the Eastern countries and in front 
of the national public opinion. Whereas political and military aspects of 
détente were, according to the West German theoretical conception, 
inseparable, in the practice Bonn’s CSCE policy took on increasingly 
the instrumental function of counterweighing the decisions made on 
the front of military security.363 
 
New opportunities for East-West relations in the field of military 
security 
One of the most important lessons the FRG had learnt at the 
Belgrade CSCE was that the process of European détente could 
improve only if Western countries would manage to get the Eastern 
bloc more involved. Hence, the West German Foreign Office was faced 
with a crucial question as it was preparing its strategy for the second 
follow-up meeting of Madrid: where should the relaunch of the CSCE 
process start from, in times of renewed East-West confrontation over 
military security? An indication on the path to follow came from a 
Soviet proposal; it suggested that the solution to the stalemate of the 
CSCE should be sought within the field of security itself. 
As the Western Alliance was discussing the details of the dual-track 
strategy, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact gathered in the 
Polish capital on 14-15 May 1979 replied by advancing the idea of a 
“Pan-European Conference on Questions of Military Détente.364 The 
Eastern initiative recalled the French similar proposal for a Conference 
on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) put forward by Giscard d’Estaing in 
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January 1978.365 According to the Eastern project, the pan-European 
conference would constitute a third additional forum of East-West 
cooperation, whose negotiations should be carried out separately from 
the MBFR and the CSCE frameworks. Questions of disarmament 
should be discussed at a different pace from and in parallel with the 
CSCE.366 From a strategic point of view, the new Warsaw Pact’s 
proposal was in line with the Eastern idea of the development of 
détente after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Indeed, it aimed first 
at breaking up the unity of the contents of the CSCE by focusing 
cooperation on selected issues; and second, at lowering gradually the 
profile of the follow-up meetings, by extracting “important” 
negotiations from the frame of the Helsinki Final Act. A similar attempt 
had been already made at the Belgrade CSCE, where Eastern 
delegations had tabled 1975 Brezhnev’s proposal for a conference on 
cooperation in the fields of traffic, environment and energy which 
aimed at deepening cooperation on specific issues of Basket II outside 
the existing frameworks in charge – i.e. the CSCE and the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).367 Whereas the new Eastern 
invitation to cooperation on disarmament shared similar strategic and 
propagandistic intents with elder initiatives, it contained some aspects 
of novelty the West German Foreign Office considered worth to be 
taken into account.368 During inner-German talks on 24 July 1979, East 
German Deputy Foreign Minister Moldt introduced the project of the 
pan-European conference to West German State Secretary van Well as 
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“the cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact’s package of proposals”. The 
socialist countries were open, as Moldt declared, to discuss similar 
initiatives coming from the Western side.369 East Berlin was giving clear 
indications about the direction to follow: the Eastern and French 
proposals for a CDE offered a possible common ground for 
negotiations at the Madrid CSCE.  
As the armament track of NATO’s new dual strategy was taking 
shape in the course of 1979, Eastern invitations to cooperation on 
disarmament intensified. The interweaving between missiles, 
disarmament and CSCE became stricter and stricter as the appointment 
of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid was approaching. The 
adoption of the NATO’s December 1979 decision did not only affect the 
formulation of the West German détente strategy, but brought 
important changes in the approach to the CSCE of the Soviet Union and 
its protégées. Disarmament had been always been a focal item of Soviet 
propaganda. A large part of the Soviet proposals tabled at the Belgrade 
CSCE addressed matters of disarmament.370 However, Eastern 
initiatives in this field took on a new concrete dimension at the turn of 
the decade: they became a major foreign political tool intended to 
hinder the deployment of new U.S. ballistic missiles in Western Europe. 
The CSCE became again, as in Helsinki, an important framework for 
the Eastern bloc to pursue its own vital interests.  
The proposal for a conference on disarmament – revised and 
updated by the Warsaw Pact in May 1980 – was promoted by the 
Soviet diplomacy through a round of talks in several Western capitals 
in the summer of 1980.371 During bilateral CSCE consultations in Bonn, 
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Moscow reconfirmed its strong interest in negotiating a CDE with the 
West. To this purpose, Eastern countries would consider to make 
concessions in the fields of Basket II and III, against the Western 
reassurance to avoid sterile polemics over confrontational issues.372 The 
way was paved for the strategic course Eastern delegations would 
pursue during the whole duration of negotiations at the Madrid CSCE. 
Besides the CDE project, a series of proposals for enhanced cooperation 
on security issues were brought forward by the Warsaw Pact in the 
months of preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting. They 
focused on developing CBMs, reinforcing the security aspects of 
détente in the Mediterranean region,373 reducing troops and 
armaments, renouncing to the first-use of both nuclear and 
conventional force.374  
The Eastern bloc had not played such a proactive role since the 
times of negotiations for the first CSCE. The West German Foreign 
Office observed with interest the ongoing shift beyond the Iron 
Curtain. The complex of Eastern proposals indicated clearly what the 
focal theme of the review conference in Madrid would be.375 More 
importantly, it unveiled that the Soviet bloc had regained strong 
interest, out of necessity, in getting involved in the CSCE process. As 
the West German Foreign Office observed in the spring of 1980, the 
East’s renewed interest for cooperation on the security dimension of 
détente could be turned to the West’s advantage: if handled carefully 
and kept within the framework provided by the Helsinki Final Act, it 
could be utilised to revitalise the CSCE process and force the East to 
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those substantial concessions the Belgrade conference had failed to 
achieve.376  
 
Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to new conditions: the 
preparation of a balanced agenda for Madrid 
The relaunch of the détente process at the Madrid CSCE required 
the West German Foreign Office to deal with two main tasks, in 
coordination with its Western partners: first, shaping debates on 
disarmament according to the Western view; second, safeguarding the 
balanced nature of the CSCE from the predictable predominance of 
security questions. To these purposes, the diplomatic efforts of the 
Auswärtiges Amt were directed, in the months of preparation of the 
second follow-up meeting, to bring together the Soviet and French 
drafts for a CDE and to agree a list of attainable proposals for the 
improvements of détente in its fields of interest. 
At the end of 1979 it had become clear that the Soviet bloc would 
take a proactive approach to negotiations on security in Madrid.377 The 
Western Alliance was compelled to define a detailed, coordinated plan 
in order “not to leave a clear field for Soviet initiatives”.378 In December 
1979 NATO’s foreign and defence ministers had declared themselves in 
favour of using the 1978 French draft as the basis for negotiations at the 
Madrid CSCE. Overcoming the initial U.S. opposition and the 
scepticism of a number of European partners, the CDE had become 
part of the “negotiation track” of NATO’s twofold strategy.379 The 
definition of the Western proposal for a CDE was object of analysis 
within the Auswärtiges Amt and of debates within the Alliance in the 
course of 1980. Bonn aimed at not limiting discussions to technical 
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details, but rather at conceiving the Conference on Disarmament as a 
project of vast “political dimensions and significance”.380 The West 
German ambitions to enhance the political value of the CSCE process 
were invested in the project of the CDE as well. The achievement of a 
big initiative on disarmament within the framework of the détente 
process would represent that important counterbalance to NATO’s 
rearmament decisions the West German federal government longed for 
in order to appease domestic oppositions.  
The Auswärtiges Amt identified the most important aspect of the 
CDE in its geographic mandate. Indeed, the 1978 French proposal 
covered the whole European continent “from the Atlantic to the Urals”. 
Keeping the initiative within the framework of the CSCE would 
provide, amongst other reasons, the legal basis for the inclusion of the 
European part of the Soviet territory.381 The geographic area of the CDE 
represented the main difference between the French and the Eastern 
proposal. The West German diplomacy tried to bring the two projects 
together throughout the spring and the summer of 1980, in order to 
achieve an agreement in principle before the start of negotiations in 
Madrid. Bonn’s efforts did not succeed: both a Western initiative for a 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and an Eastern initiative 
for a Conference on Military Détente in Europe (CMDE) were brought 
forward at the negotiation table of the second CSCE follow-up 
meeting.382 The question of the geographic mandate of the conference 
would represent a major bone of East-West contention in the Spanish 
capital and the conditio sine qua non for the Western final approval. 
The preparation of the Western agenda for the Madrid CSCE did 
not limit itself to the sole CDE. To the contrary, the aim of the CDE 
should be strategically used, according to Bonn, to obtain those 
concrete improvements of the Helsinki process the West German 
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delegation had longed for in Belgrade. The West German traditional 
interest for human contacts remained unvaried. The reinforcement of 
the human dimension of détente appeared even more urgent in times 
of renewed East-West tension, both from a substantial and a symbolic 
viewpoint. Between the first and the second CSCE follow-up meetings 
an interesting shift gradually occurred in the West German attitude 
towards the idea of balance which should necessarily characterise the 
development of the CSCE process. Safeguarding the harmonic 
relationship amongst the Helsinki’s baskets had always been a 
cornerstone of the Western German policy of multilateral détente. In 
principle nothing changed: indeed, aiming at the balance between 
security, economic and human matters continued to represent one of 
the guiding postulates of the Western strategy at the Madrid CSCE.383 
Its importance was reiterated in a number of declarations of the EPC, 
NATO and European Council during the preparation and the 
unfolding of the follow-up meeting. In practice the goal of balanced 
improvements should be pursued less mechanically: the experience in 
Belgrade had shown that it was quite unrealistic to attain achievements 
in all fields of the Helsinki Final Act in every contingency. Particularly 
in the human field, pragmatic distinctions should be made between 
attainable and unattainable aims against the background of the existing 
circumstances.384 The acceptance by the Eastern bloc of three or four of 
the Western demands concerning the easing of family reunification, 
exchange of contacts and visits of relatives would represent according 
to the Auswärtiges Amt a sufficient counterweight to a positive decision 
on the CDE.385  
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The preparation of Western proposals in the fields of Basket II and 
III was carried out within the EPC frameworks between 1979 and 1980. 
The legacy of Belgrade affected significantly the formulation of the 
Nine’s strategy. In a strategic paper of December 1979 the West 
German Foreign Office addressed the question of how to deal with the 
numerous Western demands which had remained unanswered at the 
first follow-up meeting. On the whole, they still remained valid and 
relevant for the continuation of the process of détente: as West German 
chief delegator Fischer had stressed in its concluding address in 
Belgrade, they addressed concrete problems which could be solved 
only through the common commitment of all CSCE participants.386 
However, they needed to be revised and updated. The West German 
Foreign Office indentified the following tasks the Nine had to deal 
with. First, the number of proposals should be reduced: an important 
step in this direction was made by the Nine by collecting and 
summarising their demands in some synthesis papers – as for instance 
the so-called “Miller-Paper” on human contacts and the “Hoffman-
Paper” on information.387 Second, possible initiatives should be 
classified according to criteria of priority and negotiability, by 
excluding those which had scarce chances of success. For instance, the 
U.S. proposal for the convening of a meeting of experts on the 
participation of single individuals in the CSCE presented within the 
NATO caucus in February 1980 was firmly rejected by the Nine.388 
Third, Western delegations should take the initiative with more 
conviction than they had done in Belgrade, where fears of diverting the 
attention from implementation issues had restraint more proactive 
attitudes. In January 1981 the Nine openly declared their intention to 
pursue a different course in Madrid. The reiteration of old demands 
(addressing the implementation flaws of the Helsinki Final Act), would 
be flanked by initiatives on those issues of the Helsinki Accords which 
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leave room for further improvements (namely the CBMs) and by more 
innovative proposals (resting upon the “letter and spirit” of the 
Helsinki’s provisions but enlarging its contents).389  
 
To sum-up, the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting 
was pursued by Bonn with increasing pragmatism. The development of 
a détente policy which did not limit itself to being realistic in words 
was a gradual process, triggered by the lessons learnt in Belgrade, the 
changing international environment and the enduring pressures 
coming from the domestic public opinion. The West German CSCE 
strategy underwent two important changes between Belgrade and 
Madrid. First, after the adoption of NATO’s December 1979 decision, 
the inherent interweaving of security and détente interests had to 
become more evident: the CSCE policy was pursued instrumentally to 
counterbalance the decisions of the federal government in the field of security 
in front of the eyes of public opinion. Second, the necessity to relaunch the 
CSCE process required greater flexibility: the Auswärtiges Amt developed 
a more pragmatic interpretation of the “balanced character” of the 
development of the CSCE process.  
As those adjustments were gradually taking shapes, East-West 
relations were faced with two major crises, which would profoundly 
affect the unfolding of the second CSCE follow-up conference. 
Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to times of crises: the influence 
of Afghanistan and Poland 
In the twelve months before the beginning of the Madrid CSCE the 
East-West relationship went through a significant deterioration, which 
has led historians to speak of the “return to a second Cold War”. Two 
major Cold War crises unfolded at the turn of the decade: they 
triggered a redefinition of the balance of power between the two blocs 
and challenged directly the continuation of the CSCE process. The first, 
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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve of 1979, occurred 
outside the European continent but contradicted the commitment made 
by the CSCE participants to attune their general international conduct 
to the principles of détente. The second, the Polish crisis, developed in 
the heart of Europe and escalated between the summer of 1980 and the 
end of 1981: notwithstanding its domestic nature, it had important 
international repercussions and addressed open violations of the 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Both Afghanistan and Poland were 
comparable, for their public impact and the imaginary they recalled, to 
the 1968 Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.390 However, 
they did affect much more seriously the prosecution of the policy of 
détente, than the solution to the Prague crisis by armed intervention 
had done a decade before.  
Afghanistan 
As Zubok has highlighted, Moscow’s decision to invade 
Afghanistan was a surprise not only to politicians and foreign policy 
experts in the West, but also to most of the Soviet foreign policy elite.391 
Although it matured from the endemic weakness of the Soviet bloc, it 
was largely interpreted as a clear proof of Moscow’s return to 
expansionist drive in foreign policy. The Afghan crisis deepened the 
strains between the superpowers and the rifts in the transatlantic 
partnership. The U.S. administration undertook unilaterally a series of 
punitive sanctions intended to affect economic, security and political 
vital interests of the Soviet Union.392 Against Carter’s expectations, 
Western Europeans were little inclined to follow the American 
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example. Whereas the British declared themselves ready to met 
Washington’s demands, the French tried to convince the European 
allies to undertake an autonomous course from Washington.393 West 
Germans opted for a moderate course towards Moscow as well: 
notwithstanding a firm condemnation of the military intervention in 
Afghanistan, it was essential “not to break off communication with the 
Soviet Union during such times of crisis”, as Schmidt explained to the 
American President in a long call phone on 11 January 1980.394 The U.S. 
sanctions against the Soviet Union had not been discussed with the 
Western partners, although they affected some of their important 
interests. Economic and trade measures would inflict important 
damages to Western European economics in times of deepening 
recession.395 The conditions for the continuation of the policy of East-
West dialogue were at stake, as concerned Schmidt and Giscard 
observed few weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan.396 
The West German federal government had its hands tied. The 
sanctions affair took on increasingly the meaning of a loyalty test 
towards the U.S. administration. Possibilities of resisting to the 
pressure coming from Washington were limited by the awareness that 
the particular conditions of West German sovereignty made the FRG 
more heavily dependent on the American public opinion and military 
protection with respect to its Western allies. The pursuit of Bonn’s 
Ostpolitik remained still critically dependent on the good health of its 
Westpolitik. Since the beginning of its bilateral policy of dialogue with 
the East, the West German federal government had to strike a balance 
between supporting the foreign political choices of the U.S. 
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administration and pursuing good relations with the Eastern countries. 
In times of superpower rivalry, this task required greater efforts and 
sacrifices. A very reluctant Schmidt decided to make at least some 
concessions to Washington’s demands. Whilst the FRG managed to 
forego economic sanctions, it was amongst the few NATO countries – 
together with Norway and Turkey, similarly exposed to the presence of 
Soviet fighting forces on their immediate borders – to join the U.S. 
boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Even though the boycott represented 
“a victory of impotence over politics”, as former Chancellor Willy 
Brandt commented in an interview on French television,397 it was the 
necessary price to pay not to revise the policy of dialogue with the 
Soviets. Hence, at the beginning of July 1980 Helmut Schmidt travelled 
to Moscow to meet Brezhnev, following the example of Giscard’s visit 
to the Soviet leader in Warsaw in May.398  
As the Western partners were drifting apart over the sanctions 
issue, their efforts to coordinate their strategies for the Madrid CSCE 
continued. The U.S. ambassador in Brussels presented a list of 
proposals for Madrid at the NATO meeting in February 1980.399 
Washington seemed to wish to give its imprinting to the formulation of 
the Western conference strategy.400 Its initiative featured a mixture of 
good willingness and persisting scepticism about the possibilities of 
European détente. On the one hand, the U.S. administration committed 
itself to complying with the needs of the European allies: the 
declaration that a “balance between a thorough and frank review of 
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implementation and willingness to discuss new proposals in all areas of 
the Final Act” was the best course to follow in Madrid represented an 
absolute novelty.401 On the other hand, the limits of possible 
cooperation with the Soviet Union in the wake of Afghanistan were 
clearly set: the U.S. ambassador warned Europeans that they “should 
be aware that events of the next several months with regard 
particularly to Afghanistan will determine whether the United States 
can agree to participate in any post-Madrid meeting aimed at 
expanding contacts or cooperation with the Soviets”.402 Bonn remained 
sceptical about the possibility of a significant shift in Washington’s 
CSCE policy. As West German Ambassador at the NATO quarters 
Pauls reported in August 1980, it was not to exclude that the U.S. 
administration – considering the increasing political weight of hard-
line positions emerged in the aftermath of Afghanistan and in 
concomitance with the ongoing presidential election campaign – would 
reiterate the strategy pursued at the first CSCE follow-up meeting, by 
putting great emphasis on review debates and human rights issues in 
Madrid. The West German conference aims, namely improvements of 
human contacts and the convening of a CDE, were at risk to be pushed, 
again, to the background.403 
Whilst no significant change was to expect on the front of the U.S. 
approach towards the CSCE, an important shift was ongoing beyond 
the Iron Curtain. As Zubok has highlighted, the collapse of superpower 
détente in the wake of Afghanistan changed the Soviet calculus of the 
CSCE between Belgrade and Madrid. 404 The international consequences 
of Afghan crisis accelerated the trends triggered by the adoption of 
NATO’s dual-track decision. Faced with the pending prospect of a U.S. 
reinforced military presence in Western Europe, the economic 
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repercussions of punitive sanctions placed by Washington and the 
widespread international condemnation of its Afghan endeavour, the 
Soviet leadership needed cooperation with Western Europe more than 
before.405 The upcoming CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid opened 
possibilities for achieving the aim of the CDE, improving the trade with 
the West and breaking away from diplomatic isolation. Taking on a 
more cooperative attitude towards the process of European détente 
imposed itself as a Soviet foreign political necessity in the course of 
1980.  
Poland 
In August 1980, as the beginning of the preparatory works for the 
second CSCE follow-up meeting of Madrid was getting close, a wave of 
protests erupted in Poland. Labour strikes in Gdansk guided by the 
anti-Soviet movement Solidarność (Solidarity) soon escalated into an 
overall systemic crisis of the Communist rule in Poland.406 In the second 
half of 1980 and throughout 1981 workers’ requests took on a broader 
political meaning, by discrediting the communist thesis of unity of 
action between the ruling party and the working class and questioning 
the legitimacy of Warsaw’s regime itself. Three main elements 
characterised the Polish domestic developments of 1980-1981 as a major 
international crisis. 
First, Poland’s turmoil represented a serious threat for the duration 
of the Soviet leadership and the existing geopolitical order in the 
Eastern bloc. The possibility of a Soviet external military intervention 
casted a long shadow over the development of the Polish crisis, 
reinforced by the inability of the government in Warsaw to deal with 
protesters’ demands. The solution by armed intervention to the 1968 
                                                          
405 The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan roused a widespread weave of 
disapproval which went far beyond the borders of the Western bloc. At the emergency 
special session on Afghanistan of the UN General Assembly, an overwhelming majority 
of 111 countries expressed their firm condemnation of the Soviet military initiative. 
406 M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p. 
265. 
151 
 
Prague Spring had not prevented the embryonic process of détente 
from progressing at the end of the Sixties. But the overall international 
background against which the Polish crisis unfolded had profoundly 
changed since then. Indeed, it was clear to all parties involved in East-
West cooperation that détente – already harmed by the deterioration of 
the superpower relationship, by the strains over securities between the 
two blocs and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – would not 
tolerate a military intervention in the heart of Europe. Moreover, 
whereas détente had still been a clear field at the time of the Prague 
crisis, a corpus of rules and commitments had been defined by its 
participants and had consolidated throughout the Seventies: their open 
violation could hardly be ignored. 
Second, as Zubok has observed with force, the Polish revolution 
spilled over, politically and psychologically, into the borders of the 
Soviet Union.407 Fears of contagion were present in Moscow and in the 
Eastern capitals. The Polish example risked to encourage further 
dissident groups, whose public demands intensified as the 
appointment of the Madrid CSCE was getting close. Hence, events in 
Poland triggered defensive reactions in most of the Eastern countries, 
which affected also their contacts with the West. Bonn’s federal 
government observed with particular worry the ongoing developments 
in the GDR at the beginning of the new decade. Hence, bilateral inner-
German relations were going through difficult times due to the 
renewed restrictive political course pursued by East German 
authorities.408 Already since the spring of 1979 the GDR had 
strengthened its policy of ideological demarcation from the other 
German counterpart: working conditions for West German journalists 
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had become harder, the criminal law had been reformed by introducing 
more repressive elements, and the overall control over the lives of East 
Germans reinforced by the adoption of new legal disciplining tools.409 
But even more surprising and disappointing for Bonn was East Berlin’s 
decision – taken on 9 October 1980, few days after the federal elections 
in the FRG and before the opening of the CSCE works in Madrid – to 
enhance drastically the so-called Mindestumtausch, i.e. the mandatory 
minimum currency exchange of a specified amount of Deutsche Mark 
for Western citizens visiting the GDR.410 This measure, which came into 
force immediately without any exception and notice, represented, first, 
a unilateral modification of the agreed inner-German regulation in 
force since November 1974, considered an integral part of the acquis of 
détente. Second, it contradicted the multilateral commitments made at 
the Helsinki CSCE with regard to the facilitations of travels and 
contacts between signatory countries. Hence, Bonn denounced East 
Berlin’s initiative as an open infringement of the legal and political 
grounds which inner-German relations and East-West détente rested 
upon.411 A second slap in the Bonn’s face came a week later, on 13 
November, as during his speech in the city of Gera SED General 
Secretary Honecker demanded a list of unacceptable conditions for the 
normalisation of inner-German relations and directed a series of sharp 
criticisms against the FRG which recalled the tones of the past, harshest 
Cold War times.412 The Auswärtiges Amt’s interpretation of the East 
German repressive turn, which in Bonn’s view had been largely 
affected by the eruption of the Polish crisis, seemed to be confirmed 
few months later as East Berlin agreed with Warsaw on a series of 
restrictions to the flows of visits and contacts between the two 
countries which aimed at closing de facto the Polish border to East 
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German citizens.413 Whereas economic motivations could be put 
forward by the East German leadership to explain the rationale of the 
October 1980 enhancement of the mandatory currency exchange, they 
could hardly be used to justify the limitations of human contacts with 
Poland. East Berlin’s restrictive measures were rather to be understood, 
according to Bonn, as similar attempts to discipline the population and 
discourage contacts both with the West and with Polish dissidents.414 
The meaning of such trends went far beyond the specificity of the 
inner-German relationship. They contributed to complicate the 
negotiation landscape at the Madrid CSCE, especially with regard to 
the matters of Basket III.415 
Third, the management of the Polish crisis by the government in 
Warsaw received high international exposure as the confrontation 
between protesters and authorities developed in concomitance with the 
unfolding of the second CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid. Indeed, 
the Polish crisis, already serious on the eve of Madrid, deteriorated 
dramatically during the first conference year. The Madrid CSCE 
became inevitably an international sounding board for the crisis: what 
was happening in the Eastern country was under the eyes of the 
delegations gathered in Madrid and of the international public opinion. 
As a signatory state of the Helsinki Final Act, Poland had committed 
itself to the respect of all its principles. Eventual massive violations of 
Polish dissidents’ human rights and basic freedoms by the government 
in Warsaw would compel delegations in Madrid to take positions. Even 
though the Polish crisis did not become an official item of debate at the 
Madrid CSCE during the first conference year, at least until Jaruzelski’s 
decision to impose martial law in December 1981, it was constantly 
under the careful scrutiny of the CSCE participants since the start of 
multilateral negotiations in the Spanish capital. As Chapter 4 analyses, 
diplomatic works in Madrid could not but be affected by the 
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deterioration of the relations between protesters and authorities in 
Poland. If, on the one hand, it became more and more difficult to 
silence massive violations of human rights and punitive measures 
adopted by Warsaw’s authorities, on the other hand the crisis 
drastically sank the Eastern countries’ tolerance thresholds and room 
for manoeuvre.416 Hence, dealing with the Polish question became in 
the course of the conference an inevitable task for all delegations 
gathered in Madrid.  
 
Rethinking a realistic policy of détente in the times of the Afghan 
and Polish crises 
The international developments in Afghanistan and Poland urged 
the West German Foreign Office to revise further its multilateral 
détente policy in view of the appointment of Madrid. The Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan represented a massive violation of 
the shared principle of geographic indivisibility of détente, according to 
which each CSCE participant state committed itself to conforming its 
conduct outside of Europe to the requirements of European détente.417 
Such infringement posed the West German federal government in front 
of the question of how to conciliate firmness on the respect of the basic 
principles of the Helsinki Act with its foreign policy interests and 
needs. Even though Schmidt and Genscher continued to foster the 
continuation of détente even after the Afghan crisis – and in spite of it – 
there was awareness in Bonn that indulgence towards the Soviet 
endeavour would endanger seriously the credibility of the whole 
détente construction.  
A solution to the dilemma was found by distinguishing with 
pragmatism, once more, between the theoretical and the operational 
side of the process of multilateral détente. This meant that, even though 
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the principle of geographic indivisibility of détente remained valid as a 
theoretical postulate of the CSCE and an imperative for its participants, 
the West German Foreign Office decided to deal with it with flexibility 
on the operational level.418 Developments in Poland of the years 1980-
1981 came to Bonn’s aid to motivate this partial rethinking of its 
realistic policy of détente. The FRG tied the continuation of the process 
of East-West dialogue to the possibility of fostering stability in Poland 
both in the internal analyses of the Auswärtiges Amt and in the 
argumentations of the West German diplomacy. The improvement of 
multilateral détente – and more specifically the successful outcome of 
the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid – would exert, 
according to Bonn’s view, a positive effect on the ongoing attempts for 
liberalisation in Poland.419 In the course of the Madrid CSCE the West 
German Foreign Office promoted the link between improvement of 
East-West dialogue and solution to the Polish crisis, shaping 
increasingly its multilateral détente policy as a policy of stabilisation 
and, after Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law in December 1981, as a 
policy of crisis management towards Poland.420 According to the 
indications provided by the Auswärtiges Amt, whilst the West German 
delegation at the Madrid CSCE should not withdraw from denouncing 
open violations of the Helsinki Act – as the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan – in its opening address and during review debates, 
negotiations on concrete improvements in the field of human contacts, 
trade and disarmament should be pursued also for Poland’s sake.421 
Moreover, the CSCE’s protective function towards Poland was one of 
the main arguments adducted by the West German delegation 
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throughout 1981 to contrast the possibility of a premature conclusion of 
the follow-up conference.422 
Tying Poland’s destiny to the advancement of multilateral détente 
was part of a broader strategy of stabilisation encompassing a series of 
diplomatic actions pursued at different levels. Bonn’s strategy aimed at 
improving East-West dialogue through CSCE negotiations in Madrid 
and INF negotiations in Geneva; at sending positive signals from 
Brussels to the Eastern bloc through the proposal of negotiations and 
economic cooperation with the European Community; at offering to 
Warsaw targeted economic help.423 As on the bilateral level, Schmidt 
and Genscher used their network of good relations with the Eastern 
countries to avert the risk of an armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact 
in Poland, the West German diplomacy at Madrid aimed at continuing 
the CSCE, with the idea that the Eastern neighbour would more easily 
find a solution to its domestic crisis within an improved international 
environment. 
The strategy of de-escalation was directed also towards the USSR. 
Given the renewed Soviet interest for achieving concrete results within 
the process of European détente, CSCE negotiations were considered 
by the West German Foreign Office an important diplomatic tool to 
convince Moscow to abstain from an armed intervention in Poland. The 
West German shifting attitude towards the principle of indivisibility of 
détente served foremost to the purpose of constraining the Soviet 
conduct in Poland. If the process of European détente had continued in 
spite of Afghanistan, an armed invasion on the European territory 
would not be tolerated, as Genscher made clear in his inaugural 
address.424 
                                                          
422 Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Vorschläge eines Zieldatums zur Beendigung des Treffens 
Mitte Juli, 26.06.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.954. 
423 Vorgänge in Polen. Hier: KSZE-Aspekte, 29.12.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 
132.928.  
424 Zum Entwurf Genschers Madrid-Erklärung, 06.11.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 
178.804. 
157 
 
More than a radical shift in the West German CSCE policy, the 
formulation of an operative approach to the geographic dimension of 
the indivisibility of détente represented a realistic adaptation of the 
theoretical grounds of multilateral détente to the constraints imposed 
by the tense international context. Bonn’s efforts revealed that the 
federal government, besides continuing to consider the CSCE a priority 
foreign policy field, preserved a certain amount of confidence in the 
possibility of prosecution of East-West dialogue while approaching the 
appointment in Madrid, against widespread scepticism of large part of 
the national public opinion towards a process which seemed to be 
seriously worn out through the difficulties of that year.425  
In the last phases of the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up 
meeting the West German Foreign Office was faced with another, more 
practical question: i.e. how to address publicly the Afghan and Polish 
issues at debates in Madrid. According to the political guidelines for 
the West German delegation at the CSCE, collected in the strategic 
paper drafted by State Secretary van Well on 5 November 1980, all 
major setbacks of détente – included Afghanistan – should be discussed 
in the first review phase of the conference.426 A different treatment was 
reserved instead for Poland. Although the Polish developments were a 
central matter of concern for Bonn, it was decided not to mention them 
in Genscher’s address at the inaugural session of the CSCE follow-up 
meeting – except for the general but implicit reference, mentioned 
above, to the circumstance that the process of détente would not 
tolerate, after Afghanistan, any military enterprise within the European 
borders.427 The West German Foreign Office decided to abstain as much 
as possible from public statements on the Polish crisis which risked 
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aggravating further the precarious international situation. Bonn’s 
choice was dictated by reasons of diplomatic prudence and 
convenience: there was awareness that any Western and West German 
declaration would be easily stigmatized by the Eastern countries as an 
attempt to interfere into the Polish domestic affairs, burdening in vain 
the development of works at Madrid. The West German delegation, 
along with its allies, reserved however the right to take a position, 
depending on the future development of the situation.428 Hence, both 
for Poland’s and the CSCE’s sake, the Polish crisis managed to remain 
an unspoken presence in Madrid at least until events escalated in 
December 1981.  
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“In this dynamic world, stability cannot be obtained by trying to turn back the wheel of 
history” 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, speech at the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting’s 
plenary session in Madrid, February 9, 1982 
 
 
Chapter 4 
For the Sake of Poland, For the Sake of Détente: 
the Implementation of a Realistic Policy of 
Détente at the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting 
in Madrid (1980-1983) 
 
Introduction: Changing political landscapes in the West at the 
beginning of the new decade 
One month before the start of the second CSCE follow-up meeting 
in Madrid in November 1980, federal elections took place in the 
Bundesrepublik. On 5 October West German voters reconfirmed the 
social-liberal coalition: both the SPD and the FDP performed better 
than in 1976, increasing their number of seats in the Bundestag, whereas 
the CDU/CSU – though remaining the country’s strongest party – 
suffered a consistent loss of 4,1 percent of votes. The October’s federal 
elections had turned into a referendum over the hard-liner Christian 
Democratic candidate Strauß, spokesman of those in the CDU who 
continued to be opposed to the policy of dialogue with the East.429 The 
young political party of The Greens (Die Grünen) – founded at the 
beginning of that year – obtained 1.5 percent of votes. It was the start of 
a parabolic rise at the national level which would bring the ecologist 
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and pacifist party to enter the federal parliament in March 1983: for the 
first time in the postwar time a new political entity added to the three 
traditional parties at the federal level.430 This novelty marking the 
political landscape was the symbol of a broader process of 
transformation that the West German society – as well as other Western 
European societies – was going through in the early Eighties.431 The 
internal fragmentation of the Social Democratic party, the outburst of 
the peace movement, the emergence of The Greens, the drift of public 
opinion over security issues represented different aspects of an overall 
process of polarisation.432 
The reconfirmation of Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor – with Hans-
Dietrich Genscher continuing to lead the Auswärtiges Amt – represented 
a countertrend to the developments occurring in the most important 
Western countries at the turn of the decade. A first major political turn 
took place on the other side of the Atlantic only one month after the 
federal elections in the FRG. In the electoral turn-out on 4 November in 
the U.S., Republican candidate Ronald Reagan reported an uncontested 
victory over President Carter. Hence, unlike West Germans, Americans 
showed their favour for a clear political change by turning their back 
on the weak Carter administration, supporting Reagan’s economic 
program of deregulation and opting for a harder line in foreign policy. 
In Reagan’s foreign political program there was no room for any form 
of dialogue with the East: as Romero has highlighted, the idea itself of 
détente was undermined at its grounds by rejecting the Soviet Union as 
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a partner on the same level with the American power.433 As it will be 
analysed in the course of this chapter, Reagan’s election worried 
seriously the supporters of détente in the FRG and Western Europe, 
who started to interrogate themselves on what possible developments 
would occur in international politics after the inauguration of the new 
U.S. administration on 20 January 1981.434  
Other two pillars of the Western Alliance underwent major political 
changes at the turn of the decade. 1979 Margaret Thatcher’s seizure of 
power in the UK caused an epochal twist whose political consequences 
marked the beginning of the new decade. Moreover, in the course of 
1980, French politics too was preparing for change: presidential 
elections in the spring of 1981 marked the victory of Giscard’s 
opponent, Socialist candidate François Mitterrand. A reconfiguration of 
political balances and personal relations was ongoing within the 
Western caucus in the early Eighties. It contributed to complicate 
further the landscape wherein the Madrid CSCE took place.  
The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid started in 
November 1980 and lasted, after repeated breaks and adjournments, 
until the fall of 1983. It represented the main multilateral stage where 
changing intra-bloc and inter-bloc dynamics were put to test and took 
shape. Whereas interdependence between the two blocs had increased 
during the Seventies, conflicts and contentions at the turn of the decade 
imposed – or tried to impose – new dividing lines. As the wheel of 
history seemed to turn back under the impulse of the affirmation of the 
“second Cold War”, the Madrid CSCE offered the stage where 
supporters of détente attempted to pursue a countercyclical 
international policy. Amongst those, the FRG aimed at playing a primal 
role. As the chapter illustrates, West German diplomacy tried to 
implement in Madrid a realistic détente policy which, with respect to 
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the past, had gained increased flexibility and pragmatism. Bonn 
supported firmly the opportunity to continue negotiations even in 
adverse conditions. But the Madrid CSCE became soon a terrain of 
indirect confrontation over the major episodes of crises marking the 
turn of the decade: Afghanistan, Poland, the deployment of new 
missiles in Europe. Whereas the Polish crisis was not initially an item of 
multilateral debate, it casted a lengthening shadow over the unfolding 
of negotiations until the precipitation of events in Poland in December 
1982 changed the track of the conference. The chapter shows how the 
major issues of East-West confrontation entailed some potential for 
bringing the conference to a good conclusion. Throughout the three 
years of negotiations in Madrid, West German diplomacy tried to draw 
from the major episodes of international crisis arguments of persuasion 
and tactical tools of negotiation that they could used both with the 
Western partners and the Eastern counterparts in order to attain its 
own détente goals. 
 
“Looking behind to go ahead”: reviewing the state of multilateral 
détente in Madrid 
The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid was marked by a 
difficult start. Delegations had not managed to agree on a common 
conference agenda during the preparatory meeting which, started on 9 
September 1980, was still ongoing at the beginning of November 1980 
when the main conference should officially begin.435 West German 
Foreign Minister Genscher instructed the head of his delegation, 
Ambassador Kastl, not to cede to easy compromises in this first 
determinant phase of the conference where the contents and the 
structure of negotiations were defined: what would be given away at 
the beginning could no more be improved afterwards.436 The lingering 
fear of a premature interruption of the Madrid CSCE should not urge 
Western delegations to excessive compliance. Indeed, the months of 
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diplomatic preparation of the Madrid CSCE had revealed that the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern allies had substantial interests in bringing 
the conference to a successful conclusion.437 This awareness nourished 
the West German confidence in the possibility of achieving concrete 
détente improvements even though East-West dialogue was going 
through one of its hardest phases. After a few days of uncertainties and 
tensions, a last minute agreement on the main organisational 
conference aspects was reached on Friday 14 November 1980, paving 
the way to the official start of the second CSCE follow-up meeting the 
week after. 
The beginning of the conference was surrounded by troublesome 
international developments. The hanging consequences of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the escalating crisis in Poland, the growing 
strains between the superpowers, the East-West confrontation over 
armaments, the embitterment of inner-German relations, and the 
overall worsening of Western journalists’ working conditions in the 
Warsaw Pact’s countries were heavy problems weighing on the 
diplomatic work in Madrid. Their existence and influence could not be 
ignored by delegations at the CSCE. The question of how those 
challenging issues were to deal with at multilateral negotiations had 
been addresses by the West German Foreign Office – as it had been 
partly analysed at the end of Chapter 3 – on the eve of the start of the 
conference. According to the main political guidelines for the West 
German delegation at the Madrid CSCE, collected in the strategic paper 
drafted by State Secretary van Well on 5 November 1980, all major 
setbacks of détente should be discussed in the first review phase of the 
conference.438 Bonn asked its delegations to take a stand against open 
violations of the Helsinki agreements perpetrated in the Eastern 
European countries by using, however, objective, moderate and 
political argumentations. It was not the case to turn Madrid into a 
tribunal and to repeat the frustrating experience of Belgrade, where the 
                                                          
437 Ibid. 
438 Schrifterlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Joetze, 17.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980, 
vol. II, doc. 369, pp. 1909-1915. 
164 
 
Warsaw Pact had used Western attacks to justify their refusal to 
negotiate.439  
In continuity with the strategy pursued in Helsinki and Belgrade, 
instead, the Auswärtiges Amt decided to leave off the multilateral 
negotiation table specific bilateral issues regarding the querelles 
allemandes.440 In accordance with the GDR, questions related to the 
status of the inner-German relationship and of Berlin should not – and 
would not – become conference themes.441 Both Bonn and East Berlin 
had good additional reasons for rescuing inner-German relations from 
international debates: at the turn of the decade Schmidt and Honecker 
tried to shelter the continuation of bilateral cooperation – as much as 
their room of manoeuvre and upper reasons of dependence on their 
respective alliances consented it – from the escalation of East-West 
tensions that threatened to disrupt the achievement of the last years.442 
Hence, the late restrictive measures imposed by East German 
authorities were mentioned in the inaugural address of the West 
German delegation within the framework, however, of a broader 
analysis of setbacks of the détente process in view of the ensuing 
review debate. West German demands regarding the improvement of 
everyday life of German citizens living in the divided country and 
beyond the Iron Curtain were included in the proposals package on 
Basket III of the EC-group.443 A list of other problematic inner-German 
issues – concerning the Berlin Wall, the firing at the inner-German 
border, the situation in East German prisons, the repression of the 
freedom of expression in the GDR – were packed into the so-called “big 
luggage” collecting those argumentations to keep in reserve and use as 
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reply to direct Eastern attacks only in the case of a serious and 
irreparable deterioration of cooperation in Madrid.444 
In line with the strategy sketched out by the Auswärtiges Amt on the 
conference eve, all major setbacks of détente of the years 1979-1978 
were addressed directly by Foreign Minister Genscher in his inaugural 
speech in Madrid. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was mentioned 
as a massive violation of that principle of indivisibility of détente, 
according to which each participant’s conduct outside Europe had to be 
compliant with the requirements of détente in Europe.445 After having 
reminded the core points of West German Deutschland- and 
Berlinpolitik, criticisms were directed against the violations of the 
Helsinki commitments in the fields of human rights, freedom of 
religion, freedom of movement, and free information perpetrated in the 
GDR.446 A similar stress was put on other violations perpetrated by the 
Eastern countries. Genscher was aware of the great visibility of his 
inaugural speech, whose first addressees were the West German and 
Western public opinions: Bonn’s concept of détente needed to be 
explained with clarity and no hesitation in denouncing violations 
needed to be showed to the domestic and international audiences.447 
According to a consolidated rhetorical strategy, critical stances were 
concentrated in the first part of the speech, to leave room for positive 
assessments of what had been reached so far in the second part. 
Optimism towards possible future achievements of multilateral détente 
had the meaning of holding out the hand to the Soviet Union and its 
allies.448  
Showing firmness when reviewing the state of détente did not 
contradict the intention of pursuing pragmatism when negotiating 
afterwards. A dividing issue as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was 
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considered exhausted by the Auswärtiges Amt with its mentioning in 
the plenary session and it should not dominate ensuing review 
discussions.449 This was in line with the West German concept of a 
realistic policy of détente as it had been revised after the Afghan crisis: 
pursuing realism at the Madrid CSCE required the West German 
delegation to display acrobatic abilities to walk on the fine line between 
the levels of principles and concrete behaviours. Moreover, review 
debates should remain circumscribed – unlike in Belgrade – to the first 
conference weeks in order to proceed soon to substantial 
negotiations.450 A sense of precariousness – due to the worrisome 
developments in Poland – loomed over the meeting. It was important 
to Bonn not to miss time and opportunities: already the first phase of 
review debates should be used by Western delegations to present their 
proposals for the continuation of the Helsinki process. As stated in the 
strategic paper of the West German Foreign Office, it was opportune 
“to look behind, only when it is necessary to go ahead”.451 
According to the conference schedule, the first phase of works in 
Madrid dedicated to review debates lasted six weeks and came to an 
end on 19 December. The West German delegation drew a quite 
positive balance: whereas firm criticisms had been directed towards the 
Eastern countries and East-West respective positions over the main 
political questions – Afghanistan and human rights – had remained 
irreconcilable, discussions had been overall marked by a more objective 
atmosphere than in Belgrade.452 In compliance with the compromise on 
the conference rules agreed by all delegations on the last day of the 
preparatory meeting in November, the Eastern countries had not 
obstructed the regular unfolding of review debates.453 
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Continuing European détente in the advent of the Reagan Era 
There was awareness within the Western caucus that the second 
phase of the conference, whose start was scheduled for 27 January 1981 
after the Christmas break, would be more difficult, as its unfolding 
would depend on the ongoing international developments and the 
health condition of East-West relations.454 To be put to the test was not 
only the possibility to negotiate material détente improvements with 
the East, but the solidity of the Western unity front in Madrid as well.  
The transition to the ensuing phase of substantial negotiations was 
indeed welcomed by several Western delegations – and by some 
delegations of the NNA group – with spread scepticism.455 The Dutch 
and the British were those showing scarcest interest in multilateral 
negotiations (they lacked, according to the West German assessment, of 
the necessary “animus negotiandi”), as considered the mandate of the 
follow-up meeting fulfilled with the review debate. The uncertainties of 
the ongoing presidential election campaign in France further weighed 
on the pursuit of a Western effective conference strategy. The biggest 
interrogative regarded the future development of superpowers 
relations after Ronald Reagan’s inauguration day on 20 January 1981. 
Indeed, besides the persistent Soviet military presence in Afghanistan 
and the precarious situation in Poland, the international policy of 
strength launched by the new U.S. administration threatened to puzzle 
definitively multilateral détente. An urgent question concerned the 
West German Foreign Office: what were the intentions of the new 
administration in Washington for the Madrid CSCE? 
The years of the Carter administration had not certainly represented 
a blossoming time for Washington’s diplomatic relations with Moscow 
– and either for the relations with the Western European partners. 
Ideological confrontation, human rights, sanctions, security issues and 
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a good dose of personal animosity and incomprehension – marking 
both Carter’s relationship with his “special partner” Helmut Schmidt 
and with his rival Leonid Brezhnev – had represented heavy 
burdens.456 But the change of power in Washington did not appear 
promising either. During the months of the presidential election 
campaign, the West German federal government and the Auswärtiges 
Amt had carefully analysed the contents of the Republican Party’s 
foreign political program and the possible consequences of Reagan’s 
victory for East-West dialogue. To emerge from the West German 
assessment was a bipolar Weltanschauung, highly ideological and 
characterised by strong anti-Communist stances, marking Reagan’s 
attitude towards international politics.457 Many in Bonn feared that the 
new administration in Washington would put under radical 
examination the whole U.S. foreign policy, included MBFR negotiations 
in Geneva and CSCE negotiations in Madrid, i.e. the only forums of 
East-West dialogue which had remained in place after the interruption 
of the superpowers talks on strategic arms.  
With regard to the Madrid CSCE, the West German Foreign Office 
aimed at profiting from the pending uncertainty to persuade Reagan 
and his collaborators, as far as it was possible, of the convenience of the 
West German strategy.458 During a confidential talk with U.S. Secretary 
of State Haig in the wake of Reagan’s inauguration, Foreign Minister 
Genscher reminded the vital importance the CSCE process had for the 
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FRG and highlighted the West’s position of strength in negotiating with 
the East on CSCE matters.459 Even though no spectacular outcome was 
to expect at Madrid, Bonn stood firmly on its conference aims on the 
eve of the restart of the follow-up meeting’s works: pursuing with 
conviction the continuation of the CSCE process in spite of adverse 
international situations; not releasing the Soviet bloc’s countries from 
their obligations to the Helsinki Act; and urging them, through an 
achievement-orientated approach, to make concessions on the main 
requests of the EC-Ten – i.e. CDE and improvements in the fields of 
human contacts and information.460 On 16 February 1981 positive 
signals came from the Reagan administration. The head of the U.S. 
delegation at Madrid, Max Kampelmann, finally broke the silence over 
the goal of the CDE and announced the U.S. backing of the French 
project.461 In return, he demanded the European allies’ greater support 
for the U.S. proposals on human rights.462 As highlighted by Selvage, 
Western Europeans were highly relieved that the U.S. decided to 
remain at Madrid and endorse the Western conference aims, against 
Reagan’s electoral statements which had let them fear worse 
scenarios.463  
 
Negotiations at the Nullpunkt: the West German dilemma 
between hypotheses of adjournment and risks of isolation 
Whereas the American proof of goodwill reassured provisionally 
European worries, it did not help appease contrasting views within the 
Alliance. Existing differences amongst the Western partners emerged 
indeed in the spring 1981 with regard to the issue of the duration and 
conclusion of the follow-up meeting. Before the start of the second 
                                                          
459 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem amerikanischen Aussenminister Haig in 
Washington, 09.03.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 62, pp. 340-341. 
460 Ibid. 
461 "Am Nullpunkt”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 32, 1981 
462 D. Selvage, "The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 33. 
463 Ibid. 
170 
 
conference phase in January ministerial director Blech observed that 
the high number of proposals presented by all delegations – totally 85, 
much more than expected – spoke itself against a rapid conclusion of 
negotiations.464 As West German chief delegator Kastl confirmed, 
negotiations in Madrid went on at a snail pace and entered soon a 
stalemate.465 It became clear that the foreseen goal of ending the 
conference at the beginning of March 1981 was quite unrealistic. Hence, 
shortly before the Easter pause, after the date initially scheduled for 
concluding negotiations had expired since weeks, delegators’ efforts to 
agree on a final document had produced scarce results in all Baskets.  
Moscow’s new interest in achieving concrete results at the Madrid 
CSCE turned out to be a factor which slowed down significantly the 
advancement of negotiations. Unlike in Belgrade, time pressure did not 
seem to play any decisive role for Moscow in this phase of the 
conference. In his speech at the CPSU congress on 23 February 1981, 
Brezhnev had declared to be available to extend the area of CBMs and 
the CDE to the Soviet territory up to the Urals against the inclusion of 
the U.S. and Canadian territory and of air and sea manoeuvres.466 In the 
following weeks Soviet diplomatic efforts in Madrid were focused on 
obtaining compensations for Brezhnev’s opening.467 The Soviet 
delegation made its decision on a third follow-up conference and on 
concessions in Basket III dependent on a positive decision on the 
CDE.468 No progress was made with regard to the Western core 
demands: the Eastern delegations opened to concessions limited to 
those issues which were covered by their own proposals or did not 
force them to big sacrifices.469  
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As in April 1981 it became evident that multilateral negotiations 
would go inevitably on for very long, a few NNA and Western 
delegations – namely France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium and the U.S. – 
got more and more inclined to withdraw experts from Madrid, to agree 
in short time on a brief concluding document and, in case of failure, to 
postpone the meeting for one year.470 France and the U.S. in primis were 
not ready, for different reasons, to pay dearly for the continuation of 
détente. The Reagan administration persisted on its anti-communist 
stances and was not willing to cede on human rights. The French 
government, fully absorbed by the last moves of the presidential 
election campaign, 471 opposed instead any attempt to water down the 
mandate of the CDE.472 The majority of Western delegations supported 
the idea of raising renewed review criticisms after the Easter break in 
order to spoil Soviet delaying tactics. Such views were contrasted by 
the West German delegation, which considered all review discussions 
definitively exhausted with the conclusion of the first phase of the 
conference and continued to support the persistent pursuit of open-
ended negotiations.473 Indeed, West German diplomacy was not 
impatient to come to a rapid conclusion of the follow-up meeting: as 
now in Madrid as before in Belgrade, Bonn had always spoken for 
longer negotiation times in order to achieve positive outcomes.474 A 
worrisome Kastl observed the growing risk that his delegation would 
remain isolated within the Western caucus: an inconvenient position 
that Germans could not easily afford.475 
However, any proposal for a premature conclusion of the 
conference was opposed by the West German delegation throughout 
the spring of stalemate at the Madrid CSCE. During the informal 
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meeting in Venlo on 9 May 1981 the foreign ministers of the EC-Ten 
decided to continue with negotiations until July of that year, after 
having assessed that the state of things in Madrid was favourable to 
Western interests.476 During his diplomatic visit to Washington at the 
end of May, Schmidt explained to Reagan the fundamentals of the West 
German policy of stabilisation pursued in Madrid: the prosecution of 
the CSCE process made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to opt for 
a military solution to the Polish crisis.477 West German stubbornness 
seemed to be rewarded: Western pressures for a rapid (and 
inconclusive) end of the conference were left out for the moment. 
The West German victory turned out to be precarious. Negotiations 
continued to be, indeed, at the Nullpunkt.478 In June 1981 the idea of 
suspending negotiations around the mid of July for a long summer 
break and adjourning the conference works to October, was growingly 
catching on within the Western Alliance. Bonn could not oppose to this 
eventuality: the West German delegation found itself gripped between 
the impossibility to afford solo positions and the evidence that, given 
the existing conditions, possibilities to unblock the stalemate were at 
the moment scarce. West German diplomacy was forced to readjust 
partially its official line – not without a certain political opportunism – 
to the circumstances: the adjournment option would savage the most 
important aim of continuing the conference. As Genscher confirmed to 
deputy chief delegate Graf zu Rantzau, slow-moving was better than 
breaking off.479 On 24 July 1981 the West German diplomat reported to 
Bonn that the plenary session in Madrid had voted the adjournment of 
the conference until 27 October 1981.480  
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Notwithstanding setbacks and difficulties, negotiations in Madrid 
had worked that far, according to the West German assessment, better 
than in Belgrade: Graf zu Rantzau observed with satisfaction that, 
before the starting of the summer break, already seventy percent of the 
conference materials had been already discussed.481 West German 
Ambassador in Moscow Meyer-Landrut stressed that the policy of 
stabilisation pursued by the federal government seemed to work: the 
international situation remained tense; this would enhance, on the 
other hand, the importance for the Soviets to commit themselves to the 
CSCE.482 Bonn expected with confidence signals of goodwill coming 
from the Soviet Union, once delegations would be back to Madrid in 
October. 
The West German Foreign Office continued to work on the CSCE 
during the summer break. An attempt to improve coordination within 
the Western Alliance was undertaken with regard to the most dividing 
matters, i.e. the issues of human rights and dissidents. In view of the 
restart of negotiations in Madrid, all Western requests in the fields of 
human rights and basic freedoms, human contacts and information 
were grouped together under the formulation of the concept of “human 
dimension”.483 From the theoretical point of view, dispositions of 
Basket III remained a derivation, in the substance, of Principle VII of 
the Helsinki Final Act. From the operative point of view, the collective 
concept of “human dimension” served to avoid that improvements in 
the fields of human contacts and information – i.e. the primal 
conference interest of the Bundesrepublik – would be eclipsed by some 
other partners’ preference for human rights and dissidents issues.484 
Hence, the formulation of the “human dimension” was conceived as 
tool of Western coordination to limit the drifts between the allies’ 
different interests. In Bonn’s view it had foremost the meaning of an 
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opening towards Washington’s demands, with whom the divergence 
on principle still persisted after the power change. Similar reasons of 
solidarity within the Alliance had dictated the FRG’s and Western 
Europe’s decision to adhere to the U.S. proposal – initially welcomed 
with some scepticism – of convening a meeting of experts on human 
rights.485 As highlighted in the analysis of the Auswärtiges Amt, the 
“human dimension” package should be instead used externally – i.e. 
towards the Eastern countries – with caution and flexibility.486 
Although differences in the Soviet bloc’s commitment to Principle VII 
and Basket III existed, both issues of human rights and human contacts 
became increasingly a sensitive matter for Eastern Europe’s communist 
regimes throughout 1981, as developments in Poland continued to 
deteriorate. 
 
Because of Poland, for Poland’s sake: the impact of the Polish 
crisis on the further unfolding of the Madrid CSCE 
Because of Poland... 
In the weeks between the restart of conference works in Madrid 
after the summer break and the new Christmas break, as delegations 
were mainly busy with discussions on the geographic jurisdiction of 
the CDE, the gravity of the Polish crisis escalated.  
1981 had been overall a quite positive year for West German foreign 
policy. Particularly in the fall of the year East-West relations seemed to 
have significantly improved. Negotiations at the Madrid CSCE had 
continued in spite of repeated threats of interruption; West German 
diplomacy had succeeded in convincing the allies of the opportunity to 
use the Soviet Union’s moment of weakness and defensive stance to 
persist in handling with the East and attain concessions to the West’s 
advantage. The superpowers détente seemed to have slowly restarted: 
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U.S. Foreign Minister Haig had met with the Soviet colleague Gromyko 
in New York on 23 and 28 November 1981; a couple of days later, on 30 
November, bilateral INF talks between the superpowers had been 
resumed. On the front of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, Brezhnev visited the 
Bundesrepublik between 22 and 25 November 1981, and Schmidt’s long 
planned and repeatedly postponed visit to the GDR took finally placed 
between 11 and 13 December of that year.487 The summit visit, initially 
scheduled for the end of August 1980, had been cancelled at the last 
minute by the West German Chancellor because of the recent 
developments in Poland: the renewed raging of strikes raised fears in 
Bonn that tensions in the neighbouring country would exacerbate and 
cause an international escalation.488 Whereas in the summer of 1980 a 
Soviet armed intervention in Poland appeared indeed as an incumbent 
threat, the virulence of the crisis appeared diminished in the mid-1981. 
As observed in an internal analysis of the Auswärtiges Amt, after the 
compromise achieved between Polish authorities and protesters on 1 
April 1981 domestic tensions had been eased.489 
Quite ironically, the Polish crisis degenerated again dramatically at 
the end of the year, during the last day of Schmidt’s long-planned visit. 
In the morning of 13 December 1981 the West German delegation at 
Lake Werbellin was taken by surprise by the news that martial law had 
been imposed in Poland during the night by General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, the head of the Polish armed forces who had taken over the 
Party leadership in October. After some weeks of resistance to Soviet 
pressures, Jaruzelski’s radical decision provided a fragile and 
                                                          
487 The visit was first postponed on Honecker’s decision at the beginning of 1980, as 
East-West strains drastically reduced the room of manoeuvre of the inner-German 
dialogue; the second postponement was announced by the West German side in August 
of the same year under the influence of the Polish crisis and the ongoing federal election 
campaign in the FRG. See H. Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 
1990, pp. 162-172. 
488 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten 
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 360. 
489 Besuch Außenminister Haig in Bonn am 11.04.1981. Sachstand: Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 
38), in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.931. 
176 
 
provisional solution to the crisis in Poland – and in the Eastern bloc.490 
From a pragmatic point of view, the “internal” solution to the crisis 
adverted indeed the risk of a Soviet military intervention which would 
have serious international repercussions – and to which détente would 
hardly survive. Although Genscher would refer on 9 January 1982 in 
front of the plenary session of the Madrid CSCE that the imposition of 
martial law in Poland had been received in Bonn with “bewilderment, 
bitterness and indignation”491, there was some realistic awareness, as in 
the Bundesrepublik as in the other Western countries, that Jaruzelski’s 
decision offered an exit strategy from worse scenarios and savaged the 
possibility for East-West dialogue to continue. Similar considerations 
had driven Schmidt’s decision to show some caution in expressing 
condemnation of what was happening in Poland during the press 
conference hold in the GDR on 13 December 1981.492  
Besides considerations dictated by pragmatism and political 
opportunism, the news of the declaration of martial law against 
dissidents in Poland was a shock to the international public opinion. As 
information about the recrudescence of the repression against the 
Polish opposition begun to circle, all Western governments were 
compelled to take on harder stances. The West German Bundestag 
professed on 18 December 1981 its unanimous solidarity with the 
Polish people and appealed to the military government in Warsaw to 
release all detainees, restore the freedoms and the conquests reached by 
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the opposition in the course of the process of liberalisation since the 
summer of 1980, and resume the dialogue with the opposition.493 
The harsh repression ongoing in Poland risked undermining the 
conditions for the continuation of the CSCE. In the days in which 
Jaruzelski was going to take his decision to impose martial law, some 
significant steps had been made in Madrid. On 10-11 December 
NATO’s foreign ministers had decided to go on with multilateral 
negotiations after the conference Christmas break.494 As highlighted by 
Peter, it was a lucky temporal coincidence, that NATO’s decision to 
resume the conference works in February 1982 had been made few 
days before the escalation of events in Poland.495 During the meeting of 
the Four Political Directors in Brussels, Genscher tried to convince his 
Western allies, sceptical about the possibility to continue the CSCE 
follow-up meeting under such circumstances, to remain in Madrid and 
focus discussions on the compromise draft for a final document handed 
out informally by the NNA delegations: in the West German view, it 
was a good draft which included a large part of the Western aims.496 
And it was a fortunate case as well that the NNA draft for the final 
document, the so-called “RM-39”, was ready to be tabled on 16 
December.497 Both the NATO decision and the NNA initiative 
undoubtedly contributed to lay the foundations for the continuation of 
the follow-up conference after the imposition of martial law in Poland.  
Since the beginning of the second CSCE follow-up meeting there 
had been a widespread feeling that its destiny was strictly intertwined 
with the development of the Polish crisis. As stressed by Mastny, 
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Jaruzelski’s December 1981 initiative “plunged the CSCE into the worst 
crisis of its existence”.498 The continuation of the conference after the 
Christmas break became very uncertain: the Western delegations were 
faced with the main questions of whether and how to remain in 
Madrid.  
In the direct aftermath of the imposition of martial law in Poland 
Western Europeans opted for prudence, considering that radical 
initiatives would primarily damage the Polish and the Eastern 
societies.499 Harder stances were taken instead by the administration in 
Washington: a series of punitive sanctions against Poland and the 
Soviet Union were imposed by Reagan on 29 December 1981.500 With 
regard to the CSCE, during the special NATO session on Poland on 14 
December 1981 U.S. assistant secretary of State Eagleburger reassured 
the European allies about the will of his administration to come back to 
the negotiation table in Madrid after the Christmas break.501 
Washington’s reassurance did not clarify, however, the fundamental 
matter of what attitude Western delegations would take towards the 
Polish question and multilateral negotiations once back in Madrid. 
How to deal with Warsaw, Moscow and East-West relations after the 
escalation of the Polish crisis were the main items of debate within the 
Western caucus at the turn of the year. A question was raised in 
NATO’s strategic paper on the state of the Alliance: could the West 
negotiate further with the East, being aware that massive violations of 
the Helsinki Final Act were being committed in Poland?502  
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Similar interrogatives confronted the West German federal 
government as well, which was urged by the Polish late developments 
to reflect on its overall complex of Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik. A 
strategic paper of the Auswärtiges Amt drafted at the beginning of 1982 
took into consideration the possibility to introduce some corrections to 
Bonn’s détente policy in case of an aggravation of the situation in 
Poland.503 Signals coming from Warsaw suggested that the lift of the 
state of emergency and the return to normality in the country were not 
to expect in the short run.504 However, Bonn remained convinced of the 
opportunity to continue pursuing a policy of dialogue directed to the 
stabilisation of its Eastern neighbour. According to the internal 
analyses of the Auswärtiges Amt, Poland was compelled to remain 
heavily dependent on Western economic aid if it wished to solve its 
serious economic difficulties.505 The main task of the West was to play 
skilfully the “economic card” in order to force Polish authorities to 
concessions to its own advantage – and to the own sake of Polish 
citizens.  
The loyalty of the Bundesrepublik to its policy of dialogue with 
Warsaw and Moscow risked opening a new front of transatlantic 
strains. West German-American divergences on how to deal with East-
West relations in times of “emergency” were addressed with harsh 
tones in the public debate. At the end of December 1981 the U.S. press 
attacked repeatedly the West German “reticence” on the Polish 
question.506 The Auswärtiges Amt denounced that U.S. media were 
superficially informed about European stances on Poland; West 
German positions in particular had been object of rough 
misinterpretations.507 Schmidt’s visit to Washington at the beginning of 
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January 1982 was surrounded by a new series of public, harsh 
criticisms against the West German federal chancellor and his 
December meeting with East German leader Honecker: Schmidt was 
blamed for being blinded by his attraction to the East and for putting 
the Western Alliance at risk of finlandisation.508 Since the time when 
Bonn’s Ostpolitik had moved its first steps at the end of the Sixties, 
suspicions about the FRG’s ultimate aims had continued to surround 
West German initiatives towards the Eastern countries. Still in the fall 
of 1980, an article published on the outstanding French newspapers Le 
Monde defined the FRG as the weakest point in the solidity of the 
Western Alliance due to its indispensable tie with détente and its 
benefits.509 
The conduct of the FRG’s dialogue with the East remained still 
strictly interwoven with questions of Deutschlandbild. If divergences 
with the U.S. administration – with their load of public repercussions – 
would deepen, it would be hard for Bonn to simply ignore them. 
Bonn’s federal government still needed the support of the whole 
Western Alliance to implement its Eastern policies. Détente and 
Ostpolitik could be pursued in full autonomy, indeed, as long as their 
ties with the interests of the Western Alliance were secured. Defending 
the Western anchoring of its foreign political complex remained for 
Bonn as important as defending the achievements of the dialogue with 
the East. As long as a common strategy towards Poland would not be 
agreed, it was important to abstain from any public statements which 
could reveal disharmony with the allies. As the influential West 
German magazine Der Spiegel reminded: “As we make public 
statements on our Eastern policy, we must be aware of the distrust 
which has always surrounded this policy and has further grown after 
Afghanistan”.510 
 
                                                          
508 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten 
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 391. 
509 „Keine Deutschlandpolitik zum Nulltarif“, in Der Spiegel, 52/1980, 22.12.1980. 
510 „Feste Sprache“, Der Spiegel, Nr. 4/1982 
181 
 
... for Poland’s sake 
The Polish crisis was a matter of central concern for Bonn not only 
with regard to the conduction of its Ostpolitik and Westpolitik. It raised 
the question, as well, of how the West German delegation should 
behave in Madrid, were CSCE negotiations were still officially open 
and would be resumed on 9 February 1982 after the Christmas break. 
Albeit developments in Poland had not caused the interruption of the 
conference, it was undoubted that they would importantly change its 
track. At the beginning of January some light was shed over the 
strategy the NATO-Sixteen would implement once back to Madrid. 
After few weeks of uncertainties and mutual suspects within the 
Alliance, the Western partners agreed on a common strategy in which 
punitive stances were relegated to the background and which Bonn 
positively assessed as balanced and flexible.511  
NATO foreign ministers, gathered on 11 January 1982 in Brussels 
for a special meeting of the NATO Council on Poland, gave their 
consent to the EC-Ten’s idea of returning to Madrid to deal with the 
Polish crisis.512 They advanced the idea to dedicate the first weeks of 
the new conference phase to assess and discuss developments in 
Poland at the level of foreign ministers at a special plenary session.513 
Hence, the Western proposal consisted in reopening review debates 
with an exclusive focus on the ongoing violations of Helsinki 
provisions perpetrated in Poland. In the Western view, it was a 
necessity dictated by the circumstances: even though the “RM-39” draft 
remained a valid basis for a final document, concrete negotiations on 
human aspects of détente could not be normally pursued as long as 
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major violations of human rights and basic freedoms were being 
perpetrated by a participant state.514 The Western allies approved three 
demands directed to the Polish authorities: to end the state of martial 
law, to release those arrested and to restore a general dialogue with the 
church and Solidarność.515 Advocate of these three demands had been 
the Bundesrepublik: they had already been issued by the West German 
Bundestag on 18 December;516 and they had been sponsored by Foreign 
Minister Genscher who at the end of December 1981 had told Polish 
Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski that, in return for a 
partial accomplishment of those requests, Bonn would plead for the 
Polish government with the Western allies, convincing them eventually 
to withdraw sanctions and creating some room for manoeuvre to 
continue the cooperation with Warsaw.517 The three demands to Poland 
had been then agreed by the EC-ten on 4 January 1982 and restated on 
the following day by Schmidt and Reagan, before being agreed as a 
cornerstone of NATO’s approach to Warsaw. On their fulfilment 
depended the possibility that Poland could “enjoy fully the benefits of 
stability in Europe and of constructive political and economic relations 
with the West”.518  
The broad consensus on the three demands to Poland represented 
an episode of rare unity of the Western Alliance. On occasion of 
previous major crises within the Eastern bloc – i.e. in the cases of 1953 
East Berlin, 1956 Hungary, 1968 Prague and lastly, 1979 Afghanistan – 
the Western partners had hardly reached common declarations of 
intents.519 Though, substantial strategic and theoretical differences still 
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divided the allies’ respective approaches. They regarded, first, the 
definition of Moscow’s responsibilities and the consequent issue of 
punitive sanctions; second, the destiny of the CSCE after the special 
session on Poland; and third, the concrete meaning of the shared 
consideration that “no business as usual” was possible in Madrid. 
The issue of sanctions became one of the central bones of contention 
between Reagan and the European allies. The U.S. administration 
advocated a greater Western commitment to the unanimous 
condemnation of the late developments in Poland. It made of it a 
matter of principle and morality and put great pressure on Western 
European governments to adopt hard punitive economic measures 
against the Soviet Union.520 In accordance with his policy of strength, 
Reagan urged the allies to use a “carrot and stick” approach towards 
the East, which raised little enthusiasm amongst Western Europeans.521 
Similarly to what had occurred in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, the Western Alliance split again over the issue of 
sanctions between December 1982 and January 1983: the U.S. 
administration imposed unilaterally economic sanctions against the 
Soviet Union; in spite of Washington’s insistence, Western Europeans 
deferred their decision on the issue by replacing punitive measures 
with general statements of condemnation and warning.522 NATO’s 
foreign ministers – gathered for a special session of the North Atlantic 
Council dedicated to Poland on 11 February 1982 – limited themselves 
to recognising the importance of the economic measures announced by 
President Reagan to persuade Polish and Soviet authorities of the 
seriousness of Western concerns, without otherwise joining them. The 
revision of the overall course of their economic relations with the Soviet 
Union was postponed to an undefined future.523 
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Transatlantic divergences regarded not only the operational 
consequences of the Polish crisis – i.e. how to deal with it – but its 
interpretation as well. Considering that the worst scenario of a Soviet 
military initiative in Europe’s heart had been swept away, Western 
European leaders tended to abstain from making the Soviets directly 
responsible for the imposition of the martial law in Poland.524 It was 
undoubted that some Soviet responsibilities were involved in the 
escalation of the crisis, as West German Chancellor Schmidt had 
stressed in the Christmas letters sent to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski on 25 
December 1981.525 However, the FRG avoided, in accordance with its 
European partners, attributing the origins of Jaruzelski’s initiative to 
orders coming directly from Moscow.526 Whereas Western Europeans 
had generally tended, since the declaration of the state of emergency in 
Poland, to focus their criticisms on the repressive measures adopted by 
Polish authorities in open violations of human rights, free movement 
and trade union freedoms, Americans had not ceased to direct 
vehement attacks against the Soviet Union. As West German 
Ambassador in Moscow Meyer-Landrut had reported to Bonn at the 
end of December 1981, justified sentiments of indignation over the 
ongoing repression in Poland had caused misleading assessments in 
the public opinion: American public statements addressed the Polish 
crisis as a de facto Soviet aggression.527  
Interpreting accurately the Polish crisis – i.e. identifying the 
responsibilities involved, the main problems at stake and the possible 
solutions in place – was not an issue of secondary importance for Bonn. 
Since the declaration of the state of emergency developments in Poland 
had been observed and assessed daily through in-depth analyses 
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drafted by the Auswärtiges Amt.528 Poland was a West German 
neighbour, connected to the Bundesrepublik through a complex of 
multiple economic, human and historical ties. It was one of the main 
addressees of West German Ostpolitik. It was, furthermore, an 
important participant of the process of multilateral détente. The West 
German idea of linking the solution to the Polish crisis to the 
prosecution of East-West dialogue was driven by strategic 
considerations, national interests and sincere motivations. Hence, in the 
second part of the Madrid CSCE West German diplomatic efforts were 
directed to the sake of Poland for the sake of détente. 
 
“No business as usual”: dealing with the consequences of the 
Polish crisis at the Madrid CSCE 
Continuing the process of multilateral détente represented the 
unchanged priority of West German foreign policy in the wake of the 
Polish crisis. With regard to the prosecution of the Madrid CSCE, 
Genscher held tight to the aim of resuming negotiations on the final act 
in the direct aftermath of the special opening session dedicated to 
Poland. Bonn’s Foreign Office instructed its delegation in Madrid to 
convince the Western partners – especially the U.S. delegation – to 
remain at the negotiation table and maintain an achievement-oriented 
attitude with the declared aim of helping Poland’s stabilisation and the 
general improvement of East-West relations.529 The West German 
interests collided, however, with the goals the U.S. administration 
pursued in Madrid. U.S. chief delegator Kampelmann had consented to 
return to the Spanish capital on the scheduled date of 9 February 1982 
with a very restricted mandate: after a short plenary session on Poland, 
he was intentioned to adjourn the conference without further 
negotiations.530 As U.S. Foreign Minister Haig pointed out in his speech 
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in the plenary debate at the Madrid CSCE, as long as situation in 
Poland would not return to normalisation, “business as usual here at 
Madrid would simply condone the massive violations of the Final Act 
now occurring in Poland”.531 
Bonn shared partly Washington’s point that it had to be made clear 
to Moscow and Warsaw that the repressive course in Poland impeded 
the normal conduction of “business as usual” in Madrid. 
Notwithstanding a general agreement in principle, the Auswärtiges Amt 
deduced, however, different operative implications from Haig’s 
statement. “No business as usual” did not mean, according to the West 
German viewpoint, interrupting or adjourning the conference: Western 
delegations should rather use the Polish crisis – especially its economic 
implications – to urge Moscow and Warsaw to make concessions on 
Western demands.532 The gravity of the repressive measures 
undertaken by Polish authorities, as well as their harmful impact on the 
prosecution of East-West relations, should not be ignored. 
Condemnation should be openly expressed by Western delegations 
during the plenary debate and be then channelled during negotiations 
into efforts of bearing pressure on the Eastern delegations to the 
Western advantage.533 This was, according to Bonn, the meaning of the 
three demands Western countries had been directing to Poland since 
December 1982: besides their public dimension, they should be used 
tactically to force the East to concessions. Not differently from the 
management of the Afghan crisis, dealing with the Polish question 
required the alternation of firmness on principles and flexibility in 
negotiations. The restart of East-West negotiations should not be made 
dependent on the reestablishment of normalisation in Poland; to the 
contrary, solutions for the Polish crisis could develop within the 
framework of the CSCE. This was the core difference between the 
meaning the U.S. and the West German delegations attributed to the 
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formula of “no business as usual”: whilst for the first it meant exclusion 
of negotiations in conditions of abnormality, for the second it meant 
“harder negotiations” in order to restore normality.  
The special session on Poland, which opened in Madrid on 9 
February 1982, offered to the Auswärtiges Amt the ideal stage to expose 
the main lines of its strategy of de-escalation and stabilisation. In his 
address to the plenary assembly, Genscher listed first the violations of 
the Helsinki commitments perpetrated in Poland to direct then to 
Warsaw’s military government the main Western demands: “Lift 
martial law. Release the detainees. Resume the dialogue with the 
Church and with Solidarność. Let the scientists return to their work”.534 
If Polish authorities would return to the path of reforms and 
renovation, Bonn was ready – together with the Western partners – to 
concede that generous financial support the country needed to 
overcome its economic difficulties.535 There was still a margin, Genscher 
reminded, to “keep the door open for the expansion of political and 
economic relations”.536  
However, expectations to close quickly debates on Poland and move 
on revealed to be illusionary. The works of the plenary assembly were 
cramped by procedural obstacles and ideological confrontation. The 
opening session was interrupted before all delegations could have a 
word. The Polish chief delegator, who chaired the session, impeded to 
12 foreign ministers and diplomats amongst the 21 inscribed on the list 
of speakers to held their speeches by raising procedural motivations.537 
The “Kafkaesque play”, as it was defined by Spanish Foreign Minister 
Perez-Llorca,538 aggravated the exacerbation of tensions between 
delegations. Debates took on confrontational tones whose harshness 
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reminded of the tensest days of confrontation at the Belgrade CSCE. As 
the Western delegations claimed their legitimate right to denounce 
open violations of the Helsinki Accords committed by one participant 
state, the Eastern countries stigmatised any Western remark as an 
external interference in the country’s domestic affairs and as an attempt 
to internationalise the Polish crisis. Against Bonn’s hope, the new phase 
of the CSCE deadlocked hopelessly, again, over the Polish crisis.539 
Confronted with the growing East-West animosity dominating in 
Madrid, the group of the NNAs got more and more inclined to a 
renewed adjournment-option.540 The proposal of Swiss Foreign 
Minister Aubert to defer the conference works to the fall of 1982 was 
opposed, as a few months before, by the West German delegation. A 
speaker of the Auswärtiges Amt confirmed Bonn’s unchanged intention 
to conduct negotiations on the basis of the “RM-39” draft with the goal 
of achieving an acceptable final document. The possibility of 
adjourning the conference to autumn would be taken into account if 
and only if strictly useful for that purpose.541 In this case, the restart of 
negotiations should be scheduled on a precise date and not tied to the 
fulfilment of any precondition – especially with regard to the situation 
in Poland.542 In spite of its outspoken position, the West German 
delegation had soon become aware of the fact that circumstances had 
made the conduction of substantial negotiations very hard during the 
first 1982 conference weeks.543 Multilateral debates continued to be 
strongly beset by the cumbersome Polish issue. Some positive signals 
seemed to arrive from the Polish side in the course of February, as 
during a press conference Deputy Foreign Minister Wiejacz announced 
Warsaw’s intention to lift martial law and other restrictions until the 
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end of the month and to start consultations on a possible new course of 
reforms with trade unions and the church. Moreover, it was promised 
that Solidarność’s leader Lech Walesa would be set free in the near 
future together with other protesters kept in custody.544 
However, as at the beginning of March it became clear that no 
concrete steps would follow to Warsaw’s promises, most Western 
delegations expressed themselves in favour of the adjournment-option. 
For the West German delegation there was no other choice as to join the 
majority. Kastl pointed out to the allies, however, that the recess of the 
conference should be presented neither as an exceptional circumstance, 
nor as a Western victory over the Eastern bloc. Most of all, the decision 
had not to be motivated by referring to Poland. Any explicit linkage 
between the suspension of the conference and the Polish crisis would 
otherwise tie dangerously the possibilities to resume multilateral 
negotiations with future developments in the Eastern country. 545 Bonn 
wanted to avoid this circumstance at all cost. Even though positive 
signals coming from Warsaw would undoubtedly enhance the 
possibility of restarting East-West dialogue on the CSCE matters, they 
had not to be turned into compulsory preconditions for the possibility 
itself to negotiate. Of another opinion was, as renowned, the U.S. 
administration. At the end of March, Undersecretary Eagleburger 
pointed out in front of the U.S. Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe that there would be no room for negotiating 
with the East in Madrid if no significant initiatives for the restoration of 
normality – i.e. “the release of political prisoners, the lifting of martial 
law, the initiation of a process of national reconciliation” – would be 
realised by the Polish government.546 The fact that Eagleburger referred 
generally to the release of “some” prisoners and to the initiation of a 
process of reconciliation without demanding its completion were 
assessed by Bonn as signal of a possible, more flexible attitude of the 
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U.S. administration.547 Onto those signals grabbed West German hopes 
to make the process of multilateral détente continue in spite of its 
evident crisis.  
On 12 March 1982, after a month of unfruitful debates on Poland 
had undermined the possibility of restoring the conditions for running 
“business as usual”, the plenum at Madrid decided to adjourn the 
restart of negotiations for the final document on the basis of the “RM-
39” draft to 9 November 1982.548 The West German delegation could 
achieve at least the fulfilment of its requests: the adjournment was 
decided with the consensus of all participant states; the resuming of 
negotiations was scheduled on a precise date without being subjected 
to any preconditions.549 
During the months after the conference recess, the destiny of the 
process of European détente remained very uncertain. Divergences of 
views on matters of East-West relations continued to split the Western 
Alliance. Bonn’s main task with regard to the CSCE process focused on 
convincing the sceptic partners to return to Madrid on the scheduled 
date.550 Flexibility and pragmatism continued to represent the 
trademark of the West German foreign political approach to East-West 
relations throughout 1982. In a strategic paper of July 1982 the 
Auswärtiges Amt highlighted that every international conjuncture was 
marked by specific problems Western countries had to take into 
account to rethink pragmatically their diplomatic strategies towards the 
process of détente. The adverse state of international relations required 
to adapt the CSCE policy to the situation. Translated into the practice of 
the negotiations for the final document of the Madrid CSCE, it meant to 
understand what could be achieved and what not under the given 
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circumstances.551 Bonn’s Foreign Office suggested interpreting and 
pursuing the principle of equilibrium amongst the components of the 
final act with flexibility. It was not always possible to attain 
improvements in all fields of the Helsinki Act. This approach 
contrasted with the U.S. and British rigid insistence on including in the 
final document of Madrid reinforced commitments in the field of 
human rights. But, as the credibility of such commitments would be 
compromised by persisting violations in Poland, the request was 
tantamount to aim at an empty final document, on the model of 
Belgrade.552 
 
Change and continuity: the new West German federal government 
dealing with the last moves of the Madrid CSCE  
During 1982 the West German federal government was faced with 
serious social, political and economic problems on the domestic front. 
The recess of the Madrid CSCE seemed to give right to those West 
Germans who denounced the Reagan administration’s lack of 
willingness to negotiate with the East. There was a shared feeling that 
East-West relations had returned to the hard confrontational tones of 
the first Cold War years. Protests against the return to a course of 
military and nuclear confrontation with the Eastern bloc intensified as 
the imminent appointment for the deployment of new U.S. missiles on 
the West German territory came closer. As negotiations in Madrid had 
been failing to bring improvements on the front of détente, the question 
of the implementation of NATO strategy’s “armed track” remained at 
the centre of the public debate without an adequate counterbalance. 
Besides public anxieties and social unrests, the federal government was 
growingly confronted with political problems inside the social-liberal 
coalition. The unfolding of 1982 was marked by the progressive 
deterioration of the relations between the SPD and the FDP. Political 
balances within the Bundestag were shifting. Chancellor Schmidt, in a 
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position of minority inside its own party with regard both to the 
missiles issue and economic matters, was increasingly in trouble with 
the allied party. The overall affirmation of the neoliberal turn affected 
the configuration of the West German political landscape as well. The 
common social-liberal project came to an end in the course of 1982, as 
divergences on economic policies become irreconcilable and the entente 
on foreign policy was no more sufficient to keep the coalition 
together.553 Helmut Schmidt, the “good manager of economic affairs”, 
was defeated foremost on the front of unsolved economic problems. 
The FDP left the coalition government in September and joined a new 
alliance with the opposition of the CDU/CSU. The Christian 
Democratic leader Helmut Kohl was elected Bundeskanzler by the 
Bundestag on 1 October 1982 after Schmidt had been deposed through a 
constructive vote of no confidence – used for the first time in the 
parliamentary history of the FRG.554 
This major political change marked the return to power of the CDU 
for the first time after the Bundesrepublik had entered the new era of 
good relations with the GDR and the East. The new Chancellor led the 
party which had vehemently opposed the new Ostpolitik in the years of 
its formation and consolidation. Christian Democrats had reconciled 
with the policy of dialogue with the East only in the late Seventies, after 
bilateral Ostpolitik and multilateral Enstpannungspolitik had brought to 
important realisations and had affirmed themselves as solid foreign 
political paradigms.555 This reconciliation paved the way for securing a 
certain degree of continuity in foreign policy, once the CDU came back 
to power. Hence, the program of radical spiritual-moral renovation of 
West German politics announced by Helmut Kohl left nearly 
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untouched the cornerstones of the FRG’s foreign political system. 
Continuity in foreign policy was granted, moreover, by Genscher’s 
confirmation at the lead of the Auswärtiges Amt. Some corrections were 
introduced to adjust the balance of Westpolitik-Ostpolitik: diplomatic 
relations with the GDR and the Eastern countries continued to be 
pursued, but with less ideal conviction; greater attention was directed 
to foster the special relationship with Washington and reinvigorate the 
process of European integration.556 Even though Bonn’s dialogue with 
the East continued, the West German propulsive role diminished under 
the years of government of Helmut Kohl who, unlike Brandt and 
Schmidt, did not share similar ambitions to play the role of interpreter 
between the East and the West. With regard to the process of 
multilateral détente, Bonn’s commitment to the CSCE process remained 
nearly unchanged. Quite meaningfully, the Helsinki Final Act, which 
had been strongly opposed by Kohl at the time of its signing, was 
mentioned in the new Chancellor’s inaugural address in front of the 
Bundestag as “an element of change, a Charta for the coexistence in 
Europe”.557 
Kohl’s seizure of power was not the only significant political 
turnover of the fall of 1982. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died in 
November 1982; KGB chief Yuri Andropov was chosen by the Politburo 
as the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU). Brezhnev’s replacement brought no dramatic change to 
the Soviet international strategy: Andropov had been, together with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Minister of Defence Ustinov, one of the 
three aged members of the troika which had directed Moscow’s foreign 
policy in the years of Brezhnev’s physical decline.558 The stagnation 
marking the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership continued under the 
short offices of Andropov and of his successor Konstantin Chernenko. 
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As the West German political landscape was undergoing a major 
change, the appointment for the resuming of the CSCE in Madrid was 
approaching. Reconfirmed as foreign minister of the new Christian-
liberal government, Genscher continued to support the idea of 
restarting multilateral negotiations with the aim of bringing the 
conference to a quick and acceptable conclusion. Even though all 
delegations had agreed to return to Madrid without requiring the 
fulfilment of any preconditions in return, the U.S. delegation aimed de 
facto – backed by the British and the Dutch – at tying the destiny of the 
conference to the liberalisation of the repressive course in Poland. 
During the 1982 summer break the West German Foreign Office 
observed with preoccupation that the restart of multilateral 
negotiations in Madrid in the fall of that year seemed to be possible, 
given the circumstances, only if either Poland would fulfil the three 
Western demands or the U.S. administration would change its mind.559 
An answer to the dilemma of whether the U.S. delegation would accept 
to return to Madrid came few weeks before the scheduled date for the 
beginning of the last conference phase. On occasion of an informal 
meeting in Lisbon, all Western chief delegators agreed to resume 
negotiations in Madrid on 9 November. Washington’s assent was 
merely tactical and aimed at pleasing the European requests. The U.S. 
delegation remained of the view that the possibility of a successful 
conclusion of the conference was to exclude.560 As Kampelmann 
pointed out to his NATO partners, the Alliance’s solidity was the U.S. 
priority: “Negotiations are not the aim of the U.S.; if we negotiate, we 
do it as a favour to our friends”.561 However, Washington asked for 
compensation for its return to Madrid. In the margins of Lisbon’s 
informal meeting Kastl was informed by Kampelmann that his 
delegation would continue to negotiate at a higher price: i.e. in change 
of the Western partners’ assent to include additional demands on 
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human rights, evidently tailored on the Polish situation, in the list of 
Western proposals for the final document.562 
 On those additional demands the U.S. delegation made dependent 
the good outcome of the conference once back to the negotiation table. 
Addressees of the American ultimatum were both the Eastern 
delegations and the Western partners, whose deviations would not be 
tolerated by Washington. Between the last weeks of 1982 and the first 
weeks of 1983 a renewed stalemate dominated at Madrid. As Selvage 
has correctly highlighted, all delegations were compelled, for different 
reasons, to remain in the Spanish capital, but were unable to pursue 
real negotiations.563 It was clear that the CSCE had turned into a forced 
occasion of gathering in times in which the exacerbation of the 
superpower relationship reached its zenith.  
A way out of the deadlock was offered by a new draft of the final 
document presented by the NNA delegations on 15 March 1983, whose 
providential efforts were praised, once more, by the West German 
delegation.564 The so-called “RM-39 revised” took extensively into 
account the Western aims and incorporated a large number of Western 
proposals. Most importantly, the mandate of the CDE was defined 
according to Western criteria. The area of MBFR was extended to the 
whole European territory, with consideration for the functional 
limitation for maritime activities. The convening of a meeting of experts 
on human rights – one of the main U.S. request from the beginning of 
the conference – was now assured. Even though improvements in the 
“human dimension” remained insufficient, the new NNA draft 
proposed some small facilitations of human contacts and incorporated 
a passage on the freedom of religion and contacts between churches 
which, though not being a West German demand, responded largely to 
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West German views.565 Main reason of disappointment for Bonn was 
the exclusion, amongst several other aspects left out, of the West’s 
proposals in the field of information, traditionally a West German 
priority domain. But according to the assessment of the Auswärtiges 
Amt, the overall progress made in the “human dimension” with respect 
to the Helsinki Accords represented a not minor achievement.566 As the 
West German delegation had unceasingly repeated since the beginning 
of the conference – and particularly after the exacerbation of the Polish 
crisis – the actual state of East-West relations required pragmatism and 
flexibility, which suggested focusing only on those issues where a 
compromise with the Eastern countries was possible. Bonn remained 
loyal to its realistic approach: small, attainable improvements in the 
field of human contacts should not be sacrificed in the name of greater 
unreachable aims. The “RM-39 revised” had all the characteristics, in 
Bonn’s view, to be considered as a good document for a satisfactory, 
substantial conclusion of the conference.  
Not of the same idea was the U.S. delegation: backed by the British 
and the Dutch, it continued to refuse to negotiate any documents which 
did not include all November 1982’s Western requests in toto.567 As 
Kastl reported to Bonn after a round of top-level talks in Washington, 
the CSCE continued to represent, as before in Belgrade as now in 
Madrid, a quite secondary stage for the U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan 
administration considered the CSCE mainly a forum on human rights 
and a multilateral showcase to carry out its ideological struggle with 
the Soviet Union.568 In the meantime, the vehemence of the U.S. anti-
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communist rhetoric gained new impulse, as Reagan addressed the 
Soviet Union as “an evil empire” in a renowned public speech on 8 
March 1983.569 The statement was ensued, a couple of weeks later, by 
Reagan’s announcement of the launch of a new big project in the field 
of military security under the label of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). 
Within the overall security strategy of the U.S. administration the CDE 
played a very little role, as the decision to tie its destiny to the 
acceptance of unattainable demands in the field of human rights 
demonstrates.  
West German diplomacy tried, first, to convince the U.S. 
administration of the opportunity to foster the “RM-39 revised”. In a 
letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz,570 Genscher stressed that 
“on the whole the draft does greater justice to Western interests than 
Eastern ones”. He then added that “the draft by the neutral and non-
aligned countries affords a framework for keeping the CSCE process 
alive and for making the Soviet Union answer every three years for its 
behaviour in honouring the pledges entered into and for wringing 
further concessions from it in the fields of importance to us”.571 When it 
became clear that the attempts of persuasion pursued that far would 
not affect Washington’s decisions, Bonn tried to correct its strategy. As 
West German chief delegator Kastl observed, any attempts to convince 
the U.S. delegation in Madrid and the administration in Washington of 
the value of the NNA draft or of the reasonable idea of Western 
“victory” at Madrid were vain.572 Bonn’s efforts were redirected, hence, 
to convince the Americans of the detrimental consequences of an 
eventual failure of the Madrid CSCE.  
The new strategy of “reinforced persuasion” attempted by 
Chancellor Kohl during his visit in Washington in mid-April 1983 
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levered the spread anti-American sentiments present in the West 
German society.573 Anti-Americanism had grown in the Bundesrepublik, 
indeed, after the adoption of NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision and the 
inauguration of the first Reagan administration, returning to similar 
levels of those of the Vietnam War’s years. Reagan’s foreign policy had 
raised widespread public concerns almost everywhere in Western 
Europe. According to an opinion poll published in Newsweek in 1983, 
pluralities of around 40 percent of the people interviewed in France, 
Britain and Germany disapproved American policies.574 The 
transatlantic relationship in the first half of the Eighties was marked by 
problems regarding the entente within the Western Alliance and the 
U.S. image in Western Europe.575 Both aspects were taken into account 
by the arguments devised by the West German Foreign Office to 
convince Washington. 
Hence, Kohl and Genscher warned the U.S. administration that in 
case it would not modify its intransigent stances towards negotiations 
at the Madrid CSCE, the European allies would have no other choice 
than to follow, to the detriment of the outcome of the conference. 
Whilst this would savage the surface of the Alliance’s unity, the West 
would become the easy target of Soviet propaganda and blamed for the 
failure of the CSCE. Predictably, a large part of the Western public 
opinion, too, would single out the U.S. responsibility. Many Western 
Europeans had doubts about Washington’s commitment to East-West 
dialogue and were protesting against the deployment of U.S. middle-
range rockets in Europe. A renewed faux pas on the front of the CSCE 
process would reinforce such suspicions further, to the detriment both 
of the U.S. reputation and missiles. The West German federal 
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government – as the administration in Washington was admonished – 
would hardly manage to make the deployment publically acceptable if 
not able to offer some concrete improvements in the field of détente in 
return.576 The list of West German arguments continued by depicting 
other consequent negative scenarios: the hardening of Spain’s path 
towards NATO membership; the strengthening of neutralist 
movements in Scandinavia; the disappointment of the lefts in power in 
France; the risk of compromising cooperation with the NNA 
countries.577 
Bonn tabled an ultimatum trade option, by demanding 
Washington’s commitment to a successful conclusion of the conference 
in Madrid in return for Bonn’s endorsement of the decision of 
stationing U.S. Pershing II on its territory. The intertwining between 
the diplomatic pursuit of the process of détente and its domestic 
reception had always been an important costituent of Bonn’s CSCE 
policy. It was not the first time that the West German federal 
government, when negotiating with its Western allies and the Eastern 
countries, reminded its counterparts of its domestic need for concrete 
achievements on the front of détente and made a tactical use of it in 
order to attain its foreign policy goals. Quite interestingly, this assertive 
diplomatic initiative towards Washington was taken by a liberal-right 
coalition government which had declared that strengthening the 
special relationship with the U.S. was its main foreign policy goal. This 
episode shows that the landscape of relations between Americans and 
Western Europeans was more complicated than mere ideological and 
political vicinity would suggest and was rather dependent on specific 
circumstances, especially when vital national interests were involved.  
The upcoming implementation of the armed track of NATO’s 1979 
decision had tactical implications with regard to negotiations with the 
Soviet delegation at the Madrid CSCE, too. Moscow hoped that a 
positive decision on the CDE would undermine the psychological 
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grounds of the decision to station U.S. LRTNF in Western Europe. Even 
though Bonn disagreed with such calculation, it was determined to use 
it strategically to win the Soviet approval of the Western parameters for 
the CDE.578 Time became a decisive factor in the spring of 1983: in order 
to attain their respective goals, both Bonn and Moscow aimed at 
reaching as soon as possible an agreement on the Madrid final act – and 
a positive decision on the CDE – before the first missiles would be 
stationed on the West German soil in the fall of the year. On 6 May 1983 
the Soviet delegation appealed to all participating states to negotiate on 
the basis of “RM-39 revised”. The initiative meant that the Soviets 
accepted the last NNA draft in its entirety, including its provisions 
regarding the CDE. Time for further negotiations had run out: no 
additional Western proposals or revisions would be taken into account 
by the Soviet delegation.579  
By accepting the NNA draft in all its parts, the Soviet Union had 
decided to make large concessions to Western requests. Besides the 
matter of the mandate of the CDE, “RM-39” included indeed a series of 
proposals which had already been tabled at the Belgrade CSCE and 
had been rejected by the Eastern countries for years. The new opening 
revealed the East’s urgency to obtain a final document which ensured 
the convening of the CDE and the continuation of cooperation with the 
West. In April 1983 Erich Honecker expressed its favour to a successful 
conclusion of the conference.580 The East German leader was aware that 
the interruption of the CSCE process would burden the continuation of 
inner-German relations. As the GDR’s economic dependency on 
cooperation with the FRG had dramatically grown, the protection of 
inner-German relations had become increasingly vital for East Berlin. 
Negotiations on important financial projects and on the facilitation of 
human contacts had continued in the early Eighties via the existing 
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confidential channels.581 However, adverse international conditions – 
i.e. the renewed bipolar confrontational course, the Polish crisis and its 
repercussions within the Eastern bloc, the East-West competition over 
missiles – had drastically limited Honecker’s room of manoeuvre and 
prevented the East German leader to make significant concessions to 
the FRG. There was awareness both in Bonn and East Berlin that the 
achievement of a multilateral agreement at the Madrid CSCE would 
facilitate the expansion of bilateral relations between the two German 
states. The multilateral embeddedness of the inner-German dialogue 
continued to be in place in 1983 and still affected German political 
decisions. 
 
The Madrid CSCE at its conclusion: matters of détente, matters of 
security 
In the concluding phase of the Madrid CSCE, the game of the 
agreement on the final document was played mainly within the 
Western field. Washington did not seem to be particularly impressed 
by the West German strategy of reinforced persuasion. The aim of 
securing the planned deployment of U.S. rockets in Western Europe 
contributed to convince the Reagan administration to remain involved 
in the affairs of European détente, but did not urge the American 
delegation in Madrid to revise its strategy and goals. For the West 
German frustration, additional provisions on human rights continued 
to be demanded with unchanged insistence. On occasion of the London 
meeting of the Four Political Directors on 22 April 1983, Kampelmann 
notified that the corrections to the NNA draft suggested by the Western 
delegations were insufficient; the “Soviet performance” – i.e. the 
implementation by Soviet authorities of concrete steps in the field of 
human rights – was added as fundamental precondition for the 
conclusion of the conference. As the U.S. chief delegator had pointed 
out to the British, French and West German colleagues: “For us 
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performance is of the same importance as CDE”.582 The Western allies’ 
respective positions remained irreconcilable: whilst Washington 
advocated the possibility of a failure of the conference – for which the 
Soviet Union could be blamed – Bonn aimed at the favourable 
conclusion of the meeting and not at the apportioning of blame.583 Also 
after the Soviets had opened to the acceptance of “RM-39 revised”, the 
U.S. delegation did not change its mind. The NNA draft’s provisions 
remained inadequate: as Secretary of State Schultz explained to his 
British, French and West German colleagues, at the Madrid CSCE it 
was about improving both the text of the conference final document 
and the Soviet behaviour.584  
The way to the conclusion of the Madrid CSCE was paved by a last 
intermediation attempted by the Spanish delegation. As guest of the 
conference, Madrid had promised to take all necessary initiatives to 
favour a successful outcome of the second follow-up conference. 
Spain’s new Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales took the initiative 
on 17 June 1983 by proposing to incorporate into “RM-39 revised” two 
provisions convening a meeting of experts on human rights in Ottawa – 
a major concession to one of the U.S. fundamental demands – and a 
meeting of experts on human contacts in Bern – an addition pleasing 
particularly Bonn. Moreover, the calendar of the CDE was set: the 
works of the preparatory meeting were scheduled for the end of 
October in Helsinki and the beginning of the main conference for 17 
January 1984 in Stockholm.585 A week later, all Western and NNA 
delegations declared their willingness to accept the Spanish draft.586 
After few days of uncertainty, on occasion of the meeting of the Soviet 
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bloc’s leaders of 28 June in Moscow, Andropov suggested to accept the 
Spanish offer.587 On 1 July Soviet chief delegator Kovalev declared 
officially to be willing to work within the framework of the Spanish 
initiative. As unique, small concession to Moscow’s requests, the clause 
convening the meeting of experts on human contacts was incorporated 
into the chairman’s statement, instead of being included amongst the 
matters of Basket III.588  
On 15 July 1983 the final document of the Madrid conference was 
approved by thirty-four delegations – with the only exception of Malta, 
the “enfant terrible” of the CSCE,589 which, as it had already done in 
Belgrade, tied its approval to three additional requests.590 The shooting 
down of a South Korean passenger plane flying over Soviet territory by 
the Soviet air force in September 1983 represented the last hindrance 
and episode of East-West tension marking the concluding moves of the 
Madrid CSCE.591 Works were still protracted until the fall of 1983 – the 
year initially thought for beginning possibly the third review 
conference. After “two years and eight months of continual frustration” 
– as it was commented by the West German delegation592 – the second 
CSCE follow–up meeting came to a conclusion which was far more 
satisfactory than initial expectations and following developments had 
let hope. The achievements in the human field were reason of 
particular satisfaction for the West German diplomacy. Besides the 
convening of the two meetings of experts on human rights and on 
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human contacts, the West could attain a series of important 
improvements which were largely tailored on the situation in Poland. 
The Eastern countries committed themselves to recognising the 
freedom of religion and tolerating free contacts between churches; to 
facilitating the fulfilment of the applications for family reunification 
and marriage between Eastern and Western citizens, by introducing 
faster processing times, clearer rules, more information and lower 
taxes; to guaranteeing free access to the respective embassies and 
consulates for foreign visitors; to selling Western newspapers and 
magazines at reasonable prices and to improving working conditions of 
Western journalists; to liberalising trade unions, by recognising the 
right of citizens to choose freely their trade union.593  
On 8 September 1983, the foreign ministers of all thirty-five 
participant states gathered in Madrid to approve the final document. 
The conference ended, as it had begun, under a high political profile. 
This responded, as the West German Foreign Office pointed out, to the 
significance of the circumstance: in Madrid was celebrated the first 
important political agreement between the East and the West after a 
long time.594  
Few weeks after the adoption of the final document of Madrid the 
preparatory works of the Conference on Confidence and Security 
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe started in Helsinki. 
The Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which had originated from 
two parallel proposals by the Soviets and the French, represented a 
traditional long-sought goal of the Warsaw Pact and had turned into 
the priority aim of the Western delegations at the Madrid CSCE. The 
mandate of the conference had been progressively shaped according to 
the Western criteria. The Warsaw Pact had ceded, indeed, on the 
inclusion of the Soviet territory up to the Urals; on the primal 
negotiation of binding and verifiable CBMs; and on the notification of 
big manoeuvres. As unique concession to the Eastern requests, the 
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obligation of notifying air and naval forces operating on the Atlantics in 
connection with ground forces had been accepted by the West.595  
The West German Foreign Office was confident that the positive 
outcome of Madrid would nourish renewed East-West cooperation and 
exert a positive effect on the prosecution of armament negotiations.596 
The fact that the CSCE process could have continued and expanded 
notwithstanding major adversities reinforced Bonn’s firm belief that 
European détente was the right way to follow. Within the West 
German overall complex of détente and security, the upcoming CDE 
represented an important stage wherein the grounds for the 
construction of a safer Europe could be negotiated. As the following 
chapter of this work illustrates, matters of security returned to 
dominate East-West relations in the wake of Madrid as they done 
before its start; but important decisions on central security issues took 
place elsewhere, outside the CSCE framework.  
During the very last days of the follow-up meeting in Madrid, INF 
negotiations597 and the deployment of U.S. new cruise and Pershing 
missiles in Europe were main items of debate between Genscher and 
his Soviet and East German colleagues, Gromyko and Fischer, in the 
margins of the conference.598 Negotiations in Geneva had reached a 
stalemate because of the Soviet demand to include the British and 
French strategic systems in the U.S count and the consequent U.S. 
refusal to take the request into account.599 As Andropov explained in an 
interview with the Prawda, the Soviet security strategy aimed at 
preventing a West’s military hegemony on the European continent by 
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pursuing two concrete goals: the inclusion of third countries’ nuclear 
systems in the calculation of the INFs and the exclusion of the 
stationing of new U.S. LRTNF in Western Europe.600 In return, 
Andropov was open to concessions, by reducing the number of Soviet 
warheads targeted at Western Europe.601 Around the issue of the 
nuclear arms in Europe everyone was playing its own diplomatic 
game. At stake for Bonn were its traditional security needs and reasons 
of transatlantic alliance: it was not just about diminishing the Soviet 
threat but remaining on board with the deployment decision as well. 
As he had already done before on occasion of negotiations on the CDE, 
Genscher reminded Fischer that all fractions of the Bundestag had 
agreed in 1979 to start the stationing of Pershing II in the fall of 1983, if 
negotiations on armaments control would not lead to concrete results 
capable of appeasing West German security needs.602  
Eastern hopes that the agreement on a CDE would be sufficient to 
derail the armament track of NATO’s dual-track decision vanished in 
the course of few weeks after the conclusion of the CSCE in Madrid. 
The preparatory works for the CDE concluded successfully on 11 
November 1983.603 The Conference on Disarmament in Europe would 
start on 17 January 1984 in Stockholm. On 22 November 1983, the 
majority of the West German Bundestag – namely the MPs of the 
CDU/CSU and FDP fractions – approved the stationing of the U.S. 
Pershing II. The day after the Soviets announced to walk out of INF 
negotiations and on 8 December they decided to break off START 
negotiations as well. On 10 December, the stationing of the U.S. new 
cruise and Pershing II missiles began in Germany and Italy.604  
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The deployment of Pershing II in the FRG was followed by 
Genscher’s reassurances about the West German enduring commitment 
to détente. The fulfilment of its alliance duties did not mark a shift in 
Bonn’s foreign policy. As Genscher claimed in front of the Bundestag on 
6 December 1983: “missiles neither are an instrument for a ‘new policy 
of strength’, nor are conceived as an instrument for a new 
confrontational strategy towards the Soviet Union on the European 
territory; to the contrary, we hold onto détente and cooperation”.605 
 
Assessing the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid: 
security needs, good intentions and foreign political ambitions 
The deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western 
Europe marked the symbolic conclusion of the long diplomatic affairs 
of the second CSCE follow-up meeting of Madrid. Matters of security 
in Europe dominated its overall unfolding. They strongly affected the 
preparation of the conference. Multilateral negotiations in Madrid 
focused mainly on the issue of the Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe and were flanked by the fluctuating unfolding of talks on 
armaments and disarmaments in Geneva. The CSCE participants’ 
security needs were taken into account to shape the respective 
diplomatic strategies towards the allies and their counterparts. And, 
last but not least, the common interest in the security aspects of détente 
provided the grounds for achieving an agreement on a substantial final 
document. This does not mean that the Madrid CSCE was just about 
security. As stressed in the previous paragraph, multilateral 
cooperation was intensified in other areas of the Helsinki Accords, too. 
With regard to the “human dimension”, in particular, achievements 
were possible which had been unattainable at the Belgrade CSCE and 
had seemed unconceivable during the tensest phases of negotiations in 
Madrid. The way to those improvements had been largely paved by the 
CSCE participants’ respective security needs and security fears. 
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Paradoxically, when major crises unsettled East-West relations, détente 
managed to achieve more concrete realisations. The importance of such 
results had not to be diminished: a positive outcome of the conference 
was not expected. Episodes of tension endangering the continuation of 
negotiations in Madrid were serious and fears that the developments in 
Afghanistan and Poland would interrupt the process of détente for 
good were real. 
The Federal Republic of Germany was the country which suffered 
the most from the uncertainties caused by the deterioration of East-
West relations. Therefore, it had good reasons to celebrate the outcome 
of the Madrid CSCE as a diplomatic success. The CSCE continued to be 
for the Bundesrepublik the multilateral framework which allowed and 
completed the bilateral pursuit of its Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik. 
Bonn’s federal government was aware of their vital interdependence. 
As East-West confrontation escalated between the late Seventies and 
the early Eighties, the West German Foreign Office repeatedly observed 
in its internal strategic papers that, if East-West dialogue would come 
to an end, it would be impossible for Bonn to continue to expand inner-
German relations single-handed. This awareness did not represent an 
element of novelty: but concrete evidence for it was provided by the 
renewed escalation of East-West confrontation at the turn of the 
decade.  
The CSCE process asserted itself gradually as a West German 
established foreign policy priority in the aftermath of Helsinki. Its well-
grounded stability within the FRG’s foreign political system was 
proven by the fact that it continued to be pursued nearly unchanged 
after the major political turn marked by Kohl’s seizure of power in the 
fall of 1982. Not only did the CSCE process keep the door open for a 
future solution to the German question, but it turned into an important 
channel to keep open East-West dialogue itself. European détente had 
had since its origins alternative aims in respect to superpower détente. 
As American-Soviet relations returned to confrontation under the 
Carter and the first Reagan administrations, European détente 
prevailed by default as the only available form of East-West dialogue to 
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remain in place. Taking into account the changing international 
circumstances and the lessons learnt at the follow-up meeting in 
Belgrade, the FRG’s CSCE policy was subject to a partial rethinking: it 
readdressed its goals by diminishing expectations; it gained in 
flexibility and pragmatism; it acquired a more explicit separation 
between levels of principles and practice; and it was shaped as a tool of 
anti-cyclical stabilisation in times of crisis. Moreover, the interaction 
between détente and security policies – which had traditionally shaped 
the West German concept of détente – took on new tactical tasks. If 
matters of security risked endangering détente, security needs were 
levered strategically in order to safeguard the achievements of détente. 
Even though elements of real threats for the continuation of the CSCE 
process were more serious in Madrid than they had been in Belgrade, 
higher were the risks for the participants of the CSCE to compromise 
their own respective interests.  
The Warsaw Pact’s unveiled interest in the security dimension of 
the CSCE was used strategically by West German diplomacy in order 
to obtain concessions in the human field. Bonn’s enduring confidence 
in the possibility of achieving concrete results in those areas where the 
Eastern countries had refused cooperation before was motivated by the 
awareness that, unlike at the Belgrade CSCE, the Soviet Union had now 
a greater interest in not leaving Madrid empty handed. As analysed in 
Chapter 2, the Eastern bloc had presented itself to the first review test 
of European détente without any specific goals. Its efforts had been 
directed mainly to the attainment of a rash conclusion of the conference 
which would simply allow cooperation with the West to continue. 
During the diplomatic preparation of the second CSCE follow-up 
meeting, Moscow had revealed to Bonn its interest in negotiating the 
convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, with the 
unspoken aim of mining the political and psychological premises for 
the implementation of the armed track of NATO’s 1979 decision, as it 
has been analysed in Chapter 3.  
The shift in the Warsaw Pact’s attitude towards CSCE negotiations 
had been urged by the changing balance of power between the blocs. 
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The East’s economic weakness and security worries, as well as the 
cooling off of the superpower relationship, compelled the Soviet Union 
to turn to Europe. Notwithstanding the Soviet frustration with the U.S. 
initiatives, the nature of the superpower relationship under the Carter 
administration was still based on the recognition of parity. But 
Reagan’s new policy of strength wiped out any illusion of negotiating 
with the Soviet Union on an equal footing. Matters of perception were 
involved in the political shift as well: Reagan’s assertive security 
policies put an end to the idea of the “weakness of the West” promoted 
by the Soviet bloc throughout the Seventies. To the contrary, the 
Warsaw Pact was confronted with a renewed military competition it 
was not able to afford. As Washington had needed superpower détente 
to deal with the consequences of the disastrous Vietnam War, Moscow 
needed now European détente to face its international and intra-bloc 
difficulties. It had to be remembered that also the 1969 Budapest 
Appeal – the first Eastern proposal for a pan-European security 
conference without preconditions – had come in a time when the Soviet 
Union was dealing with the negative diplomatic repercussions of the 
crackdown on Czechoslovakia.606 The Soviet weakness at the beginning 
of the Eighties was aggravated by the growing international isolation 
that the invasion of Afghanistan and the protracting of the Polish crisis 
brought about. Besides drawing Soviet financial resources and rousing 
fears of contamination in the other Eastern countries, the Polish crisis 
unveiled to the world the fragility of the realisations of socialism in the 
Eastern societies. All these elements of East’s urgency and weakness 
were carefully examined by the Auswärtiges Amt: they nourished the 
West German confidence in the possibility of obtaining favourable 
achievements at the Madrid CSCE.  
Similar considerations were taken into account by the arguments 
Bonn used to convince its most sceptical allies of the opportunity to 
                                                          
606 A firs proposal had been made by the Soviet Union in 1954 but had turned down by 
NATO because of the exclusion of the United States and Canada. The Appeal Budapest 
represented hence the first serious proposal, dictating no preconditions with regard to 
the participants. On this point, see: J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 
213. 
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continue multilateral negotiations in spite of adverse circumstances. 
The CSCE was subject to criticism within several participating states; 
they interpreted it as a diplomatic tool in Soviet hands used cleverly by 
Moscow to compensate for its incapability of coping with international 
security challenges and intra-bloc political changes.607 West German 
diplomats repeated unceasingly that the Soviet bloc negotiated from a 
position of weakness and the outcome of the conference could be 
smartly directed, as a consequence, to the West’s advantage.  
A second block of arguments the West German diplomacy 
frequently appealed to, especially in the wake of Poland’s military 
takeover, rested upon the stabilising effects that the prosecution of 
multilateral détente negotiations could exert on the Polish crisis. As 
developments in Poland casted a lengthening shadow over the 
unfolding of the CSCE, West German efforts were directed to linking a 
possible solution to the emergency in Poland to the good outcome of 
the conference – and not vice versa. Whether the CSCE did contribute to 
the de-escalation of the Polish crisis and prevented a Soviet armed 
intervention in the country is object of historical debate. Zubok has 
firmly rejected this hypothesis: as Soviet papers show, the decision to 
avoid the repetition of “another Prague” was taken by Moscow 
independently from considerations linked to the CSCE.608 However, it 
is undoubted that the Polish crisis showed that Eastern countries 
needed cooperation with the West more and more. Hence, West 
German diplomacy turned a perhaps overestimated aspiration – i.e. 
normalising the Polish crisis through détente negotiations – into a 
diplomatic tool of persuasion: the potential beneficial effects of the 
CSCE on Poland were frequently used by West German diplomats to 
convince the Western allies of the opportunity to remain in Madrid and 
continue with “business as usual”. 
                                                          
607 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE Process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond 
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 79. 
608 V.M. Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, 
pp. 267-268. 
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Bonn’s wish to remain at Madrid at (almost) any costs risked to cut 
the West German delegation from the majority of the Western partners 
in a number of delicate phases of the conference. Isolation was a risk 
that the FRG could not afford. Preserving the unity of the Western 
Alliance – or at least its surface – and bringing negotiations to a 
favourable conclusion appeared to be – throughout most of the 
duration of the conference – incompatible aims. Notwithstanding the 
Western Alliance performed very poorly at the Madrid CSCE, the fact 
that both aims could be attained in the end was reason of satisfaction 
for Bonn’s federal government. The achievement of the final document 
of Madrid represented probably the last significant success of West 
German diplomacy when dealing with the convergence of Westpolitik 
and Ostpolitik, until the end of the Cold War.  
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“Die Prozedur und das Ziel für die Entspannungspolitik in Europa sind abgesteckt. 
Der Schlingerkiel ist in Position. Er hat in den vergangenen Jahren, als die Wogen des 
Misstrauens zwischen Ost und West hochgingen, das Schiff vorm Kentern bewahrt.”609  
Christoph Bertram, Die Zeit, July 26, 1985 
 
 
Chapter 5 
The “Return of the Superpowers” and the 
“Return of the Past”: A Reappraisal of the Process 
of Multilateral Détente Ten Years after Helsinki 
(1984-1985) 
 
Introduction 
The years of the first Reagan administration represented a 
troublesome and ambivalent period in the trajectory of the Cold War 
transatlantic partnership.610 Whereas moments of profound crises 
alternated with moments of rapprochement in several policy areas, as 
Nuti has highlighted, in the field of East-West cooperation transatlantic 
divergences were profound. One of the most evident elements 
emerging from the long experience of the second CSCE review meeting 
in Madrid was that the chasm between American and Western German 
conceptions of East-West dialogue had never been more profound. As 
it has been analysed in the previous chapters of this work, the U.S. had 
been a quite sceptical participant of the CSCE since the origins of the 
                                                          
609 “The mechanism and the aim of détente policy in Europe are outlined. The rolling 
keel is in position. It protected the ship from capsizes in the last years, as the weaves of 
distrust between the East and the West reached their peak.”[transl.] 
610 L. Nuti, “Gli anni Ottanta: Le relazioni transatlantiche durante la presidenza 
Reagan”, p. 65. 
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European endeavour. The transatlantic partners had managed, 
however, to reach in Helsinki a strategic convergence between the 
respective interests of superpower détente and European détente. This 
temporary entente could not have been replicated at the CSCE in 
Belgrade and Madrid. Although single leading actors and specific 
elements of disputes changed from Belgrade to Madrid, the lacking 
convergence between West German and American interests 
represented an element of continuity. Whereas Carter’s human rights 
battle needed the CSCE as international showcase, Reagan’s overall 
foreign political vision did not envisage any room for European 
détente. Quite significantly, before the resuming of negotiations in 
Madrid in the fall of 1982, American chief delegator Kampelmann 
explained to the European colleagues that a positive conclusion of the 
follow-up conference and the convening of the CDE risked alimenting 
détente illusions and mistaken feelings of improved security in the 
continent of the public opinion.611  
The problematic entente with Washington concerned the other face 
of détente, too, i.e. cooperation in the field of security. The alternation 
of fears of American decoupling and fears of excessive American 
assertiveness marked the West German – and more generally Western 
European – attitude towards Washington’s initiatives in the field of 
military security. European worries were alimented by several episodes 
of lacking information coming from the side of the U.S. administration. 
The frustration experienced by Bonn’s federal government on occasion 
of Carter’s fluctuating conduction of the neutron bomb affair continued 
during the Reagan administration. Both in the case of Reagan’s launch 
of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 and of the 
renown “walk in the woods” between the U.S. and Soviet chief 
delegators at the INF-talks in Geneva, respectively Paul Nitze and Julii 
Kwizinski – on whose occasion they agreed on a reduction of arm 
systems which pleased Western Europeans – the allies were informed 
by the U.S. administration only after initiatives had already been 
                                                          
611 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 13.10.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 
270, p. 1404. 
215 
 
taken.612 Divergences of views and interests on security were particular 
problematic for the Bundesrepublik, the country which most depended 
on the U.S. military protection and most suffered from uncertainties 
and changes in the field of security. Whereas Bonn’s concerns about the 
vulnerability of NATO’s deterrence strategy towards the Soviet bloc 
and fears of a possible American decoupling were reassured by the 
implementation of NATO’s dual-track decision and the stationing of 
new American LRTNF, Reagan’s aim of asserting the West’s military 
superiority over the East endangered, to the contrary, the maintenance 
of that strategic balance of power between the East and the West which 
represented, in the West German view, the cornerstone of détente and 
peace in Europe.  
The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Stockholm, whose works were inaugurated on 17 
January 1984, provided the FRG with an additional framework where it 
could aspire to play a relatively influential role in shaping the 
discussion of security issues. The conference was a derivation of the 
CSCE; as it will be shown in this chapter by analysing the West German 
approach to the conference during its first year, Bonn borrowed a 
number of elements from the CSCE and brought along to Stockholm 
similar strategies, aims and ambitions. Bonn greatest aspiration, 
namely relaunching East-West dialogue through a successful pursuit of 
the CDE, remained largely unfulfilled. Indeed, the unfolding of the 
Stockholm conference coincided in time with the restart of Soviet-
American negotiations that marked the renewed assertion of the 
superpower dialogue in the field of security as the main stage of East-
West relations in the second half of the decade. 1985 was not only the 
year of the epochal change marked by Gorbachev’s seizure of power in 
the Soviet Union. It was a year of important anniversaries as well. As 
the second part of the chapter analyses, West German efforts with 
regard to the upcoming celebrations of the year 1985 were directed to 
intertwine commemorations of Europe’s past – namely of the fortieth 
                                                          
612 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten 
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 392. 
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anniversary of the conclusion of WWII – with celebrations of Europe’s 
possible changing future – namely of the tenth anniversary of the 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act. This linkage provides an additional 
explanation for the significance attributed by the West German Foreign 
Office to the ceremony in Helsinki. Besides material achievements, in 
the mid-1980s the CSCE continued to serve important purposes of West 
German international image as well.  
 
The FRG’s aspirations at the Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm  
After having stood two tests in Belgrade and Madrid and having 
survived major international crisis, the CSCE process had acquired a 
certain amount of solidity. A sort of semi-institutionalisation had come 
into being in the course of the decade after the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act. A genuine institutionalisation of the CSCE process in the 
sense of its bureaucratisation would be realised only after the end of 
the Cold War. New CSCE institutions would be established by the 1990 
Charter of Paris for a new Europe which would open a new era for the 
process of European détente. Its transformation into an international 
organisation able to cope with the new tasks and challenges of the post-
Cold War time would bring to the 1994 decision by the Budapest 
Summit of changing the name from the CSCE to the Organisation on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).613 Bureaucratising the 
process of multilateral dialogue in Europe remained, instead, out of the 
scope of the CSCE as long as the Cold War was in place. All Eastern 
offers in this direction had been declined by the Western countries 
since the origins of the CSCE.614 The West German Foreign Office had 
repeated many times in its strategic papers the reasons underlying this 
decline: the nature of the forum for multilateral East-West cooperation 
                                                          
613 See: www.osce.org; and N. Ronzitti, “OSCE peace-keeping”, in The OSCE in the 
Maintanance of Peace and Security. Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes, eds. M. Boethe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997), pp. 237-256, p. 237. 
614 J.W. Young, “Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989”, p. 291. 
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should remained flexible and open, as well as its political relevance 
high. The requests for bureaucratising the CSCE process advanced by 
the Eastern countries entailed the risk of lowering its political value, by 
turning it into an empty framework for the freezing of the status quo in 
Europe. Hence, as it has been shown in the previous chapters, both 
elements – flexibility and involvement of political commitment – had 
contributed to rescue the process of European détente from its ultimate 
interruption during the tensest phases of bipolar confrontation. 
However, a combination of practices, dynamics and rules had 
progressively cemented over the years beyond formal 
institutionalisation. The CSCE had been taking the shape of a process of 
steady learning by doing, wherein diplomats and experts of all 
delegations, as well as the planning offices of all participants’ foreign 
ministries, had got skilled to know each other’s interests, approaches, 
and ways of negotiating. This load of experience had contributed to 
bestow a certain degree of continuity on the CSCE process, 
notwithstanding changing leaderships and changing international 
conditions. 
As it had been analysed in this work, the West German diplomacy 
was taught some important lessons in the course of the unfolding of the 
multilateral détente process, which had been used by Bonn to adjust 
the orientation of its policies and its concrete strategies. The experience 
collected over a decade of CSCE was put to work by the West German 
Foreign Office to prepare and shape the Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm – simply 
known by its acronym CDE. After a rapid preparatory meeting, which 
took place in Helsinki between 25 October and 11 November 1983, the 
main works of the CDE opened in the Swedish capital on 17 January 
1984.615 The CDE was a rib of the CSCE: its convening and its mandate 
had been included in the final document of Madrid after long 
                                                          
615 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Citron, z.Z. Helsinki, an das Auswärtige Amt, 
11.11.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 346, p. 1716. 
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negotiations.616 Its participants were the same thirty-five member states 
of the CSCE. The CDE was an integral part of the multilateral complex 
on which rested European détente. It provided a parallel forum for 
political cooperation on security which flanked both the CSCE and the 
other multilateral and bilateral forums of negotiations on disarmament 
and armament control in place. Hence, its general aim was directed to 
enhancing security in Europe and favouring the overall improvement 
of East-West relations. According to the West German viewpoint, the 
conference in Stockholm served the purpose to show that East-West 
dialogue in the mid-Eighties was not exclusively dominated by issues 
of missiles deployment.617 This was a way to affirm that, 
notwithstanding the stationing of U.S. Pershing II on the West German 
territory, cooperation with the East in the field of security could and 
should continue.  
In times in which MBFR negotiations were permanently deadlocked 
and INF negotiations and superpower arms reduction talks had been 
broken off for an undefined period of time,618 Bonn identified in the 
CDE an adequate occasions to relaunch East-West dialogue on security. 
The recent success of the Madrid CSCE against the background of 
adverse international circumstances had reinforced the West German 
confidence in the means and potential of European détente. As long as 
relations of superpowers remained strained, the West German Foreign 
Office could continue to nourish its ambition of playing a propulsive 
role in East-West affairs. The FRG’s self-representation as a mediator 
between the East and the West still had in 1984 a two-fold meaning: it 
coincided with Genscher’s genuine ambition to pursue a more 
influential foreign policy; and it continued to serve the purpose of 
affecting public perceptions of Bonn’s foreign political decisions 
                                                          
616 Erklärung des Bundesministers am 26. Juni 1983 zum Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen, 
24.06.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, vol. 178.879; and Aufzeichnung des 
Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 16.06.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 181, p. 948. 
617 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse von Ploetz, 06.01.1984, in AAPD, 
1984, vol. I, doc. 3, p. 17. 
618 M. Sæter, “The CSCE Process: Problems and Prospects”, in Current Research on Peace 
and Violence, vol. 8, No. 3/4 (1985), pp. 133-136, p. 133. 
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positively. Particularly in the wake of the unpopular decision made by 
the federal government of proceeding with the stationing of new 
American weapons on the West German territory, matters of self-
representation were carefully handled by the Auswäertiges Amt in the 
public sphere. As an example, State Secretary Meyer-Landrut was 
meticulously instructed to highlight, on occasion of his participation in 
the popular television show Kontraste on Germany’s first broadcaster 
ARD, the central role played by the Bundesrepublik in bringing together 
the two superpowers during the last years of bipolar tension.619 
From the West German viewpoint, the general aims and foreign 
political usefulness of the CDE were consistent with the broader 
framework of multilateral détente. In order to repeat in Stockholm the 
successful outcome of the Madrid conference, there were a number of 
elements that the CDE should borrow from the experience of the CSCE. 
First, the West German Foreign Office aimed at reproducing at the 
CDE, mutatis mutandis, the structure laid down by the Helsinki Final 
Act.620 The partition of negotiations in thematic Baskets had provided a 
successful procedural solution at the CSCE: it had consented to pursue 
parallel negotiations in different areas with a certain autonomy, by 
keeping constantly an eye on improvements made in other fields. 
Drawing inspiration from the CSCE scheme, Bonn had in mind to 
divide the work at the CDE amongst different commissions working in 
parallel.621 This would allow interconnecting strategically separate 
negotiation tracks, i.e. to use Eastern interests in some areas to force 
concessions in other areas. This aim would be attained only in 
December 1984, as all delegations would decide to restructure the CDE 
in working groups, after one year of sterile negotiations.622 Second, the 
contents of the CSCE Basket I provided the basis for negotiations on 
disarmament. Indeed, the proposal package tabled by the Western 
delegations on 24 January 1984 built significantly upon the Helsinki 
                                                          
619 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse von Ploetz, 06.01.1984, in AAPD, 
1984, vol. I, doc. 3, p. 19. 
620 Ibid., p. 18. 
621 Ibid. 
622 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 99. 
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CBMs, by putting forward provisions for sizeable improvements and 
expansion of existing measures.623 Third, according to what West 
German diplomacy had always advocated at the CSCE, pragmatism 
should inform the conduction of negotiations: any “take it or leave it” 
approach should be put aside and Soviet conference interests – in the 
case of the CDE mainly ideological – should be strategically used to 
force Eastern delegations to make concessions on Western demands.624 
Moreover, there were other elements that the CDE shared with the 
CSCE: the high political rank of the conference, marked by the presence 
of the participants’ foreign ministers at the inaugural session; the 
grouping of delegations into a number of main groups (namely, the 
NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the NNA groups) and sub-groups 
(namely the EC-group – with a limited role – and the Nordic group – a 
loose gathering of NATO’s and NNA delegations coming from the 
same area) and the configuration of alliances (with NATO’s and NNA 
delegations sharing a common view notwithstanding different nuances 
with regard to single proposals and goals).625  
On its whole, Bonn’s idea of the CDE in Stockholm was consistent 
with the West German general conception of realistic détente and with 
the assessment of the West German possibilities of diplomatic success. 
This second element explained Bonn’s insistence that an important part 
of negotiations in Stockholm should be devoted – besides debates on 
concrete measures – to the discussion of the principle of renouncing the 
use of force.626 According to the West German position, debates on the 
formulation of the principle should start from the beginning of the 
conference. This idea contrasted with the approach to the conference of 
other Western partners, especially with the French one. France held a 
strong interest in the conference on disarmament, which originated 
from the initial idea formulated by Giscard d’Estaing in 1978 and which 
French diplomacy had been the first advocate of before and during the 
                                                          
623 For a more insightful analysis of the Western proposal package, see: ibid., p. 93. 
624 Aufzeichnung Botschafter Ruth, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 11, 18.01.1984, p. 56. 
625 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 96. 
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Madrid CSCE. As French Ambassador Andréani explained to West 
German State Secretary Meyer-Landrut in January 1984, Western 
delegations had to proceed in Stockholm according to the principle of 
“first things first”: i.e. negotiations should focus first on concrete 
measures; issues of principle could be eventually discussed in a 
ensuing phase, as conclusive crowning of the conference.627 Bonn 
opposed to the French position motivations which entailed, once again, 
general tactical considerations, its own foreign political interests, as 
well as its own vision of détente. The multilateral recognition of the 
principle of renouncing the use of force was a Soviet request which had 
consequently to be handled with some caution. It had been proposed 
by the Warsaw Pact in January 1983 and relaunched by Gromyko 
before the start of negotiations in Stockholm:628 the definition of a treaty 
on the non-use of force was one of the broad “political proposals” 
demanded by the Soviet foreign minister in order to remediate to the 
dangerous climate created by the NATO deployment.629 The 
recognition of the principle would provide further reassurance to the 
Eastern enduring security worries. It offered, moreover, an adequate 
handhold for Soviet ideological aims: after the armed track of NATO’s 
security strategy had been implemented, the Soviet bloc was compelled 
to rethink what the long-sought conference could be immediately used 
for.630 Bonn aimed at repeating the successful two-fold strategy Western 
delegations had devised at the Madrid CSCE when negotiating the 
CDE: first, the Warsaw Pact’s interest in attaining the principle of 
renouncing the use of force should be used as a lever to obtain Eastern 
concessions in other fields; second, Western delegations should commit 
themselves to the formulation of the principle, by shaping it as much as 
possible according to their own view and interest.631 Focusing on 
negotiations on the principle of non-use of force provided West 
                                                          
627 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse von Ploetz, 06.01.1984, in AAPD, 
1984, vol. I, doc. 3, p. 17 (footnote 19). 
628 The proposal was contained in the declaration of the Political Council of the Warsaw 
Pact which gathered in Prague on 4-5 January 1983: see AAPD, 1983, vol. I, p. 40. 
629 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 98. 
630 Ibid., p. 91. 
631 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Ruth, 19.03.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 85, p. 428. 
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German diplomacy, moreover, with other tactical advantages: namely, 
the West German delegation could aspire to play a more prominent 
role in discussions on non-use of force than in other negotiations areas 
wherein, given the more technical matters at stake, the positions of 
other NATO’s bigger partners would undoubtedly have greater 
weight. With regard to the contents of the principle of non-use of force, 
the FRG intended to reach in Stockholm the assertion of a common 
reinforced formulation entailing some potential for change: namely, the 
principle should be directed to overcoming the 1968 Brezhnev’s 
Doctrine and to avoiding the repetition of unilateral international 
intervention as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.632 A shared 
recognition of the principle of non-use of force, together with further 
improvements of the CBMs and an agreement in the field of 
conventional forces in Europe – which represented another primal 
conference interest of the FRG – would contribute, according to the 
West German viewpoint, to make East-West relations in the field of 
military security more stable and calculable in the immediate future.633 
The duality of stabilisation and change, underpinning the idea that 
pursuing stabilisation in the present would pave the way to change in 
the future and marking the theoretical approach of the Bundesrepublik to 
the CSCE process, was reconfirmed by the West German conception of 
what the Stockholm conference would and should be.  
The West German delegation, guided by Ambassador Klaus-Jürgen 
Citrus, committed itself to playing a propulsive role within the Western 
European caucus.634 As at the CSCE negotiations, the West German 
Foreign Office’s first task consisted in collecting the necessary 
consensus of the Western allies around its own conference aims. 
During the first months of 1984 West German diplomacy worked on 
convincing the sceptical Western partners – particularly the French and 
the Americans, who considered discussions on principles of secondary 
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importance and likely to be eventually postponed to the last phase of 
the conference 635 – of the opportunity to develop a common operative 
concept of non-use of force, in conformity with the Western conference 
goals and with the West German conception.636 A first signal of opening 
came from the U.S. administration in the late spring of 1984. In his 
Dublin’s speech on 4 June 1984, Reagan proposed to discuss at the 
Stockholm CDE the formulation of the principle of non-use of force in 
return for the Soviet commitment to negotiations on technical aspects 
of CBMs. The U.S. shift opened the way to the inclusion of the principle 
into the list of Western conference aims.637 Bonn’s Foreign Office 
welcomed this turn with satisfaction. But the meaning of Reagan’s 
move went far beyond the internal dynamics within the Western 
caucus, as well as beyond the strict development of the conference on 
disarmament in Stockholm. The American foreign political strategy 
towards the Soviet Union was preparing a major shift during the 
months of Reagan’s second election campaign which would bring to 
the President re-election on 6 November 1984. Reagan’s speech in 
Dublin contained, indeed, a much more relevant message: it 
represented an invitation directed to the other superpower to return to 
the main negotiation table and resume bilateral talks on nuclear arms 
reduction.638 
                                                          
635 The French and the Americans were the most sceptical. Andréani had repeated to 
Meyer Landrut in January 1984, what he had already explained to West German 
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negotiations on the principle of non-use of force as a lever to obtain concession from 
Moscow; but in the French strategy the formulation of the principle was postponed to an 
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vol. II, doc. 394. With regard to the U.S. position, President Reagan had pointed out in 
January 1984 that the issue was not amongst his priorities: “First, we need to find ways to 
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New ways for cooperation on security: the restart of the 
superpower dialogue in the mid-Eighties 
The first year of the Conference on Confidence and Security 
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe came to conclusion on 
14 December 1984 without any significant result.639 Negotiations had 
proceeded in a sterile manner through the largest part of the first 
conference year, under the influence of the lengthening impact of the 
NATO deployment of the fall of 1983.640 Between September and 
December 1984 debates had taken on a more business-like character – 
even though they had focused mainly on procedural issues – as a 
consequence of the beginning of a progressive shift in the Soviet 
attitude. By assessing what possible future developments would mark 
the CDE in the following year, West German chief delegator Citron 
observed that, in respect with the CSCE, the destiny of the conference 
in Stockholm would more strongly depend on the willingness to 
negotiate of the superpowers.641 The unfolding of the Stockholm CDE 
during 1984 coincided with a moment of transition in East-West 
relations. The balance of power between the two Cold War blocs was 
under redefinition after the implementation of the armed track of 
NATO’s dual-track decision. In its wake, the Soviet bloc started a 
process of redefinition of its security strategy and international 
interests. The U.S. administration was preparing to shift its political 
course towards the Soviet Union. The balance of power between 
European detente and superpower détente was undergoing a major 
change as well. 
The works of the CDE would continue until September 1986, when 
an agreement would be reached in Stockholm. It would be the first 
                                                          
639 The fourth negotiation round took place between 6 November and 14 December 1984; 
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important agreement in the field of security since the formulation of the 
1975 Helsinki’s CBM-provisions and the 1979 signing of SALT II.642 It 
would be also the first agreement signed in the new era of superpower 
dialogue which slowly began in the mid-Eighties. Being the CDE an 
emanation of the CSCE process, its concluding document represented 
an important improvement in the field of the CSCE security chapter.643 
Hence, its successful conclusion could be interpreted more as an 
outcome of the restart of American-Soviet negotiations rather than an 
achievement of European détente. It marked the omen of a changing 
trend: bilateral superpower talks on arms reduction would provide the 
decisive forum where important decisions in the field of security would 
be taken in the second half of the Eighties. Against West German 
aspirations, multilateral negotiation frameworks – as the CDE in 
Stockholm, MBFR negotiations in Vienna and the UN Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva – would represent quite secondary stages.  
The declared aim of the conference in Stockholm was to relaunch 
East-West dialogue and mark the beginning of a new phase of 
cooperation in Europe.644 In January 1984, directly before the conference 
start, West German Ambassador at the NATO headquarters Ruth had 
predicted that the conference in Stockholm could “give a hint to a 
profound process of rethinking in Moscow”.645 The prediction of a 
CDE’s influence on political changes in the Soviet Union turned out to 
be overrated. A major political shift did occur in the Soviet Union in the 
mid-Eighties. Its preparation and realisation was mainly interwoven 
with the return of the superpower dialogue on the international stage.  
On 7-8 January 1985 the American and Soviet foreign ministers met 
in Geneva to resume talks on disarmament. Schultz und Gromyko 
decided to restart negotiations on disarmament with the common goal 
of taking effective actions to reduce nuclear intercontinental and 
middle-range weapons, to hinder the space arms race and to reinforce 
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strategic stability.646 This bilateral meeting marked the gradual return 
of the superpower dialogue which would dominate East-West relations 
in the second half of the 1980s. The restart of Soviet-American talks on 
arms control and disarmament was a slow-moving process on which 
the numerous conflicts and episodes of mistrust of the previous years 
weighed importantly. Its path was shaped by important domestic 
developments occurring both in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. 
between 1984 and 1985.  
With regard to the USSR, old Soviet leader Andropov died in 
February 1984 after a long illness and was replaced by another old 
apparatchiki, Konstantin Chernenko, who would die as well only a 
year after, in March 1985.647 The youngest member of the Politburo was 
elected as Chernenko’s successor thanks to the decisive vote of Andrei 
Gromyko: on 11 March 1985 the time of Mikhail Gorbachev as new 
leader of the USSR was inaugurated, marking an epochal change in the 
Soviet domestic and foreign political course. With regard the other 
superpower, a major foreign political shift occurred in the U.S. within a 
framework of power continuity. During the unfolding of his second 
presidential election campaign in 1984, Ronald Regan decided to 
change the direction of his foreign political program: the assertive anti-
Soviet tones which had dominated Reagan’s first mandate were 
replaced by repeated invitations to Moscow to focus on the shared 
interests of the superpowers and work together on the reduction of 
nuclear armaments.648 
Reagan’s invitations to renewed superpower cooperation did not go 
unheard. After Soviet initial hesitation, a first step towards the restart 
of superpower talks on arms reduction took place in the fall of 1984, as 
Reagan and Schultz met Gromyko on 26 and 28-29 September in New 
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York in the margins of the UN General Assembly.649 In their respective 
addresses in front of the General Assembly, both Reagan and Gromyko 
reaffirmed the superpowers’ responsibility for the management of the 
world affairs. Reagan proposed to Gromyko regular talks on regional 
questions and greater commitment to achieving concrete results at the 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna, at the Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm, and in the 
field of nuclear armaments.650 These initiatives for renewed bipolar 
cooperation were observed and assessed with some caution in Bonn. 
Reagan’s willingness to resume negotiations with Moscow 
undoubtedly pleased West German needs for a relaxation of East-West 
relations. However, Bonn’s Foreign Office looked with some 
preoccupation at the hidden risks of resurgent bilateralism: the fact that 
Europe had been addressed as a “regional problem” in Reagan’s and 
Gromyko’s speeches in front of the UN General Assembly roused 
concerns about a possible limitation of that relative room of manoeuvre 
that European initiatives had hardly gained in the course of the last 
decade.651 Quite significantly, when assessing the resuming of talks 
between the superpowers, the West German Foreign Office pointed out 
that: “our statement ‘we cannot replace the dialogue between the 
superpowers’ should now be paralleled by an U.S. similar statement 
affirming its will not to replace the European and CSCE partners’ 
efforts for dialogue, cooperation and stability in Europe. Both forms of 
dialogue have to complete each other”.652 The other face of the desire of 
protecting multilateral détente from the turbulences of the superpower 
relationship was the wish to protect the prosecution of multilateral 
détente from the superpower monopoly over the management of East-
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West dialogue. Even though the resuming of American-Soviet 
negotiations was still in embryo in the second half of 1984, it is 
interesting to see how rapidly the West German Foreign Office 
identified the intrinsic perils that this return could involved for its 
ambitions of playing an influential international role between the East 
and the West. 
Times had changed since the early Seventies, when the parallel 
projects of European détente and superpower détente had been 
conceived and first put into practice. The conditions underlying 
Washington’s decision to move towards a more cooperative course 
with Moscow were profoundly different in the mid-Eighties: the U.S. 
administration proposed now to negotiate on arms control from an 
established position of undisputed force. Similarly, the reasons of the 
Soviet consent were different: in the course of the Eighties the USSR 
growingly needed to relieve itself of its most burdensome military 
encumbrances.653 As Romero has rightly observed, Washington’s return 
to dialogue in the mid-Eighties did not represent a return to Kissinger’s 
project of superpower détente.654 The framing conditions of European 
détente had changed as well. As the momentum of convergence with 
the interests of the superpower dialogue had disappeared, European 
détente had learnt to survive on its own legs. European détente – 
namely the CSCE process – had undoubtedly had the great merit of 
allowing East-West dialogue not to be interrupted during the tensest 
years of the bipolar relationship. However, its triumph by default over 
superpower détente had led some of its participants – the FRG on the 
frontline – to somewhat overestimate its international role within the 
broader framework of Cold War relations. As it has been analysed in 
the previous chapters, the FRG, as one of the key player of European 
détente, had developed a good deal of self-confidence in the potential 
for change of European détente in the course of the troubled unfolding 
of the CSCE. West German Foreign Minister Genscher stressed in front 
of his NATO partners, once again in December 1984, that the CSCE 
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process provided the adequate political framework for the pursuit of 
the superpower dialogue, by completing it thanks to the manifold 
nature of its contents.655 Bonn’s insistence on including the re-emergent 
superpower dialogue into a single, comprehensive landscape was 
largely motivated by the desire to continue to have its say in matters 
directly affecting West German vital national and international 
interests; and by the aspiration not to renounce to the international 
room of manoeuvre Bonn’s diplomacy had conquered with great effort 
during the last decade.  
 
A symbolic year: commemorating the common past, looking to the 
common future 
1985 was an important year from a symbolic viewpoint. Two 
important anniversaries fell within the space of few months: they both 
were of particular significance for the FRG. The first was the fortieth 
anniversary of the end of WWII and of the Potsdam conference. The 
recurrence reminded West Germans of the painful origins of their 
democratic rebirth and of the territorial, political and psychological 
restrictions which still affected their national and international identity. 
The second was the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords, i.e. of the founding act of the multilateral process of détente 
which had provided the FRG with vaster foreign political possibilities 
and had contributed to reinforce its international emancipation.  
The two anniversaries were tied by a fil rouge which intertwined 
Germany’s past, present and future. They touched some West German 
very sensitive nerves: whilst the first recalled the roots of Germany’s 
and Europe’s division, the second addressed the possibilities for its 
future overcoming. Hence, it is not surprising that the respective 
organisations of both celebrations interacted with each other as well. 
The West German Foreign Office tried deliberately to establish a 
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linkage between the organisation of the celebrations for the anniversary 
of WWII’s conclusion and the organisation of the ceremony for the first 
ten years of European détente. Being important matters of West 
German international image involved in the celebration of both 
anniversaries, the ceremonies in their memories were carefully 
prepared within the Auswärtiges Amt and by West German diplomacy 
already starting from 1984. 
West German diplomatic efforts were devoted to shape the political 
meaning of the upcoming celebrations of the year 1985, as much as 
possible, according to the FRG’s view. The anniversary of the 
conclusion of WWII was particular worrisome for Bonn. The federal 
government’s aim was avoiding that the focus of celebrations would 
excessively lay on the issue of Germany’s defeat.656 A demonstration of 
what Bonn feared that the ceremony on 8 May 1985 would turn into 
was provided by the celebrations of the D-Day on 6 June 1944, i.e. of 
the landings operation which had marked the beginning of the 
liberation of German-occupied Western Europe. The dilemma whether 
a West German delegation would be present at the commemorative 
ceremony in Pointe du Hoc represented for Bonn a crucial issue of 
great diplomatic significance. The list of invites was limited to all those 
who could be counted amongst the winners of the Normandy landings: 
the heads of state and government of the six countries which had 
participated in the military operation, namely the U.S. President, the 
British Queen, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Kings of Norway and 
Belgium, the Queen of Netherlands; the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, 
who had participated in the landing at Normandy as an officer of the 
British army; and the ministers of defence of those countries whose big 
contingents of soldiers had taken part in the operation, namely Poland, 
Denmark, Greece and Czechoslovakia.657 The configuration of the 
ceremony for the D-Day seemed to be marked by a symbolically 
divisive character which greatly displeased Bonn. The Auswärtiges Amt 
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had informed its three big Western allies – France, the U.S. and the U.K. 
– of its preference for shaping celebrations, as far as it was possible, as a 
forward-looking event whose meaning should not be limited to a mere 
memory of the past. Celebrations in Normandy should be respectful, 
according to the words of West German Ambassador in Paris Scholler, 
of “the present position of the Bundesrepublik as a democratic 
constitutional state and a loyal member of the Western Alliance and of 
the European Community”.658 Bonn was aware of the fact that the 
German past imposed unavoidable duties and responsibilities, with 
whom the FRG had to cope with. Bonn’s attempt was directed, 
however, to transform the commemoration of the past into an occasion 
of reaffirmed reconciliation. Initially, West German requests did not 
find positive reception in Paris. Indeed, as Ambassador Schoeller 
reported to Bonn, French President Mitterrand attached special 
importance to the commemoration of the landing at Normandy. The 
stress on reconciliation wished by West Germans would be more 
suitable as symbolic cornerstones of the celebrations of 8 May the year 
after.659 The awkwardness of the West German relations with its 
European allies with regard to their common but different past 
prevented Bonn from taking any assertive initiatives to convince Paris. 
The decision to rule out the presence of a West German delegation at 
the celebrations in Normandy was, however, reason of disappointment 
for Bonn. As it was assessed in the Auswärtiges Amt, the fact that the 
exclusion of the FRG at the commemorative ceremony on 6 June 1984 
fell in a month marked by numerous important meetings of the 
Western Alliance did highlight even more the enduring existence of 
demarcation lines amongst the Western partners.660 Ultimately, even 
though the FRG was not represented in Normandy, it received a moral 
reward through its mentioning in Mitterrand’s address in Pointe du 
Hoc. In the passage concerning the past confrontation with Germany, 
after remembering German war victims and partisans, the French 
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president reminded that: “L’ennemi de l’époque n’était pas l’Allemagne 
mais le pouvoir, le système, l’idéologie qui s’étaient emparés d’elle”.661  
Few months after the celebrations for the Normandy landings, 
another important anniversary was commemorated in France, this time 
in the presence of the West German Chancellor. On 22 September 1984 
Mitterrand and Kohl were together on the battlefield of Verdun to 
honour the victims of the longest battle of WWI, quintessence of the 
bloodbath marking Europe’s history at the beginning of the century. 
The symbolic value of the ceremony staged in Verdun was welcomed 
with coolness by a large part of the European press: most reports did 
not forget to highlight that it had the meaning of a palliative 
consolation for the exclusion of the West German chancellor at the 
fortieth anniversary of the D-Day.662 To the contrary, the celebration in 
Verdun was praised by Bonn’s federal government as an additional 
crucial reaffirmation of the solidity of the French-German entente. 
From a pragmatic viewpoint, the spirit of reconciliation dominating in 
Verdun gave clear indications, according to Bonn, on the right way to 
follow for remembering the past in view of the upcoming anniversaries 
of 1985.663  
The commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the conclusion of 
WWII on 8 May 1945 represented, for several reasons, a delicate 
appointment for the FRG. It was the day of remembrance of Germany’s 
defeat. It recalled the responsibilities of the Nazis for the rage of the 
war and for the crimes committed against humanity. It reminded the 
Germans and the world of the clear-cut division between Europe’s 
liberators and war winners on the one side and Europe’s occupants and 
war defeated on the other side. The issue of war’s defeat still remained 
in the Eighties a sensitive issues for the FRG: for a country which had 
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built its postwar identity on the pursuit of a full integration into the 
family of Western democracies, every element or circumstance echoing 
back to the existence of a German special path was carefully handled 
by the West German federal government. Quite significantly, in an 
internal paper drafted by ministerial director Pfeffer on the issue of the 
commemoration of 8 May, the formulation according to which “the 
defeat of Germany had paved the way to the rebirth of democracy in 
the Western part of the country” was replaced by the recognition that 
“Hitler’s fall had led to the liberation of Western Europe and to the rebirth of 
democracy in the Western part of the country”.664 It was not only 
opportune to single out Hitler’s responsibilities for Germany’s defeat; it 
was of the utmost importance, as well, to tie Germany’s destiny to the 
common European destiny. 
Even though the FRG had managed to consolidate over the postwar 
decades its position as an integral part of the Western Alliance, the 
burden of the past continued to affect the country’s relations with its 
Western partners. The fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII 
reminded Bonn of another bitter truth, i.e. that its national settlement 
remained dependent on the decisions of its allies.665 The former capital 
of the German Reich was the quintessential symbol of this lasting 
dependency: decisions about the arrangement for postwar Germany 
had been taken in Berlin; questions concerning the status of the divided 
city continued to be item of regular debate between Bonn, its allies and 
the Soviet Union throughout the whole duration of the Cold War.666 
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Hence, the U.S. proposal to organise a commemorative ceremony on 8 
May 1985 in the city of Berlin did not enjoy the West German favour. 
As pointed out by the Auswärtiges Amt in an internal paper, the FRG 
did not want to appear, on occasion of the anniversary of the end of 
WWII, as an object of international affairs.667 As Kohl confirmed to 
Reagan in the course of his visit to Washington at end of November 
1984, the West German federal government intended to take care of the 
anniversary and to take part in the celebrations together with the 
Western allies.668 Bonn’s idea was to shape the commemoration of the 
anniversary as a celebration of reconciliation between former enemies, 
by lessening distinctions between winners and losers: whilst an “East-
West Verdun” did not seem to be feasible because of the tense state of 
international relations, a sort of “Verdun within the Western Alliance” 
could be instead realised.669 Insisting on the aspect of reconciliation 
implied, according to the West German viewpoint, not restricting 
celebrations to the mere commemoration of the past, but focusing 
instead of the ensuing positive developments that had sprung from the 
conclusion of the war.  
It was during his talks with American Secretary of State Schultz at 
the end of 1984 that Genscher advanced the proposal of tying the 
commemoration on 8 May 1985 with the celebrations of the tenth 
anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.670 This operation 
would offer the possibility to commemorate Europe’s common past, 
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looking at the same time towards Europe’s common future. Bonn had 
put a peculiar stress on the future-oriented character of the CSCE since 
its origins, by advocating the idea that the steady improvement of the 
process of détente would create the favourable conditions for the 
overcoming of the continent’s division and for the solution to the 
German question. In 1985 the future-oriented character of the CSCE 
process served to another purpose as well: i.e. to cope with the most 
problematic aspects of the remembrance of the German past and with 
its enduring legacies still weighing on the FRG’s international image. 
The linkage with the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the 
end of WWII helps explain Bonn’s insistence, in the course of 1984, on 
the necessity of preparing carefully the celebrations of the tenth 
anniversary of the CSCE and deciding in due time at what political 
level the ceremony in Helsinki would take place.671 Genscher sponsored 
the idea of gathering at the level of foreign ministers, as he had done 
beforehand when preparing the Madrid CSCE. The process of 
European détente continued to require the highest political 
commitment of its participants. As commented by West German 
foreign policy analyst Christoph Bertram: “foreign ministers would go 
to Helsinki not just for a class reunion of memories; they could instead 
continue to work on shaping the future.”672 
 
Celebrating ten years of European détente: a final reappraisal 
As Genscher has recalled in his memoirs, the celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of the CSCE, which took place in Helsinki between 31 July 
and 1 August 1985, was mainly a West German initiative.673 According 
to the West German wish, the foreign ministers of the thirty-five 
participant states of the CSCE participate in the ceremony in the 
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Finnish capital. The significance of the gathering limited itself to its 
symbolic value: neither the thirty-five foreign ministers agreed on a 
common declaration – apart from proclaiming their vague willingness 
to continue the CSCE process and deepen cooperation in the field of 
economy and environment – nor any tangible impulse was given to the 
future development of the CSCE.674 The real element of novelty of the 
ceremony in Helsinki was represented by the international debut of 
new Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.675 After Soviet foreign 
policy had been under Gromyko’s steady direction for 27 years, 
Shevardnadze’s appointment was surrounded by diffuse curiosity and 
many expectations in Western Europe. 
Hence, at the celebrations of European détente everyone’s eyes were 
focused on the superpowers. As contemporary policy analyst 
Christoph Bertram commented, relations between the superpowers in 
Helsinki were very affable.676 If on the one hand Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze recalled in his speech at the plenary session the 
urgent necessity of peaceful coexistence,677 on the other hand U.S. 
Secretary of State Georg Schultz spoke in Helsinki of the possibility of 
opening a “new era” of international politics.678 Similarly to the CDE in 
Stockholm, the meeting in Helsinki on 31 July-1 August 1985 did 
represent more a test for the willingness to cooperate of the 
superpowers rather than a test for the willingness to improve the 
process of European détente. The significance of the Soviet-American 
encounter in the Finnish capital was mainly assessed by commentators 
and foreign policy analysts of the time through the lenses of the 
upcoming bilateral appointment of November 1985, when Reagan and 
Gorbachev would meet for the first time. It would be the first time that 
a U.S. president and a Soviet leader would come face to face with each 
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other since the last meeting between Carter and Brezhnev in 1979.679 
Quite significantly, Gorbachev gave evidence of some new flexibility in 
foreign policy before the CSCE foreign ministers gathered in Helsinki 
to celebrate European détente. The new Soviet leader advanced the 
proposal, first, of a unilateral moratorium for all nuclear tests starting 
from 6 August 1985 – date of the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of 
Hiroshima – and lasting until the end of the year. Second, the Kremlin 
smoothed its position on the American SDI project during the arms 
reduction talks in Geneva. The Soviet delegation opened, just before the 
conclusion of the second negotiation round, to the possibility of 
implementing research programmes in the field of anti-ballistic missile 
defence systems under certain conditions; moreover, it declared its 
availability to discuss the possible dismantling of about 30 percent of 
its missile delivering systems and nuclear warheads.680  
Whether and to what extent the improvement of European détente 
would benefit from the return of superpower initiative in the field of 
East-West dialogue was unclear in the summer of 1985. According to 
Christoph Bertram, looking back at the developments of the previous 
decade helped answer to the question what the CSCE process could 
and could not be in the future.681 In the past ten years of CSCE, setbacks 
had been paralleled by important achievements. First, the Helsinki 
framework had provided protection for the slow but steady process of 
change in the Soviet bloc. After Helsinki, transformations in the field of 
East-West contacts had been pursued by the West with the forced 
connivance of the Soviet bloc’s communist regimes. Second, the CSCE 
process had affirmed itself as an important form of diplomacy by 
instalment wherein the ball of dialogue remained steadily in game. 
This had allowed, third, Europeanising and stabilising East-West 
relations in times of major bipolar tensions. 682 However, the question 
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the participants of the CSCE were compelled to answer to in the 
summer of 1985 was whether the framework of the process of 
European détente would still be valid in the future under changing 
international conditions.683 In an interview released in August 1985, 
Genscher declared that East-West relations were at the beginning of a 
new era in which the West German Foreign Office would continue its 
realistic policy of détente with unchanged efforts.684 
The CSCE process had always represented an important indicator of 
the state of health of bipolar relations. Once more, the 1985 gathering of 
the CSCE foreign ministers in Helsinki served the purpose to test the 
direction of the changing dynamics East-West relations were going 
through. The return of the superpower dialogue changed the 
conditions that had underlain the unfolding of multilateral détente. 
Whereas Genscher declared he was intended to give new impulse to 
his realistic détente policy towards the East, it was evident that Bonn’s 
foreign political possibilities would be compelled to cope with the 
ongoing redefinition of Cold War dynamics. As argued by Bertram, in 
this new phase of East-West relations the FRG seemed not to play a 
central role for the first time since the late Seventies.685 After his 
appointment, Gorbachev had decided to travel first to Paris and Rome; 
similarly, his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met Genscher only at the 
end of his tour of visits in the Western European capitals.686 Times had 
changed since the era of Schmidt’s Eastern diplomacy of state visits. 
The lower profile of West German diplomatic initiatives towards the 
East was certainly affected, first, by Kohl’s international vision, which 
privileged a pronounced preference for the special relationship with 
the U.S.; and second, by the enduring opposition to proactive Eastern 
initiatives shared by some large sectors of the CDU. However, 
Genscher’s aspirations to play a propulsive role in the process of East-
                                                          
683 Ibid. 
684 “Genscher warnt vor Wechselbädern”, in Der Spiegel, 32/1985, 05.08.1985. 
685 C. Bertram, “Ein Schlingerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblicke zehn Jahre 
nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985. 
686 “Genscher warnt vor Wechselbädern”, in Der Spiegel, 32/1985, 05.08.1985. 
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West rapprochement were challenged most importantly by the 
resumption of the superpower monopoly on East-West dialogue.  
To sum up, 1985 represented an important year of transition and 
redefinition for the FRG’s international identity. West German foreign 
policy was compelled to cope with some major challenges imposed 
both by the public confrontation with its own past and by the gradual, 
renewed shift in Cold War balances. Analysing how the West German 
international role was redefined and redefined itself against the 
background of the changing international conditions of the last Cold 
War years will be the important task of future historical research. 
 
  
240 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Assessing the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years 
1975-1985 
This thesis has shown that the West German Foreign Office 
undertook major efforts to allow the process of multilateral détente in 
Europe to continue and improve between 1975 and 1985, on the basis of 
the founding grounds laid down in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. These 
efforts aimed primarily at protecting the achievements of East-West 
dialogue from the renewed exacerbation of bipolar tensions which 
marked international relations between the late Seventies and early 
Eighties. This work does not discard traditional interpretations 
according to which the CSCE represented for the FRG the necessary 
multilateral framework to embed its dynamic policies towards the GDR 
(Deutschlandpolitik) and the Soviet bloc (Ostpolitik) and make them 
acceptable to the Western partners. However, it challenges the idea that 
the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy can be reduced to this single 
aspect. The multilateral guarantee of Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policies 
was only one side of a more complex foreign political project which 
involved manifold motivations and aims.  
After the formative years of negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki, 
the CSCE policy affirmed itself after 1975 as a solid foreign policy 
paradigm and a major foreign political priority of the FRG. Improving 
the process of multilateral détente was a genuine West German 
political interest. As it had been highlighted in this thesis, the 
Auswärtiges Amt dedicated a great deal of time and attention to the 
preparation of the CSCE meetings: the diplomatic work of coordination 
with the Western partners and negotiation with the Eastern and NNA 
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countries was sided by a careful planning within the Foreign Office. A 
load of papers addressing strategic considerations and political 
orientations, assessments of contingent conditions, course corrections, 
evaluations of reached outcomes and previsions of future 
developments were drafted by diplomats, officers and policy analysts 
working for the Auswärtiges Amt. Bonn’s engagement in the CSCE 
process implied a combination of ideal stances, vital national interests and 
foreign political ambitions. The analysis of their interweaving explains 
why the CSCE process represented a main German question in the years 
1975-1985: it involved, directly and indirectly, the manifold dimensions 
of the German question (question of intra-European borders and their 
change; definition of new shared rules of co-existence; question of trust 
building and mutual perceptions; duality of Westpolitik-Ostpolitik; 
issues of Germany’s image); it allowed the FRG to pursue its vital 
foreign political needs and interests; it provided the FRG with the 
framework wherein the federal government could merge the 
peculiarities of the country’s geopolitical position with its ambition of 
playing a more influential international role.  
Ideal inspiration 
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act added to the complex of Treaties 
negotiated and signed with the Eastern countries during the first 
successful phase of Bonn’s new Ostpolitik. On their whole they form the 
“constitutional” corpus of West German détente. With 
Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik Bonn’s CSCE policy shared the ideal 
horizon, too. The aim of building a new European order of peace, 
which had been the cornerstone of Bahr’s conception of Ostpolitik and 
had been mentioned by Willy Brandt in his acceptance speech on 
occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in 1971,687 was 
inherited and pursued by Genscher in the field of the CSCE. As the 
West German foreign minister unceasingly repeated in speeches and 
interviews, Bonn efforts should be directed to the reinforcement of the 
                                                          
687 For the text of Brandt’s speech of acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 
1971, see at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-
acceptance.html. 
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climate of détente in Europe which would create in the long-term the 
favourable conditions for German people to decide in self-
determination about their unification. The traditional view according to 
which Bonn’s Eastern policies suffered from a loss of visionary 
inspiration after the important achievements of the years 1969-1973 
does not stand scrutiny: the analysis of speeches and public 
interventions on issues of East-West dialogue during the second half of 
the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s shows that the idealistic thrust 
marking West German détente during its formative years remained 
nearly unchanged. As Konrad Seitz has put it in his introduction to the 
volume collecting a selection of Genscher’s speeches, for the West 
German foreign minister multilateral détente was Deutschlandpolitik and 
Deutschlandpolitik was multilateral détente.688 Contrary to the argument 
according to which the issue of “unification” disappeared from Bonn’s 
political agenda since the mid-Seventies, the process of multilateral 
détente provided the federal government with an adequate framework 
within which the discourse on the German reunification could be 
continued.689 Even though strict inner-German issues were always kept 
out of the multilateral negotiation agenda at the CSCE meetings both 
for Bonn’s and East Berlin’s own will, the proclaimed West German 
aim underpinning the process of multilateral détente remained always 
to keep the door open to the German reunification in the long-run. 
Bonn’s insistence on the importance of multiplying and expanding 
human contacts between the blocs – the primal goal pursued by West 
German diplomats at the CSCE negotiations – was certainly due to the 
wish of improving the present living-conditions of Germans living 
                                                          
688 K. Seitz, “Einleitung” in Deutsche Außenpolitik: ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, 1974-
1985, ed. H.D. Genscher, p. XVIII. 
689 Beside the CSCE, the UN was the other main stage were the discourse on German 
reunification was publicly addressed; references to the division-unification issue were 
mentioned by Genscher in his annual speech in front of the General Assembly in New 
York. See, for instance: Rede Genschers vor der 30. UNO-Generalversammlung, 24.09.1975, in 
PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.024; Rede Genschers vor der 34. UNO-Generalversammlung, 
27.09.1979, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.034; Interview Genschers anlässlich seiner 
Rede vor der 37. UNO-Generalversammlung, 07.10.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 
179.047. 
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beyond the Iron Curtain. However, it rested upon the awareness, as 
well, that improved every-day contacts would pave the way to a 
growing interdependence between the two German states and the two 
blocs.690  
Vital national needs 
The prosecution of the CSCE process was of primal importance for 
Bonn because it contributed to satisfy the country’s vital interests not 
only in the field of human contacts, but in the field of security as well. 
The peculiarity of West German security needs has been discussed in 
the introduction of the thesis. The FRG’s influence on decisions in the 
field of the military security was limited by the existing structural 
limitations to the country’s self-reliance in this area. Differently, Bonn’s 
diplomacy could aim at having a greater weight when discussing about 
security issues within the CSCE framework. This was mainly due to the 
existence of multiple interactions amongst the Helsinki Baskets: 
through crossed negotiations West German delegators could pursue 
the goal – not always successfully – to achieve results in some areas by 
making concessions in other areas. Confidence-building measures and 
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe were Bonn’s primal 
conference interests. They were an integral part of a broader security 
complex whose reinforcement was felt as more urgent as greater 
became the federal government’s perennial worries and uncertainties 
about the fragile East-West military balances in Europe. Security and 
détente had been intertwined constitutive dimensions of the common 
project of European détente since the times of the 1967 Harmel Report. 
This dissertation discards the view according to which issues of 
security dominated West German international initiatives and East-
                                                          
690 The achievements of the inner-German dialogue in the years of the Schmidt 
administration must be evaluated through the same lenses. Frequently defined “minor” if 
compared with the 1972 signing of the Basic Treaty, they laid instead fundamental and 
concrete grounds for the rapprochement between the two German states: one need only 
consider the permanent legacy of the project of construction of the highway connecting 
Hamburg with Berlin, which was successfully negotiated in the years 1978-1980. See: M. 
Roth, Zwei Staaten in Deutschland. Die sozialliberale Deutschlandpolitik und ihre 
Auswirkungen 1969-1978 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981). 
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West relations between the late Seventies and the early Eighties, by 
making the prosecution of a policy of détente nearly impossible. It 
suggests instead to look more carefully at the interaction of security 
and détente and to interpret it differently. Even though an accurate 
investigation of debates and negotiations in the field of security is out 
of the scope of the thesis, it has been attempted to take into 
considerations their interactions with the developments of the CSCE 
process. Their study prompts the following conclusion: not only did 
détente and security continue to belong to the same political project 
even in the years of renewed Cold War tension, but they were also 
correlated to each other in a complex way. Far from representing a 
mere hindrance to the prosecution of East-West dialogue, security 
issues offered the opportunity to give a new impulse to the CSCE 
process and rediscover a field of shared East-West convergent interest 
which would allow negotiations to achieve concrete improvements, as 
the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 has shown. 
Foreign political ambitions 
West German efforts in the pursuit of multilateral détente were 
dictated, moreover, by Bonn’s ambitions to develop a more self-reliant 
and assertive international identity. The country’s overwhelming 
economic strength and assumption of new international tasks – for 
instance, the ones deriving from the FRG’s first appointment as rotary 
member in the UN Security Council – nourished the West German 
federal government’s awareness of the necessity to have its voice more 
clearly heard in the realm of world affairs. The CSCE policy was 
mentioned in Genscher’s memoirs as one of the three pillars – beside 
the UN policy and the engagement for the project of European Union – 
which built Bonn’s new foreign policy of growing international 
responsibility.691 There was awareness in Bonn that the solution to the 
German question – at least to its psychological aspects linked to 
widespread fears of a perennial German threat – passed through the 
demonstration that Germany could play a different, responsible role in 
Europe. Hence, the pursuit of multilateralism – and in the specific of 
                                                          
691 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 299-402. 
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multilateral détente – by Bonn aimed at the assertion of the FRG as a 
more influential European power. It wasn’t a coincidence that Bonn’s 
efforts were directed to the reinforcement not only of the process of 
détente but of the political and foreign political identity of the EC as 
well.692 In this sense, Bonn’s CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985 has to 
be collocated within a game played mostly within the Western caucus. 
As it has been analysed in the course of this study, an important part of 
the West German diplomatic efforts were directed, both during the 
preparation and the unfolding of the CSCE meetings, to coordinating 
and negotiating with the Western partners. The Western coordination 
within both the smaller EC-caucus and the larger NATO-caucus proved 
to be problematic in many occasions over the decade under study. The 
numerous changes of leadership in the Western countries contributed 
to the reconfiguration of the landscape of relations and balances within 
the Alliance. The evolution of the FRG’s role within the Western 
Alliance coincided in time and interacted with this broader process of 
redefinition transatlantic relations underwent in these years. 
The reasons of the West German special interest in the CSCE were 
twofold. Fist, the multilateral dimension of the process of European 
détente offered the adequate conditions for Bonn to take more dynamic 
initiatives. The necessary coordination with the Western partners set 
the limits of the FRG’s ultimate decisions: as it has been analysed in the 
course of the work, Bonn could not allow itself to bear the risk of 
diplomatic isolation. This provided the antidote against the allies’ 
enduring fears of a FRG’s solo turn to East, of its possible decision to 
opt for neutrality and of its return to great power politics. However, the 
large composition of the diplomatic forum allowed West German 
diplomacy to use multiple negotiation channels and take a wide range 
of diplomatic initiatives at multiple levels within the Western caucus, 
                                                          
692 Genscher was a convinced promoter, together with his Italian colleague Emilio 
Colombo, of the initiative for relaunching the process of European integration by 
developing its political dimension and proposing the expansion of the EC’s powers and 
coordination into new policy areas. For an historical analysis of the origins and adoption 
of the 1981 Genscher-Colombo Initiative, see: U. Rosengarten: Die Genscher-Colombo-
Initiative. Baustein für die Europäische Union, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008). 
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with the NNA countries and the Eastern counterparts. It was on this 
diplomatic work behind the scenes that Bonn focused its attention and 
efforts in order to pursue its foreign political goals in autonomy. 
Second, the CSCE process was the most suitable framework wherein 
Bonn could cultivate its ambitions of playing a political lead role within 
the Western caucus in the field of East-West dialogue which would 
parallel the country’s undisputable leadership in the field of economy. 
Given the geographic structure of the CSCE, the FRG could use the 
peculiarities of its geopolitical position – collocated in the centre of the 
continent (Mittellage) and on the outskirts of the Western bloc 
(Randlage) – to perform the role of natural mediator between the East 
and the West. The CSCE encouraged Germany’s traditional Central 
European vocation: not coincidentally, frequent references to the 
inheritance left by the East-West policies of Weimar Republic’s Foreign 
Minister Gustav Stresemann emerged from Genscher’s explanations of 
his multilateral détente policy.693 Hence, the trajectory of the CSCE 
policy in the years 1975-1985 could be read through the lenses of a 
vaster process of growing West German self-confidence and 
emancipation in foreign policy. Assessing this process requires to take 
into due account both its achievements and shortcomings. 
Achievements were manifold: the dialogue with the East continued in 
spite of bipolar major tensions; channels of dialogue remained open 
even when the conditions for material agreements lacked; the U.S. 
administration remained involved in the process of European détente, 
even though it did not share either its aims and methods; East-West ties 
increasingly grew and improvements in the different areas covered by 
the Helsinki Final Act were realised. Those results were valuable for 
Bonn for their tangible impact as well as for reasons of diplomatic 
                                                          
693 Gustav Stresemann devoted his efforts as foreign minister of the Weimar Republic in 
the years 1923-1929 to a comprehensive international policy of reconciliation both with 
the West and the East. For an historical account of the figure of Gustav Stresemann, see: 
J.R.C. Wright, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar’s greatest statesman (Oxford et al.: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). With regard in particular to his foreign political project, see: P. 
Krüger, “Zur europäischen Dimension der Außenpolitik Gustav Stresemanns“, in 
Politiker und Bürger. Gustav Stresemann und seine Zeit, ed. K.H. Pohl (Göttingen: 
Vadenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002). 
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prestige: being the country which invested most efforts into the project 
of multilateral détente, the FRG perceived any advancement attained 
on the front of the CSCE as its own diplomatic victory. As described in 
the preceding chapters of this work, in several occasions the FRG 
overestimated the effectiveness of its diplomatic means. Neither was 
Bonn able to persuade the U.S. administration to undertake a more 
pragmatic course in Belgrade and Madrid; nor was it able to bear the 
risks of diplomatic isolation within the Western Alliance. Suspicions 
about the ultimate aims of Bonn’s special interest in continuing East-
West dialogue in spite of major bipolar tensions re-emerged regularly 
in the debate within the Western Alliance. It was especially in the years 
1981-1982 – the most difficult years in the trajectory of the CSCE 
process, when many within the Western caucus took into serious 
account the opportunity of changing foreign political course towards 
the East – that the FRG returned to be placed under special 
surveillance. A problem of trust and perceptions continued to be an 
integral part of the German question. West German attempts to change 
its international image brought only to partial results. The long-lasting 
limitations to Bonn’s foreign policy did not only draw the borders 
within which West German diplomacy could chase to reinforce its 
general international action; but they did limit the political and 
psychological West German room of manoeuvre within the framework 
of the CSCE as well.  
 
Assessing the trajectory of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years 
1975-1985 
Another conclusion which emerges from this study is that the FRG’s 
CSCE policy underwent a major process of qualitative change in the 
years after 1975. Contrary to the scholars’ general trend to focus on the 
genesis of the CSCE and on the formative years of Bonn’s involvement 
in multilateral détente negotiations, the significance of this consecutive 
evolution deserves greater attention. The trajectory of Bonn’s 
multilateral policy of détente in the years 1975-1985 represented a step-
by-step learning process, where setbacks and crises turned into 
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occasions of revision and correction. Episodes of crisis played a 
formative role in the evolving process of Bonn’s multilateral détente 
strategy. Crisis is an ancient word, which originally indicated the act of 
separating the wheat from the chaff; as the etymology of the word 
suggests, crises represent occasions of rethinking, where decisions are 
to made about what one had to preserve and what one had to get rid 
of. This was the case of the process of partial revision the West German 
détente strategy went through in the late 1970s: the stall of the CSCE 
process and the climate of growing crisis coming into being in the 
landscape of East-West relations urged Bonn to make some decisions 
about what its détente policy had to focus on and renounce to. 
The theoretical grounds underpinning the West German 
participation in the CSCE remained nearly unchanged since Helsinki 
onwards: a pronounced continuity regarded its general aims and 
principles. To change were the strategies devised by Bonn in order to 
deal with the concrete challenges the CSCE process was faced with 
from time to time. The West German Foreign Office gradually 
developed a realistic policy of détente, whose realism did not limit 
itself to good intentions but was growingly translated into practice. As 
chapters 2 and 3 have shown, even though the concept of “realistic 
détente policy” was formulated by the Auswärtiges Amt and advocated 
by Genscher amongst the Western allies in the aftermath of the first 
CSCE in Helsinki, it was only during the years spanning between the 
follow-up meetings of Belgrade and Madrid that the concept found 
new ways of coming into being. As major international challenges – 
primarily the Afghan and the Polish crises – affected directly the 
validity and continuation of the CSCE process, realism became 
synonym of increasing flexibility and adaptability. Flexibility implied 
to accept the separation between the levels of principles from the level 
of actions. During the preparation and the unfolding of the review 
conference of Madrid – under the boost of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, of the general deterioration of East-West relations, and of 
the imposition of martial law in Poland – Bonn learnt to look with more 
flexibility at the respect of the principles of geographic and functional 
integrity of multilateral détente. This meant, in the practice, that CSCE 
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negotiations could continue in spite of Afghanistan and Poland; and 
that détente improvements were to pursue at different speeds in 
different areas.  
The analysis of how West German diplomacy dealt with the East-
West dispute over missiles and the Polish crisis with regard to the 
CSCE process has revealed one Bonn’s important intuition: i.e. that 
serious episodes of crises could be used to the Western advantage, if 
managed with carefulness and discretion. The West German Foreign 
Office identified in the missiles and the Polish crises some potential for 
relaunching the CSCE process. In the case of the first, the Soviet wish to 
derail the implementation of the armed track of 1979 NATO’s decision 
was used to force the Soviet bloc to negotiations. In the case of the 
second, the CSCE’s potential beneficial effect on Poland’s stabilisation 
and liberalisation was used to convince the sceptical Western partners 
to continue negotiations in Madrid. Notwithstanding the partial 
success of the second strategy – especially with regard to the capability 
of persuading the U.S. administration to pursue a more moderate 
negotiation course – Bonn’s intuition remains important. It suggests an 
alternative interpretation of the role of the crises marking the years of 
the so-called second Cold War which does not limit itself to considering 
the harmful impact of these episodes of crisis on East-West relations 
but which takes into account their multi-faceted meaning. 
Pursuing a realistic détente policy meant, as well, being able to take 
into account with pragmatism the reasons and motivations of all parts 
involved into the CSCE process. As Genscher wrote in 1984: “The 
Helsinki Final Act could be signed because none of the participants 
aimed at attaining everything by expecting the others to cede 
everything. This had to remain valid for the future continuation of the 
CSCE process as well”.694 The lesson learnt from the Helsinki CSCE 
could be replicated at the follow-up meeting in Madrid after the 
misstep of Belgrade and after long, strenuous efforts to convince the 
U.S. administration to abandon its zero-sum approach to negotiations. 
As Bonn unceasingly repeated to Washington during the unfolding of 
                                                          
694 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 312. 
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the Madrid CSCE, the Eastern vital interest for a CDE and enhanced 
economic cooperation with the West could be turned to the West’s 
advantage and to the CSCE’s sake. Tying the Soviet bloc’s growing 
needs for cooperation in the security and economic fields to the 
advancement of the process of multilateral détente was the most 
important achievement the CSCE process could attain after Helsinki: it 
paved the way to the ensuing major developments of the last Cold War 
years.  
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